THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


GIFT  OF 

Kate  Gordon  Moore 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2007 


http://archive.org/details/contemporarytheoOOwenliala 


BY  PROF.  R.  M.  WENLEY. 


Contemporary     Theology     and     Theism. 
$1.25. 

Socrates  and  Christ.     A  Study  in  the  Phi- 
losophy of  Religion.    $2.40. 

Aspects  of  Pessimism.    $2.40. 

The  Preparation  for  Christianity  in  the 
Ancient  World.     (In  preparation.) 


CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 
AND  THEISM 


In  clever  hands  that  are  not  checked  hy  a  sufficient 
consciousness  of  the  whole,  the  Hegeliau  dialectic  may  be 
made  into  the  means  of  producing  a  seeming  proof  of 
anything.  —  Edward  Caikd 

While  denying  the  presence  and  activity  of  the  princi- 
ple of  reality  in  man's  thinking,  Lotze  still  attributes 
value  and  validity  to  its  results.  —  Henry  Jones 

No  positive  hypothesis  can  be  offered  as  a  substitute 
for  a  personal  God  which  is  not  either  an  abstraction 
from  personality,  and  therefore  demonstrably  unreal,  or 
an  abstraction  inconsistently  personified,  and  therefore 
demonstrably  untrue.  —  J.  R.  Illing worth 


,  fc ,  %Q  a^t-n,?*^ 


CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

AND  THEISM 


BY 

R.    M.    WENLEY 

D.  PHIL.   (GLASGOW) 

PROFESSOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY   IN   THE  UNIVERSITY  OP  MICHI- 
GAN J     FORMERLY     LECTURER   ON    PHILOSOPHY    IN 
THE    UNIVERSITY    OF    GLASGOW 


NEW    YORK 

CHARLES    SCRIBNER'S    SONS 
1897 


Copyright,  1897 
By  Charles  Scribner's  Sons 


©ntoersitg  Press 
John  Wilson  and  Son,  Cambridge,  U.S.A. 


3T 

as 


PREFATORY  NOTE. 

Nearly  three  years  ago  the  members  of 
the  Glasgow  University  Theological  Society 
were  kind  enough  to  invite  me  to  occupy  the 
Honorary  Presidency  of  their  association.  In 
this  capacity  it  became  my  duty  to  deliver  an 
Address  on  certain  aspects  of  contemporary 
theological  inquiry.  Since  that  time  I  have 
been  repeatedly  requested  to  publish  the  lec- 
ture in  accessible  shape,  and  I  have  been  told 
that  portions  of  it,  which  appeared  in  The 
Thinker,  were  sought  after  by  students  in 
the  United  States  and  in  Germany  as  well 
as  in  Scotland.  To  meet  this  request  more 
adequately,  the  materials  have  been  greatly 
extended ;  those  who  heard  the  Glasgow  lec- 
ture will  find  that  less  than  one-fourth  of 
the  present  volume  consists  of  the  consid- 
erations I  was  permitted  to  place  before 
them.     The   personal   tone    incident    to  the 


O  <ji  xjt  Jt  \j> ,  'w 


VU1 


PREFATORY  NOTE. 


lecture  form  has  for  the  most  part  been 
eliminated,  although  traces  of  it  may  still  be 
found  in  one  or  two  places. 

I  venture  to  express  the  hope  that  the 
book,  small  as  it  is,  may  to  some  extent 
subserve  the  function  to  which  the  original 
Address  was  subordinated,  —  that  of  leading 
students  to  frame  opinions  of  their  own  on 
these  questions. 

R.  M.  WENLEY. 

Ann  Aebor,  Michigan, 
November,  1896. 


CONTENTS. 

Introductory  :  page 

The  Theological  Situation 1 

Speculative  Theology: 

I.    The  General  Principles  of  the  Speculative 

School 11 

II.    The  Special  Conclusions  of  the  Speculative 

School 27 

III.  Criticism  of  the  General  Principles  of  the 

Speculative  School 39 

IV.  The  Treatment  of  Christianity  by  the  Spec- 

ulative School 60 

Kitsohlian  Theology  : 

I.    The  Presuppositions  of  the  Kitschlian  School      82 
II.     The  Special  Conclusions  of  the  Kitschlian 

School 95 

III.    Criticism  of  the  Ritschlian  Presuppositions    112 

The  Theistic  Problem: 

I.    Philosophy  and  Theological  Problems,  espe- 
cially Theism 125 

II.     Agnosticism  and  the  Theistic  Problem    .     .     135 
III.    The  Principle  of  Rationality 146 


X  CONTENTS. 

The  Theistic  Problem  {continued):  page 

IV.    Speculative  Gnosticism   and   the    Theistic 

Problem 162 

V.    Personality  and  the  Theistic  Problem  .    .    173 

Conclusion  : 

The  Final  Idealism 187 

INDEX 199 


CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 
AND  THEISM 


INTRODUCTORY 

The  Theological  Situation 

Little  more  than  a  decade  ago  an  impres- 
sion happened  to  be  prevalent  among  theolog- 
ical students,  my  college  contemporaries,  that 
their  subject  was  a  dry,  uninteresting  study. 
Indeed,  I  fear  that  not  a  few  were  wont  to 
indulge  themselves  in  the  very  doubtful 
luxury  of  contempt  as  they  approached  it. 
Time  tries  all,  however,  and  it  is  possible, 
after  an  interval  of  reflection,  not  only  to 
justify  a  complete  reversal  of  this  attitude, 
but  also  to  show  incidentally  that  such  an 
opinion,  especially  at  the  present  time,  must 
either  be  devoid  of  foundation  or  based  upon 
misconception.  To-day  each  of  the  several 
departments  of  theology  demands  a  scientific 
training,  and  so  the  preparation  for  any  one 
contributes  to  the  best  kind  of  education; 
while  theology  proper  is,  perhaps,  only 
equalled  by  speculative  biology  in  the  interest 
which  surrounds  its  most  pressing  problems. 
l 


2  CONTEMPORARY    THEOLOGY 

Thought  has  been  ceaselessly  moving,  and  we 
have  arrived  at  the  stage  when  a  new  depart- 
ure seems  highly  probable  —  a  departure  that 
cannot  but  be  fraught  with  deep  import  to 
the  moral  and  spiritual  life  of  the  generation 
in  which  we  live.  Moreover,  the  much- 
discussed  lectures  delivered  upon  the  Gilford 
Foundation  in  the  Scottish  universities,  the 
Hibbert  lectures  at  London  and  Oxford,  and 
the  lectures  provided  by  the  Ely  and  other 
Foundations  in  the  United  States  have  caused 
many  among  us  to  bestow  renewed  attention 
upon  the  questions  connected  with  the 
interpretation  of  religions,  particularly  of 
Christianity. 

At  the  outset,  in  order  to  keep  discuss- 
ion within  comparatively  narrow  limits, 
the  general  development  of  theology  during 
the  last  seventy  years,  say,  must  be  presup- 
posed. The  drawn  battle  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  between  the  upholders  of  rational- 
ism and  supernaturalism,  was  brought  to  an 
end  by  the  summary  methods  of  Kant  and 
Schleiermacher,  who  respectively  conducted 
the  contestant  groups  off  the  field.  There- 
after, for  a  considerable  period,  notwith- 
standing the  growth  of  theological  schools 


INTRODUCTORY  3 

with  terfets  inspired  by  these  formative  think- 
ers, importance  centred  in  philosophy.  The 
systems  of  the  elder  Fichte,  of  Schelling, 
and  of  Hegel  dominated  nearly  all  noticeable 
work.  In  spite  of  the  romantic  tendencies  of 
some  theologians,  and  the  refined  Spinozism 
of  others,  like  C.  H.  Weisse,  it  can  hardly  be 
said  that  either  Fichte  or  Schelling  succeeded 
in  creating  a  theological  following  of  his 
own.  Very  different  was  Hegel's  case. 
Numerous  and  influential  writers  gathered 
round  him,  and  applied  his  distinctive 
methods  to  religious  questions.  Men  such 
as  Marheineke,  Gdschel,  and  Daub  in  his 
third  stage,  devoted  themselves  to  a  restate- 
ment of  dogmas  directed  towards  bringing 
them  into  accord  with  the  forms  of  the 
Dialectic.  Their  contribution  is  to-day  of 
little  more  than  historical  interest  —  a  fact 
that  need  occasion  no  wonder  when  their  fre- 
quent lack  of  balance  is  remembered.  Daub, 
for  example,  hardly  inspires  confidence  when, 
in  his  anxiety  to  illustrate  progress  by  antag- 
onism, he  confers  the  divinity  of  Satanhood 
upon  Iscariot,  so  that  the  betrayer  may 
oppose  the  Master  on  something  like  equal 
terms.     The  truth    is   that   Hegel's   epoch- 


4  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

making  incentive  to  theological  progress  con- 
sists far  rather  in  the  central  conception  of 
his  thought  —  the  rationality  of  history  — 
than  in  the  peculiar  framework  with  which 
he  surrounded  it.  Accordingly,  the  new  era 
may  be  dated,  not  from  Marheineke  and  the 
rest,  but  from  Strauss,  Vatke,  and  F.  C. 
Baur. 

Their  achievement,  which  would  never 
have  been  accomplished  without  Hegel,  con- 
stitutes, as  we  shall  see,  a  permanent  factor 
in  contemporary  controversy.  When  the 
clouds  of  critical  dust  raised  by  the  scrimm- 
age (I  think  this  term  best  conveys  the 
remarkable  absence  of  dignity)  over  the 
Leben  Jesu  of  Strauss  had  to  some  extent 
subsided,  theologians  were  better  able  to  dis- 
criminate gains  and  losses.  And,  as  a  result, 
an  eclectic  tendency  appeared.  Of  this, 
Richard  Rothe  may  be  said  to  have  been 
the  most  distinguished  originator,  and  his 
Theologische  Ethik  marks  a  middle  point 
between  the  earlier  groupings  of  German 
theology  and  those  now  prevalent.  Rothe 
drew  elements  from  the  Hegelian  Right, 
from  Schelling's  follower  Oetinger,  and  from 
Schleiermacher.     His  work,  along  with  that 


INTRODUCTORY  5 

of  F.  C.  Baur  —  taking  names  for  movements 
—  furnishes  a  starting-point  for  more  modern 
theories.  Theology  proper,  in  the  classical 
speculative  line,  then  came  to  have  a  new 
Left  and  a  new  Right.  Biedermann,  Keim, 
Weizsacker,  and  Otto  Pfleiderer  are  chief 
representatives  of  the  one ;  Dorner  and  Bey- 
schlag,  with  whom  Ave  may,  perhaps,  name 
Bernhard  Weiss,  are  associated  with  the 
other.  Both  parties  maintain  what  is  prac- 
tically a  composite  scheme  —  the  former  be- 
ing swayed  most  by  the  results  of  speculative 
interpretation  and  historical  criticism,  the 
latter  by  the  desire  for  systematic  statement 
of  religious  doctrine,  as  it  affects  man  per- 
sonally. The  one,  in  short,  emphasizes  the 
objective,  the  other  the  subjective  aspect  of 
theology.  The  theories  represented  by  these, 
among  numerous  other  writers,  are,  as  a 
natural  result,  prone  to  mutual  inconsistency. 
They  at  least  agree  in  containing  philosophi- 
cal factors  derived  from  a  common  source  — 
no  small  matter,  indeed,  seeing  that  theology, 
like  religion,  has,  until  very  recent  times,  in- 
variably been  concerned  with  the  meaning  of 
the  universe.  Accordingly,  their  supporters 
combine  to  show  a  solid  front  against  that 


6  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

now  influential  theological  school  which  has 
sprung  up  within  the  last  twenty-five  years 
under  the  leadership  of  Albrecht  Ritschl. 
This,  winch  may  be  termed  the  theology  of 
the  end  of  the  century,  has  adopted  different 
premises.  It  derives  largely  from  the  scep- 
tical factor  in  Kant,  and  from  the  empiricism 
of  the  scientific  movement,  to  some  extent 
from  the  epistemology  of  Lotze,  and  to  a 
lesser  degree  from  the  subjective  theology  of 
Schleiermacher.  Broadly,  then,  these  two 
parties  confront  one  another.  They  have 
their  serious  internal  differences  —  as  be- 
tween Pfleiderer  and  Weiss,  or  between 
Herrmann  and  Bender  —  but  these  are 
comparatively  trivial  as  compared  with  the 
gulf  fixed  between  the  two  schools  as  a 
whole.  Accordingly,  it  must  be  our  effort 
to  understand  the  doctrines  and  aims  of 
each,  if  we  are  to  apprehend  the  problems 
with  which  at  this  moment  theology  is  face 
to  face. 

Before  proceeding  to  this  task,  it  may  be 
well  to  premise  further  that  the  progress  of 
German  theology  just  noted  is  not  without 
parallel  in  Britain  and  America.  During  the 
early  part  of  the  period,  no  doubt,  inefficient 


INTRODUCTORY  7 

means  of  intercommunication  rendered  recip- 
rocal influences  somewhat  feeble.  Never- 
theless, like  German,  English  theology  had 
its  rationalism  and  supernaturalism,  its 
pietism  or  subjectivity,  its  semi-sceptical, 
semi-empirical  exponents.  At  present,  too, 
the  new  Left  and  the  new  Right  are  not 
without  representatives  among  us,  and  the 
parallelism  is  likely  to  become  more  and 
more  striking.  Biedermann  and  Pfleiderer 
embody  theological  tendencies  not  widely 
different  from  those  of  Drs.  Everett  and 
Royce  of  Harvard,  Sterrett  of  Washington, 
Stewart  and  Menzies  of  St.  Andrews,  and 
the  late  Willam  Mackintosh  and  T.  H. 
Green;  while  Principal  Fairbairn  occupies  a 
middle  position  on  the  Right,  which  is  shared 
largely  by  Professors  Orr  and  G.  P.  Fisher, 
and  partly  by  Professors  Bruce  and  Briggs. 
Parallel  also  to  the  Right,  though  with  very 
considerable  variations,  due  to  the  influence 
of  Renouvier,  stands  Dr.  Flint.  Curiously 
enough,  too,  though  without  any  collusion, 
Matthew  Arnold  and  Mr.  Gladstone  furnish 
elements  of  agreement  with  the  Ritschlian 
standpoint,  which,  in  the  realm  of  Christ- 
ology,    was   to  some   extent  anticipated  by 


8  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

Macleod  Campbell,  and  which  has  not  been 
without  influence  over  that  independent  and 
rising  theologian,  Professor  Robert  Mackin- 
tosh, of  Manchester.  It  would  not  be  surpris- 
ing were  some  younger  Scottish  or  American 
theologian  to  furnish  us,  at  no  distant  date, 
with  an  authoritative  pronouncement  on 
Ritschlianism  from  the  vantage-ground  of 
discipleship ;  in  the  meantime,  however,  it 
would  be  premature,  and  probably  unfair,  to 
mention  names.  The  German  and  British- 
American  positions  differ  in  many  details, 
especially  as  concerns  such  development 
towards  Ritschlianism  as  we  can  at  present 
show.  But  interchange  of  opinion  is  incom- 
parably freer  than  it  once  was,  and  sub- 
stantially the  same  forces  are  at  work,  if 
allowance  be  made  for  the  predominance  of 
philosophical  considerations  on  the  conti- 
nent, and  of  ecclesiastical  ties  in  the  Eng- 
lish-speaking countries. 

The  most  recent,  and  in  many  respects  the 
most  remarkable,  of  Scottish  contributors  to 
this  discussion  says,  in  a  passing  reference  to 
method :  "  It  may  be  observed  in  general  that, 
when  a  controversy  is  carried  on  for  centuries 
on  any   subject   of   pressing    and    practical 


INTRODUCTORY  9 

human  interest,  without  reaching,  or  even 
tending  to  reach,  a  consistent  and  satisfactory- 
result —  a  result  so  commending  itself  to 
reason  as  to  command  universal  assent  —  the 
reflection  is  obvious  that  the  question  or 
subject  requires  to  be  looked  at  from  a  point 
of  view  above  that  to  which  the  disputants 
have  been  able  to  rise."1  Ability  thus  to 
overcome  half-truths  is  denied  to  all  but  a 
select  few.  Perhaps,  in  the  present  instance, 
a  sincere  desire  to  arrive  at  an  accurate  esti- 
mate of  the  positions  maintained  by  others, 
biassed  only  by  a  sincerer  desire  to  arrive  at 
the  truth,  may  subserve  a  similar,  if  less 
ambitious,  aim.  The  extreme  difficulty  of 
absolutely  setting  down  in  every  point  the 
doctrine  of  a  theological  school  must  not  be 
forgotten.  At  the  same  time,  entire  groups 
of  theologians  employ  substantially  identical 
first  principles,  and  formulate  deductions 
that  tend  practically  in  one  direction.  In 
short,  the  broad  outlines  on  which  we 
must  concentrate  attention  limn  themselves 
with  sufficient  clearness.  The  chief  restric- 
tion one  is   compelled  to  make   relates   to 

1  Wm.  Mackintosh,  The  Natural  History  of  the  Christian 
Religion,  p.  13. 


10  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

the  mediating  theologians  so  called.  For 
the  present  purpose  their  tendencies  are 
too  indefinite,  not  perhaps  regarded  as  a 
whole,  but  undoubtedly  on  certain  pivoting 
points. 


SPECULATIVE   THEOLOGY 

I.   The  General  Principles  of  the  Speculative 
School 

The  speculative  school,  to  which  we  now 
turn,  was  a  direct  product  of  the  Hegelian 
philosophy.  And,  no  matter  what  further 
elements  it  may  have  assimilated  since,  this 
system  still  remains  the  basis  on  which  the 
theology  is  founded.  Baur's  mildly  sarcastic 
criticism l  serves,  however,  to  remind  us  that, 
on  the  philosophical  presuppositions,  a  series 
of  new  developments  leading  beyond  the 
comparatively  orthodox  conclusions  of  Hegel's 
Beligionsphilosophie  was  inevitable.  Never- 
theless, the  Berlin  Lectures  are  the  real  point 
of  departure,  and  continue  to  furnish  the 
immanent  first  principles.  Even  experts, 
whose  main  interest  is  directed  to  detailed 
facts  of  religious  life  rather  than  to  general 
principles  of  development,  recognize  that 
Hegel  was   the  first  to  organize  systematic 

i  Cf.  Kirchengeschichte,  vol.  v.  p.  378. 


12  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

study  of  religion.  "  The  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  Kant's  and  Schleiermacher's  systems 
supplied  some  foundation  stones  on  which  to 
erect  a  philosophy  of  religion.  But  we  must 
recognize  Hegel  as  its  true  founder,  because 
he  first  carried  out  the  vast  idea  of  realizing, 
as  a  whole,  the  various  modes  for  studying 
religion  (metaphysical,  psychological,  and 
historical),  and  made  us  see  the  harmony 
between  the  idea  and  the  realization  of 
religion.  No  one  approaches  him  in  this 
respect."1  Naturally,  metaphysical  insight 
and  bias,  born  of  conviction,  swayed  him 
more  than  mere  learning.  At  the  same  time, 
it  is  to  be  remembered  that  he  had  mastered 
much  of  the  somewhat  meagre  array  of  facts 
then  accessible.  The  consequence  was  that 
the  problems  were  regarded  and  presented 
mainly  from  a  speculative  standpoint.  Hegel 
tries,  with  sublime  thoroughness  and  disre- 
gard of  consequences,  to  read  the  "self- 
evolution  of  the  Idea"  into  all  the  varied 
forms  of  religion,  and  to  trace  in  them  the 
ubiquitous  categories  of  the  Logic. 

The  sphere  of  the  religious  consciousness 
is  mapped  out  to  begin  with.     God,  strug- 

1  The  Science  of  Religion.    P.  D.  C.  de  la  Saussaye,  p.  4. 


SPECULATIVE    THEOLOGY  13 

gling  in  the  throes  of  self-realization,  is  the 
motive  force  of  the  evolution  of  religions  ; 
God,  as  a  completed  world-process,  is  the 
object  of  religion.  Or,  to  take  Hegel's  own 
words,  "  The  whole  manifold  of  human  re- 
lations, activities,  joys,  everything  that  man 
values  and  esteems,  wherein  he  seeks  his 
happiness,  his  glory,  and  his  pride,  all  find 
their  middle  point  in  religion  —  in  the 
thought,  consciousness,  and  feeling  of  God. 
God  is,  therefore,  the  Beginning  and  the 
End  of  everything."  This  is  the  pictorial 
way  in  which  religion  frees  man  for  a  little 
from  the  harshness  of  the  life-struggle  that 
presses  so  sorely  upon  him.  Philosophy, 
theology,  and  religion  are  accordingly  iden- 
tical in  their  subject.  The  first  considers  as 
such  the  permeating  reason  which  is  the 
efficient  cause  of  the  cosmos.  The  second  is 
the  science  of  God  in  his  relation  to  man, 
and  especially  to  the  God-Man.  The  last 
leads  to  worship  of  God  as  the  one  Being  in 
relation  to  whom  man  may  achieve  his 
highest  vocation.  Religion,  that  is,  con- 
stitutes a  particular  instance,  presented  under 
certain  limited  forms,  of  the  world-wide 
principle  which  is  continually  revealing  itself 


14  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

under  other  guises  in  every  sphere  wherein 
activity  capable  of  rational  estimate  takes 
place.  As  a  result,  speculative  notions,  in 
the  strict  sense  of  the  term,  reproduce  them- 
selves in  the  history  of  religions  and  in  the 
essential  constitution  of  the  highest  religion. 
To  illustrate  this  reproduction  and  to  prove 
at  once  its  truth  and  its  inevitableness  is  the 
task  which  Hegel  set  himself.  After  a  dis- 
cussion, in  the  first  part,  of  the  Absolute 
Idea  as  it  presents  itself  in  religious  shape, 
he  proceeds,  in  the  second,  to  characterize 
the  various  historical  religions,  and  to  indi- 
cate their  places  in  his  scheme.  In  the  third 
and  final  part,  Christianity  is  shown  to  be 
the  highest  possible  embodiment  of  religion 
—  the  religion  beyond  which,  in  the  nature 
of  the  Idea  itself,  and  according  to  its  mani- 
festation by  means  of  Jesus,  one  cannot  pass. 
For  theology,  the  most  interesting  portions  of 
this  analysis  are  unquestionably  the  specul- 
ative digests  of  the  cardinal  doctrines  of  the 
Christian  faith.  "Dogma  is  necessary,  and 
must  be  taught  as  valid  truth."  The  ration- 
alizing of  the  Trinity  is,  probably,  the  most 
conspicuous  example  of  the  method  adopted. 
Deity,   in    his  loneliness  before   the  world 


SPECULATIVE  THEOLOGY  15 

was,  embosomed  an  infinite  yearning,  and 
God  became  a  Creator  in  order  to  realize 
objectively  that  boundless  love  which  is  His 
pre-eminent  quality.  But  the  creature,  born 
into  the  thraldom  of  time  and  space,  remained 
separated  from  his  Maker  for  ages.  The 
conception  of  God's  Fatherhood  never 
revealed  itself,  and  an  awful  antagonism 
subsisted  between  created  and  Creator.  So, 
too,  not  recognizing  their  common  Father, 
the  children  opposed  one  another,  and  were 
broken  up  into  isolated  groups.  During  this 
struggle  men  tasted  of  the  forbidden  tree, 
and  became  increasingly  like  gods,  knowing 
good  from  evil.  When  the  perception  of 
evil,  with  its  accompanying  sense  of  sin, 
had  been  deepened  to  the  uttermost,  the  per- 
fect Man  appeared,  to  stem  the  mightiest 
crisis  of  moral  history.  Then  the  great 
reconciliation  was  effected.  In  the  Person 
of  Christ  God  found  himself  in  man,  and 
man  found  himself  in  God.  The  Creator 
whose  creatures  had  thwarted  him  so  that 
he  seemed  to  have  lost  somewhat  of  his  life, 
received  back  in  the  good  time  of  his  ener- 
gizing Spirit  all  that  he  had  given,  and  in 
fuller  measure.     By  the   inevitable  law  of 


16  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

moral  progress,  God  had  in  some  sense  died 
to  live.  The  work  of  the  immanent  Spirit 
wrought  its  own  self-development.  The 
depth  of  the  riches  of  the  divine  nature  was 
gradually  revealed,  and  with  the  Incarnation 
of  Christ  became  fully  known. 

This  original,  commanding,  and  seductive 
conception  did  not  maintain  itself  intact, 
except  in  the  speculations  of  Hegel's  im- 
mediate followers,  and,  so  far  as  I  am  aware, 
no  contemporary  theologian  upholds  it  in  pre- 
cisely the  old  form.  But  its  influence  is  still 
widespread,  and  it  presents  undoubted  attrac- 
tions to  many  perplexed  minds.  Two  prin- 
cipal factors  are  contained  in  it.  First,  a 
theory  of  the  ultimate  nature  of  the  uni- 
verse ;  second,  a  plan,  or  methodology,  of  the 
manner  in  which  this  nature  reveals  itself  in 
the  successive  stages  of  its  self-evolution. 
Broadly  speaking,  and  remembering  how 
hard  it  is  to  dogmatize  on  such  matters,  it 
may  be  said  that  the  former  embodies  a  truth 
of  the  last  importance,  whereas  the  latter  is 
very  largely,  if  not  entirely,  erroneous.  In 
any  case,  no  theologian  now  affects  the  cast- 
iron  dialectic  method,  and  the  one  living 
thinker  who  seems  to  countenance  it  employs 


SPECULATIVE  THEOLOGY  17 

a  wholly  new  form,  one  more  general  and 
elastic.1 

Absence  of  the  reconstruction  of  dogma 
constitutes  the  principal  difference  between 
Hegel's  work  and  that  of  his  later  disciples. 
The  historical  method  has  accomplished  many- 
things  in  the  interval,  and  the  neo-Hegelians, 
especially  in  their  treatment  of  the  Jewish 
and  Christian  religions,  have  not  been  slow 
to  take  advantage  of  the  newer  results.  They 
make  no  explicit  attempt  to  construct  a  pre- 
cise parallel  between  philosophy  and  religion, 
they  do  not  "interpret"  cardinal  tenets  of 
the  faith  —  there  is  nothing,  for  instance,  to 
place  alongside  Hegel's  presentation  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  Trinity.  The  aim,  on  the 
contrary,  is  to  trace  a  general  law  or  principle, 
peculiar  to  human  self -consciousness,  through- 
out the  entire  course  of  religious  history,  and 
to  find  in  this  very  history  a  development 
wherein  the  religious  life  of  the  race  takes 
the  shape  which  that  of  the  individual,  attach- 
ing due  regard  to  his  rational  nature,  might 
be  expected  to  assume.  Man's  consciousness, 
as  the  argument  sometimes  runs,  is  so  con- 
structed that  three  elements  must  enter  into 

1  E.  Caird,  in  The  Evolution  of  Religion. 


18  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

it.  Self  is  obviously  there;  so  too  is  not- 
self,  or  the  world  of  reality.  But,  taken 
apart,  each  of  these  is  an  abstraction,  and 
lacks  true  existence.  Thus  there  must  be  a 
union  of  both,  for  the  one  cannot  be  known 
in  isolation  from  the  other.  This  third  com- 
bining element  in  man's  being,  simply  on 
account  of  its  unifying  power,  may  be  called 
God.  The  human  mind  involves,  by  its  mere 
existence,  self,  the  world,  and  deity.  The 
position  to  be  occupied  by  the  philosophical 
investigator  of  religion  is,  accordingly,  indi- 
cated with  sufficient  distinctness.  There  can- 
not but  be  a  reproduction  of  the  indispensable 
elements  of  self-consciousness  in  the  varied 
religions.  Moreover,  representative  types  of 
religion  necessarily  derive  their  value  and 
permanent  interest  from  the  manner  in  which 
they  embody  one  or  other  of  these  elements. 
In  other  words,  apart  from  any  consideration 
of  the  facts  that  supply  the  particulars  of 
religious  history,  investigation  of  man's 
nature  as  a  thinking  being  supplies  the  pre- 
sumptions which  it  is  the  business  of  philoso- 
phy of  religion,  and  of  the  theology  based 
on  it,  to  verify.  The  unity  of  self,  not-self, 
and  God,  as  the  sole  ideas  constitutive  of  self- 


SPECULATIVE  THEOLOGY  19 

consciousness,  is  assumed  as  an  inevitable 
preliminary  to  study  of  religion,  wherein  the 
parts  organic  to  the  given  unity  are  to  be 
seen  in  such  separation  as  is  possible.  Fur- 
ther, in  the  development  of  self-consciousness 
itself  there  is  a  cyclic  predominance  of  each 
of  the  constituent  conceptions,  and  this,  too, 
theology  ought  to  follow  in  tracing  the  growth 
and  explaining  the  import  of  pious  aspiration. 
The  speculative  group,  in  short,  have  a  sketch- 
plan  ready  to  hand,  derived  from  metaphysi- 
cal considerations  of  the  most  abstract  kind, 
and  this  they  proceed  to  fill  in,  as  concerns 
religion,  after  an  equally  metaphysical 
method. 

In  this  departure  from  the  letter  of  Hegel 
it  may  be  agreed  that  theologians  have 
evinced  a  wise  instinct.  There  remains  to 
them  an  untrammelled  theory  of  the  universe. 
This  is  still  substantially  accepted;  indeed, 
from  acceptance  of  it  the  title  "speculative" 
comes.  What,  then,  does  it  amount  to  ?  It 
is  preferable  to  hear  a  statement  from  an 
accredited  member  of  the  school:  "Even  in 
the  hypothetically  assumed  case,  that  there 
is  only  an  ideal  nature  in  the  consciousness 
of  thinking  minds,  we  could  not  escape  from 


20  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

the  question  how  the  different  subjects  come 
to  a  corresponding  image  of  the  world,  and 
how  they  are  able  to  distinguish  what  is 
merely  subjectively  represented  from  the 
common  or  objective  mode  of  representation 
—  that  is  to  say,  how  they  can  distinguish 
truth  from  error.  This  question,  however, 
can  hardly  be  solved  otherwise  than  by  the 
assumption  of  a  universal  consciousness, 
which  must  be  the  common  ground,  as  well 
as  the  ruling  law,  of  all  individual  conscious- 
nesses or  minds.  ...  If  it  holds  true  of  the 
individual  being,  that  the  final  end  which 
results  from  the  development  of  its  life  is 
also  already  the  ideal  prius  of  the  whole 
process,  then  we  shall  be  able  to  apply  the 
same  thought  to  the  whole  process  of  the  life 
of  our  earth,  and  to  draw  therefrom  a  con- 
clusion as  to  the  principle  of  the  process. 
And  we  are  justified  in  doing  so  by  the  very 
fundamental  thought  of  modern  biology, 
according  to  which  all  the  life  of  the  earth 
forms  one  advancing  development  from  the 
lowest  to  the  highest  forms  of  existence."1 
Moreover,  God  is  revealing  Himself,  not  only 
in  the   natural,    but  also  in  the  moral   and 

1  Pfleiderer,  Gifford  Lectures,  vol.  i.  pp.  142,  156,  157. 


SPECULATIVE    THEOLOGY  21 

religious,  order.  "The  historical  order  of 
the  religious  revelation,  that  it  is  a  develop- 
ment from  lower  to  ever  higher  stages,  a 
development  in  which  the  new  is  always  at 
once  the  fulfilment  and  criticism  of  the  old, 
becomes  nowhere  more  clearly  apparent  than 
in  the  relation  of  Christianity  to  Judaism. 
...  I  think  assuredly  that  with  the  entrance 
of  Christianity  into  the  world,  the  firm  found- 
ation for  its  realization  has  been  laid,  so 
that  the  whole  history  of  the  world  prior  to 
Christianity  may  be  regarded  as  the  prepar- 
ation for  the  realization  of  that  ideal,  and  the 
whole  of  Christian  history  as  the  development 
of  it.  If,  therefore,  the  whole  history  of  the 
world  shows  itself  as  the  teleological  process 
of  the  advancing  realization  of  the  divine 
purpose  of  the  world,  we  are  entitled  to  find 
in  the  history  of  the  world  the  revelation  of 
the  world-governing  wisdom  of  God."1 
These  statements  may  be  taken  as  sufficient, 
because  they  are  very  recent,  and  because 
Dr.  Pfleiderer  is  one  of  the  least  doctrinaire 
members  of  the  school  which  he  ornaments. 

Setting  aside  the  speculative  treatment  of 
such  a  theory  in   and  for  itself,  its  obvious 

1  Ibid.,  pp.  189,  202. 


22  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

interest  is  historical.  And,  accordingly,  we 
find  that  minute  study  of  the  historical  data 
has,  since  the  disruption  of  the  Hegelian 
school  proper,  attracted  increasing  attention 
among  theologians.  The  leading  workers  in 
this  department  are  often  possessed,  not  only 
of  philosophical  discrimination  and  acuteness, 
but  also  of  minute  Biblical  knowledge,  which 
enables  them  to  illustrate  and  support  their 
speculative  conclusions.  When  these  two 
endowments  are  not  concentrated  in  one 
person,  a  compensation  is  found  in  the 
superior  attainments  of  single  thinkers  in  one 
sphere  or  the  other,  and  their  united  results 
serve  as  the  basis  for  a  review  of  the  entire 
field.  Our  question,  therefore,  comes  to  be 
—  What  conclusions  have  been  derived  from 
the  piecing  out  of  the  general  doctrine  of 
the  immanence  of  deity?  How  do  the 
historic  documents  supplement  and  expand 
the  speculative  presuppositions? 

The  tendency  to  lay  hold  upon  the  docu- 
ments, to  regard  them  as  memoires  pour  servir 
to  this  special  aspect  of  the  general  theory  of 
the  universe,  and,  at  the  same  time,  to 
exclude  the  peculiar  dialectical  frame-work, 
cannot  be  better  illustrated  than  by  the  fate 


SPECULATIVE   THEOLOGY  23 

that  has  latterly  overtaken  the  investigations 
of  F.  C.  Baur.  Not  infrequently  one  hears 
the  statement  that  the  great  Tubingen  critic 
has  formulated  results  only  to  have  them 
overturned ;  that  his  influence  has  dis- 
appeared ;  that  even  his  own  followers  have 
abandoned  his  positions  at  discretion.  For 
the  most  part,  this  allegation  is  due  to  a 
misunderstanding.  According  to  Baur's 
theoiy,  Christian  origins  embodied  an  im- 
plicit antagonism,  which,  in  the  course  of 
the  early  history  of  our  religion,  became 
explicit,  and  thereafter  disappeared  in  a 
higher  unity.  Christ  himself  incarnated  the 
terms  of  this  covert  opposition.  His  religion 
was  spiritually  universal,  but  he  identified 
himself  with  a  particularist  principle  when 
he  accepted  the  Jewish  Messiahship.  Hence 
the  partial  truths  defended  by  the  contending 
parties  of  the  first  Church.  Peter  and  the 
Judaizers  were  not  wholly  wrong,  nor  were 
Stephen,  Paul,  and  the  universalists  wholly 
right.  This  neo-scholastic  dogma  of  progress 
by  conflict,  as  thus  originated,  Baur  employed 
to  explain  the  beginnings  and  inner  relations 
of  the  New  Testament  documents.  When 
the  schism  was  at  its  deepest,  Paul's  four 


24  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

genuine  Epistles  and  the  Book  of  Revelation 
were  composed.  The  early  period  of  concili- 
ation, when  the  parties  to  the  quarrel  were 
tentatively  seeking  a  truce,  brought  forth 
the  synoptic  Gospels,  the  Acts,  the  Deutero- 
Pauline  Epistles,  and  the  Epistles  of  Peter  and 
James.  Finally,  when  the  reconciliation  with 
its  resultant  access  of  power  developed  dur- 
ing antagonism  had  been  effected,  the  Gospel 
and  the  Epistles  attributed  to  John,  and  the 
Pastoral  Epistles  were  written.  Now,  it  is 
true  that  Baur's  dialectic  method  has  been 
wholly  dismissed,  and  that  the  conclusions 
traceable  to  the  trimming  of  data  in  its 
interest  have,  for  the  most  part,  been  departed 
from.  For  example,  we  no  longer  hold  that 
Christianity  must  have  advanced  by  thesis, 
antithesis,  and  synthesis;  perhaps  some  of 
us  are  quite  sceptical  about  the  supposed 
influence  of  Jewish  Christianity;  therefore 
we  do  not  agree  that  Matthew  is  the  earliest, 
because  the  distinctively  Jewish-Christian, 
synoptic;  that  Luke  is  the  second,  because 
the  heathen-Christian;  and  that  Mark  is  the 
third,  because  the  product  of  an  eclectic  and 
non-partisan  redaction  of  the  two  others. 
Neither  can  we  accept  the  account  of  the 


SPECULATIVE  THEOLOGY  25 

Apocalypse.  Our  attitude,  too,  towards  the 
Pauline  Epistles  and  the  Acts,  to  say  noth- 
ing of  other  documents,  is  no  longer  that  of 
Baur.  Yet,  in  spite  of  all  this,  his  problem 
remains  till  the  present  moment  the  problem 
which  New  Testament  criticism,  especially 
in  the  speculative  school,  is  striving  to  solve. 
For  instance,  his  questions  respecting  the 
authorship  of  the  Fourth  Gospel  and  the 
relation  of  Philo  to  its  writer  are  to-day  sub 
judice.  Even  the  Ritschlians,  as  represented 
by  Wendt,1  preserve  his  conclusions  when 
they  assign  this  Gospel,  "  in  its  present  form, 
to  a  writer  of  the  second  century  belonging 
to  the  religious  circle  founded  by  the  Apostle 
John."  What  remains,  then,  to  the  "his- 
torical school  within  theology  "  is  the  general 
theory  of  a  rational  development  in  early 
Christianity,  and  of  a  consequent  explicable 
interconnection  between  the  integral  portions 
of  the  New  Testament.  Or,  as  Holtzmann 
has  put  it,  "  Baur  was  a  positive  spirit,  since 
he  was  by  no  means  satisfied  with  denying  to 
a  Biblical  writing  the  authorship  ascribed  to 
it  by  tradition  or  named  in  the  superscription, 
but  claimed  emphatically  to  practise  '  positive 

1  Cf.  Die  Lehre  Jesu  (Erster  Theil,  untranslated),  passim. 


26  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

criticism  '  —  to  show  the  place  which  the  vari- 
ous writings  of  the  New  Testament  held  in  the 
general  development  of  Christianity,  and  in 
which  they  are  historically  comprehensible.  " 
Notwithstanding  the  defection  from  Baur's 
strict  tenets,  the  speculative  theology  and 
the  theory  of  the  documents  continue  to  be 
complementary.  As  the  former  teaches,  in 
its  general  principles,  the  entire  history  of 
the  universe  is  witness  to  the  presence  of  an 
immanent  self-developing  spirit,  one  that 
commits  no  leaps  in  the  course  of  its  majestic 
evolution.  Christianity  is  not  an  exceptional 
phenomenon,  and  so  the  writings  that  record 
its  inception  and  early  progress  must  form 
portions  of  a  growing  organism.  On  the 
other  hand,  detailed  examination  of  the  books 
furnishes  forth  proof  and  illustration  of  the 
cosmic  development  at  once  during  one  of  its 
most  momentous  stages,  and  in  its  highest 
aspect  —  the  spiritual.  A  spiritual  consider- 
ation of  the  recorded  phenomena  supplants  a 
supernatural.  Miracles,  as  isolated  and  inex- 
plicable disturbances  of  the  world-order,  do 
not  happen;  the  single  miracle  lies  in  the 
constitution  of  the  universe  itself.  What, 
next,  are  the  resultant  theological  inferences? 


SPECULATIVE   THEOLOGY  27 

II.    The  Special  Conclusions  of  the  Speculative 
School 

A  somewhat  bald  statement  of  results  may- 
suffice;  and,  perhaps,  this  is  not  without 
advantage  in  the  direction  of  definiteness. 
For  it  has  only  too  often  been  the  custom  to 
express  these  conclusions  in  language  which, 
hallowed  by  long  association,  does  not  fully 
convey  all  that  is  implied. 

1.  The  doctrine  of  God.  Setting  aside, 
meantime,  the  difficult  question  of  personal- 
ity, which,  indeed,  Professor  Pfleiderer  alone 
seems  anxious  to  emphasize,  it  may  be  said 
that  God  is  at  once  the  Prius,  the  Immanent 
Principle,  and  the  Final  Cause  of  the  uni- 
verse. Being  a  subject  or  eternal  conscious- 
ness, he  finds  his  most  eminent  "manifesta- 
tion" in  our  spirits.  We  are  all  his  sons, 
not  simply  because  he  is  the  synthetic  power 
implied  in  that  "  single  and  unalterable  order 
of  relations  "  that  we  call  nature,  but  specially 
because  "  our  consciousness  may  mean  either 
of  two  things :  either  a  function  of  the  animal 
organism,  which  is  being  made,  gradually 
and  with    interruptions,    a    vehicle    of    the 


28  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

eternal  consciousness;  or  that  eternal  con- 
sciousness itself,  as  making  the  animal  organ- 
ism its  vehicle  and  subject  to  certain 
limitations  in  so  doing,  but  retaining  its 
essential  characteristic  as  independent  of 
time,  as  the  determinant  of  becoming,  which 
has  not  and  does  not  itself  become."1  If 
this  be  true,  then  nature  is  a  manifestation 
of  God  in  one  degree,  while  humanity  is  his 
revelation  in  another  and  higher  mode.  We 
are  all  brethren  because  "  only  in  such  a  uni- 
versal fellowship,  in  which  the  individuals 
are  bound  together  through  the  same  devo- 
tion of  all  to  the  common  end  of  humanity  — 
to  the  Ideal  of  the  good  and  true  —  can  we 
behold  the  ultimate  final  end  of  history."2 
Consequently,  God  is  to  be  regarded  primarily 
as  the  principle  of  unity  in  the  material 
world,  in  individual  selves,  in  the  relation 
between  these  two,  and  in  the  communion  of 
selves  or  spirits  with  each  other.  So  the 
whole  round  universe  is  an  organism  of  which 
we  are  parts,  and  of  which  he  is  the  life- 
preserving  principle.  Accordingly,  "  a  super- 
naturalism  which  tries  to  survive   alongside 

1  Green,  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  p.  72. 

2  Pfleiderer,  Gifford  Lectures,  vol.  i.  p.  202. 


SPECULATIVE    THEOLOGY  29 

of  naturalism,  dividing  the  kingdom  with  it, 
will  soon  have  taken  away  from  it  '  even  that 
which  it  seemeth  to  have.'  The  only  hope 
of  a  successful  issue  is  to  carry  the  war  into 
the  enemy's  quarters,  and  to  maintain  what 
Carlyle  called  a  Natural  Supernaturalism ; 
i.  e.,  the  doctrine,  not  that  there  are  single 
miracles,  but  that  the  universe  is  miraculous, 
and  that,  in  order  to  conceive  it  truly,  we 
must  think  of  it,  not  as  a  mechanical  system 
occasionally  broken  in  upon  from  above,  but 
as  an  organism  which  implies  a  spiritual 
principle  as  its  beginning  and  as  its  end."1 

The  chief  end  of  a  science  of  religion,  and 
of  theology  as  one  of  its  departments,  is, 
therefore,  to  bring  back  difference  to  unity, 
and  a  speculative  evolution  may  be  said  to 
furnish  at  once  the  method  and  direction. 
"  The  idea  of  an  absolute  unity,  which  trans- 
cends all  the  oppositions  of  finitude,  and 
especially  the  last  opposition,  which  includes 
all  others  —  the  opposition  of  subject  and 
object  —  is  the  ultimate  presupposition  of  our 
consciousness.  Hence  we  cannot  understand 
the  real  character  of  our  rational  life  or 
appreciate  the  full  compass  of  its  movement, 

1  E.  Caird,  The  Evolution  of  Religion,  vol.  i.  pp.  319,  320. 


30  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

unless  we  recognize  as  its  necessary  constit- 
uents or  guiding  ideas,  not  only  the  ideas  of 
object  and  subject,  but  also  the  idea  of 
God."1  Consequently,  "religions  may  differ 
very  widely,  they  may  be  comparatively  ele- 
vated or  they  may  be  what  we  would  call 
degraded ;  but  they  have  this  as  their  common 
characteristic  (at  least  when  they  rise  above 
the  vaguest  superstition),  that  they  give  a 
kind  of  unity  to  life."2  To  discover  what 
this  unity  is,  and  to  show  how  it  manifests 
itself  in  the  numerous  religions  of  the  world 
is  the  task.  The  entire  field  of  facts  is  thus 
mapped  out  according  to  a  speculative  method 
which,  in  a  sense,  is  beforehand  with  them 
in  that,  so  far  as  concerns  the  present  discus- 
sion, it  is  established  ere  they  have  received 
any  consideration.  Types  of  religion  must 
be  found  corresponding  to  the  stages  just 
specified,  and  the  embodiment  in  them  respec- 
tively of  specialized  aspects  of  self-conscious- 
ness must  be  distinctly  proved.  Seeing  that 
man  turns  first  to  the  not-self  in  the  life  of 
thought,  objective  religion  leads  the  way  in 
the  evolutionary  process.  Fetichism,  anim- 
ism, and  ancestor-worship  are   at  the  lower 

1  Evol.  ofRel,  vol.  i.  pp.  67,  68.  2  Ibid.,  p.  81. 


SPECULATIVE    THEOLOGY  31 

end  of  the  scale.  Then  follows  polytheism, 
striving,  in  the  Veclic  religion,  to  reach 
monotheism,  and  eventually,  by  an  inevitable 
process,  sinking  back  into  the  abstract  unity 
of  pantheism.  This  is  succeeded  by  the 
most  representative  objective  religion,  that 
of  Greece,  in  the  treatment  of  which  some 
writers  are  at  their  best,  perhaps  because 
they  are  least  metaphysical.  The  anthropo- 
morphism which,  particularly  in  Hellenism, 
accompanies  the  highest  forms  of  objective 
religion,  naturally  originates  a  transition  to 
subjective  considerations.  Self  looms  larger 
and  larger  till  at  length  man  is  left  alone 
with  his  own  soul,  having  surrendered  the 
"  outward  world  to  some  power  which  is  not 
regarded  as  divine."  With  wonderful  insight 
and  resource,  a  plan  is  thus  constructed,  and 
this  is  immediately  removed  from  the  specul- 
ative to  the  historical  sphere  for  the  system- 
atizing of  recorded  phenomena.  Buddhism, 
Stoicism,  and  the  religion  of  Israel  are  taken 
as  types,  each  in  its  own  rank  showing  a 
particular  aspect  of  the  predominance  of  the 
idea  of  self.  Then  usually  follow  pregnant 
discourses  on  the  relation  of  Judaism  to 
Christianity,  wherein  the  passage  from  sub- 


32  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

jective  religion  to  the  absolute  religion  is  set 
forth.  The  unity  between  subjective  and 
objective  religion  was  implicitly  present  even 
in  the  lowest  religions;  it  was  consciously 
perceived  and  explicitly  expressed  only  by 
Jesus.  The  remainder  of  the  investigation 
commonly  concerns  itself  with  the  internal 
development  of  the  absolute  religion.  Chris- 
tianity, embosoming  as  it  does  elements 
drawn  from  objective  pantheism  and  subject- 
ive monotheism,  progresses  by  the  continu- 
ous antagonism  between  these  constituent 
principles.  Now  one,  now  the  other  has  the 
ascendency,  and  according  to  the  momentary 
domination  so  is  the  contemporary  interpret- 
ation of  Christ's  message.  The  medieval 
Church,  to  take  an  example,  was  too  object- 
ive in  one  of  its  aspects,  the  Reformation 
too  subjective;  and  the  varied  phases  of 
orthodoxy  and  heterodoxy,  so-called,  in 
modern  theology  are  to  be  attributed  to  the 
same  causes.  The  labor  of  the  ages  has 
bequeathed  lessons  to  the  nineteenth  century 
which  seem  to  point  to  a  fresh  and  more 
comprehensive  reconstruction  of  the  doctrine 
of  the  Christ. 

The  term  Nothwe?idigkeit,  as  employed  by 


SPECULATIVE  THEOLOGY  33 

the  classical  German  idealists,  may  fairly  be 
said  to  describe  the  leading  characteristics  of 
this  method.  Although  the  word,  literally 
translated,  means  necessity,  it  does  not 
imply,  in  the  physical  sense,  compulsion 
from  without.  The  reference  is  rather  to  an 
inner  principle,  such  a  law  as  that  under 
which  acorns  develop  oaks,  eggs  hatch  after 
their  sorts,  and  the  child  becomes  the  father 
of  the  man.  Self-consciousness,  as  we  are 
told,  is  an  organism,  and  in  its  essential 
unity  evolves  by  a  necessity  which  is  also 
self-realization;  it  thus  comes  to  achieve 
only  what  was  always  immanent  in  it.  All 
happenings  in  the  sphere  of  the  religious 
consciousness,  thus,  could  not  have  been 
otherwise,  and  their  explanation  implies 
constant  reference  to  God,  the  unity  ever 
present  in  the  difference  between  subject  and 
object.  "  In  the  consciousness  of  the  simplest 
and  most  uncultured  individual  there  are 
contained  all  the  principles  that  can  be 
evolved  by  the  wisest  philosopher  of  the 
most  cultivated  time;  and  even  the  rudest 
religious  systems  have  represented  in  them 
—  though,  no  doubt,  in  a  shadowy  and  dis- 
torted way  —  all  the  elements  that  enter  into 

3 


34  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

the  highest  Christian  worship."1  Christian- 
ity is,  therefore,  to  be  viewed  as  an  integral, 
and  in  no  wise  exceptional,  portion  of  the 
absolute  miracle.  It  is  a  stage  in  the  mani- 
festation of  the  immanent  spiritual  principle. 
Different  in  degree,  no  doubt,  from  Buddhism 
or  the  Greek  religion,  or  even  from  Judaism, 
it  cannot  but  be  regarded  as  the  same  in 
kind.  When  we  contemplate  it  as  the 
mightiest  instance  of  spiritual  development, 
we  do  well.  But,  emphatically,  we  must 
not  permit  our  special  interest  in  it  to  mis- 
lead us  into  supposing  that  it  stands  in  a 
class  by  itself  or  constitutes  an  inexplicable 
phenomenon.  The  principle,  of  God's  rel- 
ation to  man  was  set  forth  afresh  in  Jesus,  who 
accomplished  his  mission  under  conditions 
which  do  not  differ,  except  in  their  special 
temporary  combination,  from  those  operative 
in  the  case,  say,  of  Gautama  or  Socrates, 
Dante  or  Shakespeare,  Luther  or  Hegel,  or 
of  any  other  vehicle  of  epoch-making  ideals. 

2.  The  value  of  the  New  Testament  docu- 
ments. All  these  writings  are  post  factum, 
some  having  been  produced  at  greater,  others 
at  lesser,  intervals  after  the  martyrdom   of 

1  Evol.  ofRel,  vol.  i.  pp.  201,  202. 


SPECULATIVE  THEOLOGY  35 

the  Master.  They  may  be  conveniently 
divided  into  four  groups.  (1)  The  synoptic 
Gospels,  which  state  the  religion  of  Jesus 
with  the  highest  purity  and  least  complexity, 
and  among  which,  notwithstanding  its  laconic 
severity,  Mark  alone  affords  a  basis  for  a 
trustworthy  account  of  the  world's  greatest 
religious  genius.  One  must  note,  too,  that 
these  three  Gospels  are  characterized  by  an 
absence  of  evidence  for  doctrines  that  after- 
wards became  dogmatically  embodied  in  the 
belief  in  the  divinity  of  Christ.  (2)  The 
genuine  Epistles  of  Paul,  which  summarize 
the  religion  of  the  Christ  —  a  system  to  be 
carefully  distinguished  from  the  religion  of 
Jesus.  Paul  founds  his  dogmatic  teaching 
upon  the  death  of  Jesus,  which  he  views  as 
an  atonement,  thus  reinstating  that  very 
Jewish  idea  which  Jesus  had  striven  to  break 
in  pieces.  The  "  doctrines  of  the  incarnation 
and  of  the  divinity  of  Jesus  are  inevitable 
inferences  from  that  of  atonement,  provided 
this  is  regarded  as  of  objective  significance 
and  as  an  offering  presented  to  God,  which 
was  certainly  its  significance  for  the  mind 
of    St.    Paul."1     (3)  The    Deutero-Pauline 

1  Mackintosh,    The    Natural  History  of  the    Christian 
Religion,  p.  397. 


36  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

Epistles,  which  partake  of  the  character  of 
Christian  Gnosticism.  Here,  owing  to  a 
dualistic  theory  of  the  world-order,  Christ 
has  come  to  be  regarded  as  the  one  Mediator 
between  God  and  man.  With  these  Epistles 
emerge  the  modified  doctrines  of  justification 
by  faith,  of  grace,  and  of  Christian  liberty. 
Christianity  is  now  regarded  as  a  mystic  sav- 
ing process,  of  which  Christ  is  the  instrument 
and  man  the  subject.  This  view  of  the 
matter  is  so  much  at  odds  with  that  of  the 
synoptic  Gospels  as  almost  to  cancel  their 
most  essential  teaching.  (4)  The  Fourth 
Gospel,  in  which  a  more  highly  evolved  and 
broadened  Christian  Gnosticism  is  formu- 
lated. Here  Christ  is  no  longer  a  mere 
mediator  —  a  being  standing  between  God 
and  man  —  but  has  come  to  be  identified  with 
God  himself.  Hence  the  book  has  been 
aptly  entitled,  "The  Gospel  of  a  Divine 
Humanity."  Christ  has  become  the  Word 
—  not,  indeed,  a  transcendent  emanation 
from  Deity,  but  a  human  incarnation,  who 
thus  presents  a  practicable  moral  ideal  to 
mankind.  Baur's  general  theory  accordingly 
remains,  although  its  method  has  been  for- 
saken, and  his  conclusions,  cut,  as  it  were,  to 


SPECULATIVE    THEOLOGY  37 

the  order  of  this  method,  abandoned.  The 
documents  are  still  taken  as  integrally  related 
elements  in  the  record  of  a  developing  history, 
and  so  can  be  treated  entirely  as  the  books  of 
any  other  religion.  They  are  literature,  and, 
as  such,  they  do  not  furnish  authority  for 
dogmas,  but  rather  serve  as  aids  towards  an 
explanation  of  the  manner  in  which  these 
very  dogmas  came  to  be  originated. 

3.  The  doctrine  of  Christ  and  of  the  so-called 
cardinal  tenets  of  the  Christian  faith.  On 
these  matters  it  is  most  satisfactory  to  record 
the  words  of  the  authorities  themselves.  "It 
is  no  longer  possible  to  regard  Jesus  as  an 
incarnation  of  the  divine  being,  who  wrought 
miracles,  and  by  his  death  made  atonement 
for  the  sins  of  men,  and  rose  again  from  the 
dead,  and  afterwards  ascended  into  heaven  in 
the  presence  of  his  disciples ;  but  as  one  who, 
by  nature  and  from  first  to  last,  was  a  mem- 
ber, pure  and  simple,  of  the  human  family  — 
a  link  of  the  human  chain  just  as  any  of  our- 
selves are;  having  all  the  properties  of 
human  nature,  but  those  of  no  other;  as  one 
whose  nature,  faculty,  and  character  were  to 
the  same  extent  with  those  of  other  men  the 
product  of  his  ancestry  and  of  his  surround- 


38  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

ings ;  and  whose  life  and  work  went  to  deter- 
mine and  to  influence  the  life  and  history  of 
succeeding  generations."1  As  a  result,  the 
miraculous  birth  of  Jesus,  his  mystically  con- 
secrating baptism,  his  transfiguration,  his 
institution  of  the  Supper  as  a  saving  sacra- 
ment, as  well  as  the  accounts  of  the  Resur- 
rection and  of  the  Christophanies,  and  the 
dogma  of  the  atonement  in  its  ordinary  sense, 
are  to  be  regarded,  "not  as  facts  at  all,  but 
only  as  quasi-historical  or  mythical  forms,  in 
which  Christian  phantasy  clothed  the  facts  of 
Christian  experience."2  In  the  same  way, 
Paul's  conversion,  Pentecost,  and  other 
special  manifestations  receive  explanation. 
All  are  but  symbols,  in  which  the  essence  of 
Christianity  happens  to  have  become  enclosed 
during  the  course  of  history,  and,  if  taken 
literally,  they  only  serve  to  obscure  the  "  new 
world  of  the  holy  spirit  it  was  the  purpose  of 
Christianity  to  found. " 

1  Mackintosh,  The  Natural  History  of  the  Christian  Reli- 
gion, p.  56. 

2  Mackintosh,  ibid.,  p.  83;  cf.  A.  Robinson,  The  Saviour  in 
the  Newer  Light,  jxissim. 


SPECULATIVE  THEOLOGY  39 


III.    Criticism  of  the  General  Principles  of 
the  Speculative  School 

Theee  is,  perhaps,  little  reason  for  won- 
der that  many  good  people,  on  hearing  these 
conclusions  stated  thus  without  any  trappings 
of  religious  language,  should  have  exclaimed, 
with  Mary,  "They  have  taken  away  my 
Lord,  and  I  know  not  where  they  have  laid 
him."  But  this  is  no  refuge  for  the  instructed 
theologian.  The  inferences  have  been  reached 
by  speculative  insight,  by  critical  and  his- 
torical research,  and  to  these  methods  and 
processes  they  continue  to  remain  amenable, 
by  them  they  must  in  the  issue  stand  or  fall. 
For  theology  is  not  a  matter  of  faith,  but  of 
intellectual  grasp  and  careful  scholarship. 
On  these  lines  we  must,  accordingly,  proceed 
with  what  equity  we  can  command. 

None  but  the  most  blindly  prejudiced 
would  take  it  upon  themselves  to  deny  the 
lasting  benefits  conferred  upon  theology  by 
the  speculative  group.  Indeed,  one  hardly 
oversteps  the  mark  in  declaring  that  Hegel, 
Strauss,  and  Baur,  along  with  the  many  less 
eminent  men   who  worked  in   their   spirit, 


40  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

renewed  the  science.  Once  for  all,  they  put 
an  end  to  the  peddling  rationalism  of  Paulus 
and  his  coadjutors.  They  gave  the  coup  de 
grftce  to  the  deadening  deism  of  the  eighteenth 
century.  Their  protest  against  the  natural- 
ism of  the  fifties  and  sixties  did  not  stop  short 
at  mere  criticism,  but  included  a  complete  and 
far  more  adequate  theory.  Most  of  all,  per- 
haps, they  brought  back  somewhat  of  the 
essence  of  Christian  teaching  to  theology 
when  they  attacked  individualism,  and  set 
forth  in  permanent  form  the  doctrine  that  no 
man  can  divest  himself  of  responsibility  for 
being  his  brother's  keeper.  In  carrying  out 
the  constructive  achievements  for  which 
they  are  so  conspicuous,  they,  no  doubt, 
"  clapped  wings  "  to  a  lot  of  the  solid  old 
"lumber  of  the  universe,"  and  erred  in  disre- 
garding much  that  was  of  real  value.  But, 
even  thus,  they  performed  a  service  that  can 
by  no  means  be  minimized.  Their  hypothesis 
was  not  a  vague,  mystical  suggestion,  but  a 
rounded  whole  worked  over  and  over  in 
many  of  its  parts  with  rigorous  care  and 
magnificent  determination.  The  theory  gave 
rise  to  an  extraordinary  ferment  of  inquiry 
into    the   origin  and  early  development  of 


SPECULATIVE  THEOLOGY  41 

Christianity,  and  so  effected  results  which,  if 
not  without  parallel,  have  gone  far  to  change 
the  face  of  theology.  In  one  aspect,  these 
studies  have  largely  narrowed  the  vital  prob- 
lem, with  great  advantage  to  perspicuity  and 
directness ;  while  in  another,  new  difficulties 
have  been  laid  bare,  the  very  existence  of 
which  had  not  previously  dawned  upon 
thinkers.  We  who  live  to  some  extent  in 
the  midst  of  this  movement,  or  who  owe  to  it 
far  more  than  we  are  fully  aware,  can  hardly 
be  expected  to  estimate  aright  the  stimulus 
it  has  imparted.  We  can,  at  all  events, 
acknowledge  that  the  material  on  which  it 
has  turned  our  thoughts  is  not  likely  to  be 
sterile.  What  a  recent  Gifford  lecturer  has 
said  of  philosophy  is  plainly  capable  of  still 
deeper  application  in  the  theological  sphere. 
"  The  greatness  of  a  philosophy  is  its  power 
of  comprehending  facts.  The  most  charac- 
teristic fact  of  modern  times  is  Christianity. 
The  general  thought  and  action  of  the  civil- 
ized world  has  been  alternately  fascinated 
and  repelled,  but  always  influenced,  and  to 
a  high  degree  permeated,  by  the  Christian 
theory  of  life,  and  still  more  by  the  faithful 
vision  of  that  life  displayed  in  the  Son  of 


42  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

Man.  To  pass  that  great  cloud  of  witness 
and  leave  it  on  the  other  side,  is  to  admit 
that  your  system  is  no  key  to  the  secret  of 
the  world,  even  if  we  add,  as  some  will 
prefer,  of  the  world  as  it  is  and  has  been."1 
Thanks  to  such  a  spirit  as  this,  we  now  per- 
ceive that  the  important  problems  centre 
round  God,  round  the  nature  of  God's  mani- 
festation of  himself  in  Jesus,  and  round  the 
relation  in  which  we,  sons  of  men,  stand  to 
the  Son  of  God,  our  spiritual  ensample  and 
elder  brother. 

The  Christian  conception  of  Deity,  we  are 
told,  is  a  complex  one,  containing  two  main 
elements  —  "  the  moral-religious  ideal  of  the 
anthropomorphically  represented  holy  Lord 
and  merciful  Father;  .  .  .  and  the  meta- 
physical principle  which  sprang  from  the 
Greek  speculation  of  the  infinite  Spirit  exalted 
above  all  human  limitation,  the  ground  of 
the  existence  and  of  the  order  of  the  uni- 
verse."2 So,  too,  when  we  muse  upon  God's 
relation  to  man,  we  feel  the  force  of  the  lines 
in  which  the  chief  poet  of  this  movement  has 
sung  of 

1  Wallace,  Prolegomena  to  the  Logic  of  Hegel,  new  edit., 
p.  32. 

a  Pfleiderer,  Gifford  Lectures,  vol.  i.  p.  127. 


SPECULATIVE   THEOLOGY  43 

"  that  Infinite 
Within  us,  as  without,  that  All-in-all, 
And  over  all,  the  never-changing  One 
And  ever-changing  Many,  in  praise  of  Whom 
The  Christian  bell,  the  cry  from  off  the  mosque, 
And  vaguer  voices  of  Polytheism 
Make  but  one  music,  harmonizing  '  Pray.' "  1 

So,  once  more,  no  small  part  of  the  credit  for 
what  has  been  called  the  rediscovery  of  Jesus 
by  the  nineteenth  century  is  due  to  these 
inquirers.  They,  at  least,  have  urged  his 
moral  ubiquity  more  persuasively  than  others, 
and  have  taught  that  to-day  men  in  all  ranks 
may  hear  his  voice  and  walk  in  his  ways 
without  one  whit  more  difficulty  than  the 
fishers  of  Galilee  or  the  pharisee  of  Tarsus. 
Some,  no  doubt,  may  be  attracted  by  different 
types  of  Christian  goodness.  One  may  hold 
to  Paul,  the  author  of  a  systematically  subtle 
faith;  another  to  James,  the  apostle  of  good 
deeds ;  a  third  to  John,  the  herald  of  a  mystic 
affection.  But  all  are  shown  to  be  necessary 
parts  in  a  mighty  plan.  They  subserve  their 
vocation  in  the  universal  order,  and  this,  in 
turn,  is  vindicated  by  a  view  of  life  which 
looks  upon  nothing  as  common  or  unclean. 
Knowledge  has  its  office,  so  too  belief,  so  too 

1  Tennyson,  Death  of  GEnone,  pp.  34,  35. 


44  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

works.  All  are  logically  connected,  and 
thus  come  to  have  absolute  value.  Hence 
the  optimism  of  the  speculative  school,  by 
which  its  contribution  to  theology  in  a 
manner  stands  crowned.  "  The  reverse  side 
of  universal  sin  and  need  of  redemption  is 
found  in  the  universal  ability  of  all  men  to 
be  redeemed,  which  is  based  on  the  inde- 
structible essence  of  the  divine  image  that  is 
in  every  man,  and,  even  amidst  the  thorn- 
thicket  of  sin  and  worldly  lust,  never  becomes 
entirely  extinct,  but  remains,  the  living  germ 
of  a  better  future,  of  a  new  man  in  God. 
...  In  this  manner  an  entirely  new  estim- 
ation of  man  is  reached.  It  is  no  longer  what 
he  is  and  does  externally,  or  what  he  is  con- 
sidered by  the  community  to  be,  that  decides 
his  worth.  This  is  determined  by  his  inmost 
feeling,  the  tendency  of  his  soul  towards  the 
divine  good,  even  if  this  be  at  first  only  a 
painful  regret  for  the  loss  of  it,  and  a  heart- 
felt desire  to  regain  it."1 

Yet,  if  progress  is  to  continue,  if  truth, 
always  sought  but  grasped  partially  and  with 
much  misgiving,  is  ever  to  be  unveiled,  one 
cannot  afford  to  be  blinded,  even  by  sense  of 

1  Pfleiderer,  in  The  New  World,  vol.  i.  pp.  414,  415. 


SPECULATIVE   THEOLOGY  45 

exceptional  obligation,  to  the  difficulties  and 
weaknesses  attendant  upon  this  theological 
scheme.  And,  in  the  first  place,  though 
occupying  admirable  ground  for  protest,  the 
members  of  this  group,  it  seems  to  me,  run 
to  extremes.  As  against  the  crude  supersti- 
tion that  sees  in  Christianity  nothing  but  a 
miraculously  founded  organization,  whose 
associates  are  destined  to  heaven,  leaving 
hell  as  the  portion  for  all  others ;  as  against 
an  equally  crude  materialism,  which  traces 
in  the  sons  of  men  no  more  than  a  higher, 
and  perhaps  undesirable,  animality,  the  pro- 
test can  scarcely  be  overvalued.  Yet  there 
are  reasons  for  fearing  that  it  has  still  to 
subject  itself  to  clarifying  criticism  —  a  criti- 
cism, by  the  way,  that  had  far  better  come 
from  within.  The  system  of  the  universe 
envisaged  by  it  embodies  a  conception  so 
overpowering  that  little  play  is  left  for  the 
single  parts  of  the  organism.  Philosophy 
of  the  absolute,  speculation  concerning  the 
infinite,  tend  to  rule  out  theological  concep- 
tions, strictly  so  called,  of  God  the  Father,  of 
God  the  sinless,  of  God  the  personal  friend 
of  the  truly  religious  man.  The  current  sets 
towards  emphasizing  an  ideal  plan  for  which 


46  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

man  is  in  no  wise  responsible,  but  in  the  inter- 
ests of  which,  on  cognizing  it,  he  is  bound  to 
co-operate  with  the  Eternal.  The  drift  is 
clearly  away  from  personal  religion,  where 
the  life  of  the  individual  predominates,  and  is 
as  clearly  in  the  direction  of  what  many  now 
openly  pursue,  as  a  substitute  for  religion, 
under  the  euphemism  of  "ethical  culture," 
where  membership  of  a  social  organism  and  its 
attendant  claims  swamp  other  considerations. 
The  phenomenal  manifestations  of  the  abso- 
lute, of  God,  —  phenomenal  because  "  differ- 
ences "  and  therefore  imperfect  —  are  the 
subject-matter  of  the  inquiry.  They  presup- 
pose God.  The  infinite  as  such  must  have 
existed  eternally.  Man  may  think  not,  but 
this  is  his  own  fault.  He  laboriously  follows 
out  aspects  of  deity,  which  are  such  only 
because  they  co-exist  with  many  other  ele- 
ments in  the  absolute  nature.  But  aspects 
have  no  import  in  separation.  Self  and  not- 
self  must  be  united,  "we  are  necessarily 
driven  to  think  of  them  as  the  manifestation 
or  realization  of  a  third  term."  In  other 
words,  so  far  from  the  presupposed  unity 
being  nothing  but  the  unity,  as  we  had 
naturally  anticipated,  it  inevitably  turns  out 


SPECULATIVE  THEOLOGY  47 

to  be,  and  is  constantly  regarded  as,  the  sole 
reality.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  to  be  noted 
that  this  recognition  is  kept  well  within 
metaphysical  limits.  The  question  of  the 
personality  of  God,  accordingly,  is  not  so 
pressing  as  it  might  otherwise  conceivably 
be.  Many  will  agree  that  a  defensible  dis- 
cretion is  shown  here.  The  omission  may  be 
accepted  as  legitimate,  if  it  be  remembered 
that  the  result  is  a  description  of  the  ulti- 
mate unity  in  abstract  terms  which  are 
equally  applicable  to  other  "things,"  using 
this  word  in  the  conventional  and  widest 
sense.  Further,  language  usually  associated 
with  ethical  and  personal  qualities  tends  to 
be  conspicuous  by  its  absence.  Every  man, 
seeing  that  he  is  a  partaker  in  self-conscious- 
ness, may  be  held  to  conform  to  the  standard 
of  humanity.  He  is  one  with  God,  meaning 
thereby  that  deity,  qu&  union  of  subject  and 
object,  is  the  immanent  presupposition  of  an 
intelligence  like  his.  Looked  at  from  another 
point  of  view,  the  whole  question  is  one  of 
analytic  exhibition  of  the  contents  of  self- 
consciousness,  corrected  by  observation  of 
the  synthesis  involved  in  their  eventual  co- 
operation.    By  careful  inspection,  man,  the 


48  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

individual,  finds  all  the  leading  traits  of  con- 
sciousness in  general  within  himself.  But 
these  are  the  specific  marks  of  the  unity 
which  is  the  motive-force  of  universal  con- 
sciousness. The  "single  life,"  accordingly, 
needs  but  to  arrive  at  an  explicit  understand- 
ing of  this  presupposition  in  order  to  solve 
the  problem  of  its  own  relation  to  God.  The 
question,  to  put  it  otherwise,  is  not  one  of 
sin,  as  the  discussion  of  religion  might  lead 
many  to  expect.  It  deals  rather  with  evil 
and  imperfection,  matters  peculiar  to  moral 
life.  In  the  theoretical  circle  too,  the  diffi- 
culty is  not  one  of  personal  responsibility, 
but  of  collective  ignorance. 

The  religious  problem  consequently  gives 
place  to  the  philosophical.  In  other  words, 
it  is  not  man's  relation  to  a  supreme  personal 
being  that  demands  consideration,  but  on  the 
contrary,  some  men's  interpretation  of  the 
essential  nature  of  the  cosmological  vicissi- 
tudes of  the  race.  The  reply  is  to  an  inquiry 
about  the  unity  of  experience,  and  the  results 
thus  obtained  are  next  employed  to  light  up 
the  dark  places  of  religion.  The  truth  is 
that,  as  has  been  so  often  urged  against 
Hegel,  the  speculative  interests  have  super- 


SPECULATIVE  THEOLOGY  49 

seded  both  the  religious  and  the  psychological. 
Intellect,  abstracted  from  will  and  feeling, 
holds  the  field.  Now  in  all  intellection  an 
element  of  will  is  present.  Concentration  of 
thought,  for  example,  implies  effort  to  exclude 
the  irrelevant,  and  to  reproduce  vividly  all 
that  is  germane  to  the  point  at  issue  requires 
active  power.  There  is  a  certain  energizing 
"disposition  of  the  heart,"  even  in  dealing 
with  logical  abstractions,  which,  as  might 
pertinently  be  alleged,  forbids  unquestioning 
acceptance  of  the  analysis  into  self,  not-self, 
and  the  unity  mediating  between  them  as  the 
all-sufficient  account  of  self-consciousness. 
No  doubt,  it  would  be  an  error  to  declare 
that  the  speculative  theologian  excludes  feel- 
ing; he  only  dismisses  a  view  of  religion 
which  would  base  explanation  upon  a  mere 
vague  mood.  Yet,  at  the  same  time,  he 
approaches  the  problems  of  religion  from  the 
speculative  side  exclusively.  They,  among 
many  other  things,  are  to  be  turned  over  curi- 
ously, and  regarded  from  without  inwards. 
Any  case  of  self-consciousness  will,  in  the 
main,  subserve  the  purpose  as  well  as  another. 
If  it  embody,  as  by  definition  it  must,  the 
integral  elements  enumerated,  then  the  trans- 

4 


50  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

ition  from  religious  to  speculative  consider- 
ations is  evidently  held  to  be  unavoidable. 
The  latter  cannot  but  absorb  the  former. 
God  is  to  be  known,  literally  by  an  effort  of 
mind ;  there  is  no  searching  for  deity  in  the 
personal  experience  of  the  religious  man,  far 
rather  a  calm  statement  of  the  reasons  why 
men,  being  what  they  are,  must  fall  into  the 
class  of  religious  animals.  The  existence  of 
God,  though  implicit  in  the  premises  by  their 
very  statement,  is  established  by  way  of 
inference.  Little  or  no  allowance  is  made 
for  what  Ulrici1  aptly  called  Gcfuhls- 
perception,  and  thus  an  integral  portion  of 
the  fact —  as  distinguished  from  the  notion 
—  of  religion  is  eliminated.  The  tendency 
of  the  method,  to  put  it  briefly,  is  to 
evaporate  the  personal  element  in  religious 
experience,  and  to  replace  it  by  a  common 
factor.  Certainly  this  lends  simplicity  to 
the  treatment,  and  makes  it  possible  to 
grapple  more  easily  with  the  multitudinous 
details  of  religious  life,  which,  however,  when 
all  is  said,  are  no  more  than  records  of  indi- 
vidual trial.  Indeed,  when  in  their  first 
freshness,  and  vivifying  others  by  the  magic 

1  Cf.  Gott  und  die  Nalur,  p.  606. 


SPECULATIVE   THEOLOGY  51 

spell  lent  them  by  their  originator,  they  are 
so  wholly  personal  as  to  be  significant  only 
because  they  bear  the  stamp  of  this  or  that 
man's  Ahnung.  The  mere  analysis  of  uni- 
versal self-consciousness  or  of  consciousness 
in  general,  to  be  plain,  objectifies  too  much 
the  basis  proposed  for  a  philosophy  of  religion, 
and  consequently  accords  fatally  inadequate 
consideration  to  the  subjective  side.  On 
this  scheme,  allowance  cannot  be  made  for 
those  dumb  thousands  who,  though  not  par- 
takers in  "religious  genius,"  yet  operate  as 
an  embodied  conscience  in  their  immediate, 
though  often  very  narrow,  circle. 

What  this  tendency  involves  has  been 
very  distinctly  stated  by  Mr.  F.  H.  Bradley, 
in  his  brilliant  book  which  would  scarcely 
be  miscalled  the  Disappearance  of  Reality. 
"  Nothing  is  outside  the  Absolute,  and  in  the 
Absolute  there  is  nothing  imperfect.  .  .  . 
The  individual  never  can  in  himself  become 
an  harmonious  system.  And  in  the  wider 
ideal  to  which  he  devotes  himself,  no  matter 
how  thoroughly,  he  can  never  find  complete 
self-realization.  For  even  if  we  take  that 
ideal  to  be  perfect,  and  to  be  somehow  com- 
pletely fulfilled,  yet,  after  all,  he  himself  is 


52  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

not  totally  absorbed  in  it.  If  his  discordant 
element  is  for  faith  swallowed  up,  yet  faith, 
no  less,  means  that  a  jarring  appearance 
remains.  And,  in  the  complete  gift  and  dis- 
sipation of  his  personality,  he,  as  such,  must 
vanish;  and  with  that,  the  good  is,  as  such, 
transcended  and  submerged.  .  .  .  Goodness 
is  an  appearance,  it  is  phenomenal,  and  there- 
fore self-contradictory."1  In  other  words, 
the  protest  against  raw  supernaturalism  and 
equally  raw  materialism  has  run  too  far 
towards  aggrandizing  the  transcendental  uni- 
versality of  the  timeless  one,  and  has  taken 
too  little  account  of  the  active  personality  of 
the  temporal  many.  So  far  as  one  is  capable 
of  grasping  this  immensely  difficult  problem, 
it  may  be  suggested  that  the  correction  is  not 
unlikely  to  come  from  the  side  of  religion. 
It  is  therefore  of  the  last  importance  that 
theology  should  not  too  mildly  acquiesce  in 
its  own  reduction  to  a  subordinate  depart- 
ment of  speculative  inquiry.  Personality, 
especially  in  those  aspects  wherein  it  differs 
from  mere  thinghood,  must  put  in  a  claim 
for  reconsideration.  Man,  at  least  as  a  re- 
ligious being,  cannot  afford  to  class  this  with 

1  Appearance  and  Reality,  p.  419. 


SPECULATIVE  THEOLOGY  53 

"  appearances " ;  indeed,  even  were  he  rich 
enough  to  do  so,  his  ability  to  compass  the 
bare  statement  might  very  well  be  called  in 
question.  For  personality  is  the  highest  cate- 
gory known  to  us,  and  the  more  we  can  expand 
its  content,  the  less  hopeless  does  the  search 
for  absolute  truth  become.  Only  in  a  spirit- 
ual person  limited  like  ourselves,  yet  uplifted 
as  we  are  not,  can  we  obtain  any  reassuring 
glimpse  of  the  infinity  for  which  we  yearn. 

But,  more  than  any  theoretical  analysis, 
the  immediate  character  of  the  speculative 
method  in  practice  demands  close  attention. 
The  simplicity  and  workability  of  the  scheme 
are  correlative  to  its  metaphysical  formality. 
By  a  logical  process  universal  results  are 
reached,  and  then  so  applied  as  to  reduce 
differences  and  smooth  away  difficulties.  On 
this  point,  indeed,  an  explicit  deliverance 
has  been  given.  "Simplification  is  valuable 
only  because  it  enables  us  to  see  our  way 
through  many  details  and  complexities  which 
have  hitherto  resisted  all  the  efforts  of  our 
thought,  but  which  become  pliant  and  intelli- 
gible to  him  who  has  grasped  the  law  of  their 
variation.  If,  after  we  have  reached  such  a 
universal  or  law,  such  a  simple  explanation 


54  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

of  many  complex  phenomena,  we  are  some- 
times at  liberty  to  dismiss  many  of  the  par- 
ticular details  from  our  memory,  and  to 
regard  ourselves  as  possessing  in  the  law  the 
substance  and  kernel  of  them  all,  this  is  only 
because  in  the  law  we  have  a  clue  to  guide 
us  to  the  particulars  which  at  any  time  it 
may  seem  necessary  to  verify.  ...  In  a 
sense  such  a  universal  may  be  beyond  know- 
ledge ;  not,  however,  because  it  is  too  vague 
and  general  for  definite  thought,  but  for  the 
opposite  reason  that  it  is  inexhaustible.'''1 
Such  procedure  is,  perhaps,  fair  to  epochs,  to 
general  movements,  and  to  illustrious  men; 
it  also  lacks  the  flexibility  necessary  to  esti- 
mate in  individual  cases  the  mood  natu- 
rally assumed  by  religious  aspiration.  The 
objective  delineation  of  religions  as  steps  in 
the  historical  sequence  which  at  length 
enables  a  human  being 

"  God  only  to  behold,  and  know,  and  feel, 
Till,  by  exclusive  consciousness  of  God, 
All  self  annihilated,  it  shall  make 
God  its  identity," 

is  a  mighty  theme.  But  the  sequence  and 
its  stages,   largely  to   the   exclusion  of  the 

1  E.  Caird,  Evol.  o/ReL,  vol.  i.  pp.  151-153. 


SPECULATIVE  THEOLOGY  55 

elements  constitutive  of  them,  are  forced 
into  progressive  shape  by  the  method  which 
has  reference  more  to  the  outlines  of  a  devel- 
oping order  than  to  the  concrete  evolving 
matter.  As  concerns  religions,  this  matter 
consists  of  persons ;  they  are  the  reals  of  the 
region  now  before  us.  In  place  of  a  synthe- 
sis directly  touching  them,  there  is  given  a 
classified  statement  of  the  results  which  they, 
on  the  presupposition  of  the  common  factor 
in  their  nature,  necessarily  wrought.  An 
analytic  of  types,  albeit  immense  in  suggest- 
iveness  as  in  sweep,  hardly  has  that  direct 
contact  with  life,  or  rather,  with  historical 
lives,  on  which  alone  interpretation  of  re- 
ligion must  in  the  first  instance  be  based.  Its 
formulism  smacks  suspiciously  of  medieval 
realism.  Speculative  principles  tend  to  be- 
come divorced  from  recorded  instances,  the 
latter  are  too  frequently  set  aside  in  order 
that  the  relations  wherein  they  are  found 
may  be  adjusted  to  the  general  conceptions 
or  ideas  that  have  been  assumed  to  consti- 
tute the  significance  of  members  in  a  system 
—  religious,  philosophic,  or  other.  It  need 
scarcely  be  said,  however,  that,  in  every  ap- 
plication of  the  theory,  such  a  partial  line  is 


56  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

not  rigorously  followed.  But,  undoubtedly, 
a  determined  effort  is  made  to  restrain  the 
facts  within  the  compass  of  a  definite  scheme, 
and  this  seems  to  produce  a  certain  confusion. 
The  universal,  or  presupposed  unity  in  self- 
consciousness,  is  not  kept  sufficiently  distinct 
from  the  common  element  which  appears  on 
analysis  of  selected  instances  of  this  self-con- 
sciousness. The  former  is  strictly  a  priori, 
the  latter  a  posteriori  ;  the  one  is  the  product 
of  deduction,  the  other  of  induction.  Neither 
proves  itself,  yet  both  are  worked  together, 
and  so  they  do  not  serve  to  mutual  verification 
after  each  has  been  applied  in  the  abstract. 
The  latter,  accordingly,  rapidly  wanes.  Broad 
generalizations  characterize  the  conclusion, 
and  these  are  obtained,  not  so  much  by  a 
critical  examination  of  the  evidence  as  by  an 
interested  vindication  of  carefully  selected 
examples.  When  the  treatment  is  more 
detailed,  as  of  Judaism  and  Christianity,  the 
recorded  occurrences  are  required  to  illus- 
trate the  speculative  presuppositions.  The 
a  priori  is  made  to  reproduce  itself  in  the  a 
posteriori;  the  a  posteriori  is  honored  just 
in  so  far  as  it  confirms  the  a  priori.  The 
Christian  religion,  for  instance,  is  the  first  to 


SPECULATIVE   THEOLOGY  57 

embody  an  explicit  perception  of  the  mediat- 
ing unity  that  informs  the  difference  be- 
tween self  and  not-self.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  Christ  is  not  represented  as  the  one 
person  in  whom  the  Absolute  became  incar- 
nate after  a  peculiar  kind.  Objectively,  that 
is,  Christianity  is  fitted  to  the  method ;  sub- 
jectively —  on  the  side  to  which  religion  is 
specially  germane  —  the  method  can  afford 
to  pass  over  the  personal  element  in  the 
Founder  of  this  faith,  or,  at  least,  to  inter- 
pret the  historic  events  of  a  single  life  in 
consonance  with  an  ideal  conspectus  —  which 
could  perfectly  advance  without  them.  All 
men  being  heirs  of  universality,  on  account 
of  the  diffusion  of  self-consciousness,  no 
single  one  can  be  regarded  as  the  inheritor  of 
a  kind  of  spirit  constituting  him  alone  the 
creator  of  a  new  departure.  The  head,  that 
is,  the  theory,  makes  the  theologian. 

These  suggestions  may  be  further  empha- 
sized by  pointing  to  a  tendency  —  due,  as 
must  be  remembered,  to  the  method  adopted 
—  to  treat  the  evolution  of  religion  as  if  it 
were  a  logical  process  of  development.  Now, 
taking  the  term  evolution,  commonly  em- 
ployed by  speculative  theologians  as  a  suffi- 


58  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

cient  description  of  their  work,  certain  of  its 
implications  call  for  notice.  It  implies  a  se- 
lective synthesis  which  is  the  result  neither  of 
subjective  energy  nor  of  objects  themselves, 
but  of  both  combined.  Within  the  sphere  of 
philosophy,  we  take  this  to  imply  that,  when 
a  difficulty  and  a  solution  occur  to  the 
thinker,  the  latter  ought  to  be  brought  to  the 
test  of  objective  interpretation.  The  nature 
of  the  environment  within  which  it  is  to  be 
applied  cannot  fail  to  affect  it  and  to  alter 
its  first  appearance  —  its  aspect  as  it  sprang 
brand  new  from  the  brain  of  its  originator. 
But  this  procedure  can  hardly  receive  appli- 
cation in  the  case  of  a  logical  process  inevi- 
table in  all  self -consciousness,  and  therefore, 
not  only  independent,  but  even  productive 
of  environment.  The  tendency  is,  on  the 
contrary,  to  view  the  whole  movement  as 
one  of  inner  development.  Self-conscious- 
ness has  from  the  beginning  of  time  certain 
qualities  within  itself.  These,  by  its  own 
inner  determination,  it  renders  explicit  in 
religions.  History  is  not  to  be  explained  as 
a  true  evolution  throughout  which  a  selective 
synthesis  takes  place  in  a  conditioning  me- 
dium, and  issues  in  a  series  of  determinate 


SPECULATIVE   THEOLOGY  59 

variations.  Perforce  it  is  a  neuter,  valuable, 
not  for  itself,  but  as  illustrating  a  prescribed 
theory,  and  intelligible  only  when  it  corrobo- 
rates a  specified  thesis.  The  development 
from  within  self-consciousness,  according  to 
the  elements  constituent' of  its  nature,  tends 
to  obliterate  the  evolution  according  to  the 
co-operating,  changing,  yet  determining 
factors  in  living,  or  concrete,  advance.  The 
history  of  religions  receives  too  little  atten- 
tion, the  translation  of  some  of  its  incidents 
into  the  language  of  an  "intellectual  natural- 
ism "  claims  too  much.  The  personal  exper- 
ience of  a  man  who,  at  a  certain  period  of 
his  career,  came  to  consider  himself  one  with 
God,  cannot  induce  the  same  interest  as  the 
theory  of  the  manner  in  which  the  widespread 
belief  in  a  God-man  inevitably  arose  out  of 
the  eternally  fixed  factors  of  self-conscious- 
ness. The  real  evolution  in  the  one  case 
pales  before  the  theoretical  development  in  the 
other.  The  method  —  of  evolution  —  may,  of 
course,  be  applicable  to  all  the  phenomena  of 
religion ;  on  this  point  we  do  not  at  present 
dogmatize.  Assuredly  it  is  not  so  applied  here. 
The  determination  to  read  all  religions  in  the 
light  of  the  highest  religious  achievement  is 


60  CONTEMPORAR  Y  THEOL OGT 

productive  of  a  formalism  that  seems  too 
intolerant  of  intermediate  phenomena,  and 
therefore  hardly  accepts  the  task  of  evaluat- 
ing the  indispensable  environment.  The 
logic,  which  admittedly  is  in  life,  appears 
to  be  on  the  point  of  denying  that  it  requires 
this  theatre,  at  least  it  attempts  to  lay  down 
the  law  to  influences  that  unquestionably 
react  upon  the  principle  thus  imposed.  In 
fine,  it  is  possible  to  trace  a  movement 
towards  a  conclusion  which  means  that  the 
keen  in  intellect  are  blessed,  not  that  they 
stand  in  no  need  of  the  kingdom  of  God,  but 
because  they  are  equipped  to  take  it  by  force 
of  argument. 

IV.   The  Treatment  of  Christianity  by  the 
Speculative  School 

Passing  from  these  more  general  quest- 
ions, the  treatment  accorded  to  Christianity 
demands  close  attention.  It  naturally  falls 
into  two  parts.  The  first  concerns  the  nature 
of  the  Christian  religion  and  St.  Paul's  esti- 
mate of  its  import.  The  historical  evolution 
of  life  and  doctrine  in  the  Christian  com- 
munities constitutes  the  second.  Although 
similar  views  mark  the  account  of  both  sub- 


SPECULATIVE  THEOLOGY  61 

jects,  they  lead  to  different  results  in  each 
case,  so  that  separate  notice  is  unavoidable. 

Whatever  may  be  said  of  the  doctrines 
ultimately  worked  up  into  Christian  theology 
in  the  long  course  of  its  development,  there 
can  hardly  be  a  doubt  that,  in  its  beginnings, 
Christianity  was  purely  Jewish.  Little 
abstract  thinking  and  no  learning  were  at 
its  birth,  but  rather  an  overmastering  sense 
of  man's  relation  to  deity.  The  God  of  the 
Jews  was  alone  capable  of  furnishing  the 
divine  nature  necessary  to  constitute  one  of 
the  factors  in  this  spiritual  communion. 
Christianity  grows  directly  out  of  Judaism, 
because  it  supplies  a  systematic  account  of 
God's  indwelling  in  man.  The  older  religions 
had  here  rested  satisfied  with  a  series  of 
naive  suggestions  —  naive  in  that  no  attempt 
was  made  to  see  that  they  tallied  with  one 
another.  As  I  have  tried  to  show  elsewhere,1 
the  Jews  did  not  set  God  afar  off.  But  small 
effort  was  put  forth  to  show  precisely  why 
"the  prayer  of  the  humble  pierces  the 
clouds,"  why,  that  is,  a  specific  attitude  of 
the  human  spirit  implies  a  response  in  the 
divine    nature   which    results    in    intercom- 

1  Aspects  of  Pessimism,  pp.  3-9. 


62  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

munion.  Christianity  was  a  further  contribu- 
tion to  the  explicit  statement  of  the  subjective 
element  that  forms  the  very  nerve  of  all  re- 
ligion. It  is  the  subjective  religion,  rather  than 
Buddhism,  or  Stoicism,  or  Judaism.  For, 
here  pre-eminently,  both  in  the  Person  of  its 
Founder,  and  in  the  character  of  the  belief 
which  he  requires  from  his  professors,  the 
inner,  or  personal,  process  inseparable  from 
highest  religious  aspiration  stands  at  length 
completely  revealed.  It  may  very  well  be 
that  Christianity  is  the  "  absolute  "  religion. 
No  further  exemplification  of  the  essentials 
of  the  religious  state  is  necessary;  humanly 
speaking,  no  other  may  be  possible.  But, 
with  respect  to  the  individual  who  is,  after 
all,  the  centre  of  spiritualized  life,  it  is  as 
truly  the  most  subjective  of  religions ;  for  in 
its  most  specific  quality  it  consists  of  a  per- 
sonally realized  relation  between  the  wor- 
shipper and  God,  a  relation  rendered  possible 
by  Christ.  To  term  it  the  "absolute" 
religion,  in  a  metaphysical  sense,  is  no  more 
than  a  way  of  transforming  it  into  a  philoso- 
phy, for  it  implies  an  attempt  at  reducing  the 
endless  differences  of  its  revivifying  power  in 
each  separate  case  to  a  simple,  or  abstractly 


SPECULATIVE  THEOLOGY  63 

logical,  expression ;  and  this  issues  in  a  defin- 
ite method  of  interpretation  that  is  not  only- 
inadequate  to  the  historical  facts,  but  leads 
also  to  concealment  of  the  very  essence  of 
the  religion  itself. 

Viewed  as  a  whole,  the  speculative  presen- 
tation of  Christ's  mission,  and  the  concep- 
tions of  His  person  and  position,  are  governed 
by  an  all-pervading  tendenz.  That  is  to  say, 
the  relations  in  which  Christianity  is  expected 
to  stand  to  other  stages  in  the  development 
of  religion  are  preconceived,  and  the  occur- 
rences adduced,  like  the  individuals  por- 
trayed, are  skilfully  found  to  arrange 
themselves  as  had  been  anticipated.  "It  is 
a  law  of  human  history  that  principles  and 
tendencies  which  are  really  universal,  should 
at  first  make  their  appearance  in  an  individual 
form,  as  if  bound  up  with  the  passing  exist- 
ence of  a  particular  nation  or  even  of  a  single 
man.  ...  It  is  only  the  greatest  of  all 
instances  of  this  law  of  development  which 
we  see  in  the  early  history  of  Christianity. 
.  .  .  Thus  the  way  in  which,  in  the  thought 
of  the  disciples,  the  ordinary  limitations  of 
finitude  and  humanity  —  of  that  in  the  finite 
world  and  in  man  which  separates  them  from 


64  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

God  —  gradually  drop  away  from  the  image 
of  Christ,  has  in  it  something  which,  though 
unexampled  in  degree,  yet  agrees  in  kind 
with  the  ordinary  process  by  which  the  ideal 
reveals  itself  in  and  through  the  real." 1  The 
process  of  the  Absolute,  metaphysically  con- 
ceived, is  read  into  history,  and  history 
is  unfolded  as  the  exhibition  of  this  process, 
in  which  there  are  endless  differences  in 
degree  but  none  in  kind.  Once  clearly  for- 
mulated, the  movement  cannot  be  conceived 
as  energizing  otherwise,  but  the  persons 
incident  to  it  might  quite  well  be  replaced, 
seeing  that  degrees  of  manifestation  are  not 
tied  down  to  their  authors  as  are  complete 
divergences  in  kind.  Christ  is  often  admitted 
to  have  been  unique  in  his  work;  no  such 
admission  can  be  entertained  with  respect  to 
his  person,  for  a  theory  that  construes  the 
evolution  of  religion  as  a  developing  series  of 
conceptions  —  of  and  from  God  —  cannot  pos- 
sibly permit  any  divergences  in  kind  within 
its  progress.  If  it  did,  the  process  would 
inevitably  break  down.  Something  for  which 
it  could  not  account  would  be  wedged  in 
between  its  two  halves. 

1  E.  Caird,  Evol.  of  Eel.,  vol.  ii.  pp.  220,  228-229. 


SPECULATIVE   THEOLOGY  65 

Accordingly,  unavoidable  tendencies  shape 
the  construction  of  Christ  and  Christianity. 
The  person  becomes  less  and  less,  the  specu- 
lative Idea  of  his  achievement  more  and 
more.  The  systematized  statement  of  the 
manner  in  which  an  individual  caused  his 
career  to  epitomize  "the  eternal  circulation 
of  the  divine  life  "  replaces  the  absolute  sig- 
nificance of  the  vehicle  of  this  revelation. 
As  Shakespeare  or  Goethe  stand  to  poetry, 
as  Beethoven  or  Mozart  to  music,  as  Caesar 
or  Cromwell  to  war  and  government,  as 
Raphael  and  Michael- A  ngelo  to  painting  and 
sculpture,  so  Jesus  stands  to  religion.  He 
is  first,  not  perhaps  among  his  peers,  but 
certainly  among  his  compeers.  The  single 
life  is  in  every  case  an  instance  of  a 
universal  principle.  Given  a  particular 
Weltanschauung,  and  the  speculative  inter- 
pretation follows.  We  have  to  remember 
that  it  is  no  more  than  an  interpretation, 
and  that  it  is  not  a  part  of  the  religious 
man's  spiritual  "business  philosophically  to 
arrange  matters  between  the  Christian-theis- 
tic  Weltanschauung,  on  the  one  side,  and 
the  deistic,  or  pantheistic,  or  materialistic, 
on   the   other,    which   latter    have    first   to 

5 


66  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

fight    out    their  mortal    conflict   with    one 
another. ' ' l 

In  contradistinction,  it  may  be  submitted 
that  Christianity  does  not  start  from  an  ana- 
lytic of  self-consciousness  as  revealed  in  man, 
but  from  a  certain  historical  fact  —  the  Per- 
son of  Christ.  It  embodies,  not  merely  a  phil- 
osophic scheme  dealing  with  rationality,  but 
rather  a  kind  of  spiritual  presence  never  be- 
fore exemplified  and  never  repeated  since. 
Its  marvel  does  not  lie  so  much  in  the  whole 
evolution  of  which  it  is  a  part,  as  in  the  cir- 
cumstance that  it  put  an  end  to  one  develop- 
ing series  and  initiated  another  that  still 
goes  on.  This  it  accomplished  through  a 
peculiar  personality  in  whom  alone  the  saving 
power  of  deity  was  made  known.  Christ  is 
far  more  than  an  episode  in  the  life-history  of 
a  race  in  which  the  divine  nature  has  been 
always  manifesting  itself  from  less  to  greater 
fulness.  He  is  the  sole  mediator  between 
God  and  man,  in  the  sense  that  only  by 
seeking  to  find  salvation  from  sin  through 
him  can  men  ever  hope  to  experience  that 
inner  oneness  with  God  wherein  religion  is 
consummated. 

1  Beyschlag,  Leben  Jesu,  vol.  i.  p.  10. 


SPECULATIVE   THEOLOGY  67 

The  leading  problem  for  any  systematic 
explanation  of  Christianity  lies  here.  The- 
ology must  attempt  to  show  that  "for  the 
Christian  of  the  present  the  historical  ap- 
pearance of  Jesus  can  become  accessible  as 
something  undoubtedly  certain  and  intelli- 
gible as  God's  revelation,"  and  that  Chris- 
tianity really  "  arises  in  us  when  the  good,  as 
a  power  of  judging  and  yet  rescuing  us, 
becomes  through  Jesus  Christ  a  fact  in  our 
lives."  1  The  divinity  of  Christ,  as  thus  con- 
strued, is  inseparable  from  his  religion, 
because  it  is  the  conclusion  at  which  men 
necessarily  arrive,  if  they  realize  that  God 
alone  could  have  conformed  to  God  as  he 
did.  Christianity  is  thus,  in  one  aspect,  a 
distinctively  subjective  religion.  For,  it 
implies  an  inward  change,  dependent,  how- 
ever, upon  appreciation  of  the  same  change 
as  actually  personalized  once,  and  upon  the 
spiritual  perception  that  such  transformation, 
ending,  as  it  did,  in  unity  with  God,  could 

1  Cf.  Der  Verkehr  des  Christen  mit  Gott,  Herrmann,  passim. 
The  essential  value  of  the  Kitschlian  argument  is  that  it 
has  shown  the  impossibility  of  a  theoretical  proof  of  the 
Christian  faith.  Unless  Christ  so  appeals  to  a  man  as  to 
hring  home  to  him  that  here  his  highest  ideal  has  been  real- 
ized, every  proof  must  fail  to  carry  conviction. 


68  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

have  been  wrought  out  by  God  alone. 
According  to  Christianity,  men  become  fellow- 
workers  with  God  —  they  must  find  the 
disposition.  He  has  guaranteed  in  Christ 
what  the  results  will  be.  Not  an  inherited 
self-consciousness,  but  an  inner  experience 
that  Christ  has,  and  can  transmit,  saving 
grace,  constitutes  the  core  of  Christianity, 
and  firmly  establishes  its  universal  nature. 
In  his  own  workaday  life,  each  must  prove 
for  himself,  reproduce  in  his  own  character, 
what  the  disciples  testify  of  Christ.  Only 
then  will  he  conform  to  the  faith  in  a  per- 
sonal redeemer  without  which  Christianity 
has  no  more  than  a  doubtful  logical  superior- 
ity over  other  religions.  Indeed,  the  his- 
torical facts,  which  have  withstood  all  the 
fire  of  modern  New  Testament  criticism, 
admit  of  no  other  conclusion.  The  continued 
life  of  Christ  in  the  sweet  experience  of  his 
people  is  not  accounted  for  on  the  specul- 
ative method;  and  the  method  can  only  be 
applied  by  eviscerating  the  recorded  incar- 
nation, atonement,  and  resurrection  of  all 
except  an  abstract  —  an  intellectual  —  sig- 
nificance. 

The  emphasis  laid  upon  St.  Paul's  contri- 


SPECULATIVE   THEOLOGY  69 

bution  to  the  progress  of  Christianity,  and 
the  deductions  which  it  is  necessary  to  make 
from  his  doctrine,  go  far  to  corroborate  what 
has  been  already  said.  The  proneness  to 
minimize  the  personal  element,  to  be  "care- 
ful of  the  type"  and  "careless  of  the  single 
life,"  is  here  accentuated.  "For  St.  Paul, 
what  we  may  in  a  narrower  sense  call  the 
personal  element  of  the  gospel  history  disap- 
peared altogether;  and  Jesus  was  simply 
the  Christ,  the  living  embodiment  of  the 
Messianic  idea,  which  at  once  disappointed 
the  old  Messianic  expectations  of  the  Jews, 
and  gave  them  a  higher  fulfilment."  This 
is  so  extreme  as  to  remind  one  of  Von 
Hartmann's  extraordinary  construction  of  the 
New  Testament  history,  in  which  Jesus  appears 
as  the  originator  of  das  Judenchristenthum, 
and  St.  Paul  as  the  founder  of  Christianity.1 
A  comparison  of  the  two  tendenz  interpret- 
ations is  interesting  as  illustrating  how  history 
can  be  led  to  speak  as  the  historian  desires. 
The  speculative  reading,  no  doubt,  is  far 
richer  than  Von  Hartmann's,  still  the  signifi- 
cant truth  remains  that  it  lays  stress  upon 

1  Cf.  Das  religiose  Bewusstsein  der  Menschheit,  ss.  514- 
532  and  546,  seq. 


70  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

the  indispensableness  of  St.  Paul,  and 
enforces  certain  aspects  of  Pauline  teaching 
for  special  purposes.  It  is  the  St.  Paul  of 
the  Areopagus, —  "in  him  we  live,  and  move, 
and  have  our  being,"  —  and  the  St.  Paul  of 
the  eighth  chapter  of  Romans,  —  "  the  earnest 
expectation  of  the  creature  waiteth  for  the 
manifestation  of  the  sons  of  God,"  —  whom 
Professor  Pfleiderer,  for  instance,  enhances. 

St.  Paul  when  he  insists  on  the  atonement 
is  not  so  significant.  "  The  material  out  of 
which  Paul  built  up  the  structure  of  his 
theological  thought  consisted  not  merely  of 
gold  and  precious  stones,  but  also  in  part  of 
ignoble  and  perishing  things.  .  .  .  Paul 
therefore  started  indeed  from  the  dualism 
common  to  him  with  his  time,  of  spirit  and 
flesh,  heavenly  and  earthly  world;  but  this 
dualism  —  and  this  is  what  was  distinctively 
new  in  his  view  —  was  overcome  in  principle 
in  the  one  person  of  Jesus  Christ,  the  spiritual 
man  who  sprang  from  heaven  and  was  ele- 
vated to  heaven;  and  from  this  one  historical 
point  the  advancing  subdual  of  it,  through 
the  abiding  dominion  of  the  spirit  of  Christ 
in  the  Christian  community,  is  once  for  all 
secured.     The   overcoming    in    principle   of 


SPECULATIVE  THEOLOGY  71 

this  dualism  in  the  person  of  Christ  is  indeed 
at  first  still  represented  by  Paul  in  a  quite 
supernatural  form  —  that  is,  to  speak  more 
precisely,  it  is  not  the  earthly  person  of 
Jesus,  but  the  transformation  which  took 
place  with  him  through  his  death  and  resur- 
rection, in  which  Paul  sees  the  earthly  flesh 
overcome  and  the  spirit  of  the  heavenly  man 
set  free  as  the  animating  principle  of  a  new 
humanity.  .  .  .  This  theory  of  a  vicarious 
atonement,  in  which  we  may  perceive  a 
juristic  distortion  of  the  ethical  thought 
of  Isaiah  liii.,  was,  indeed,  never  referred 
by  the  Phariseean  school  to  the  Messiah, 
because  the  worldly  political  direction  of 
their  Messianic  idea  excluded  the  thought 
of  his  suffering  and  dying.  But  when 
the  Pharisee  Paul,  after  his  conversion, 
recognized  the  Messiah  in  the  crucified  Jesus, 
and  began  to  reflect  upon  the  significance  and 
the  purpose  of  this  death  on  the  cross,  it  was 
quite  natural  that  he  should  apply  the  uni- 
versal theory  of  his  school  to  the  special  case 
of  the  martyr-death  of  Jesus,  and  should 
therefore  see  in  this  death  an  expiation  con- 
trived by  God  for  the  atonement  of  the  sinful 
world,  for  our  redemption  from  the  curse  of 


72  CONTEMPORARY   THEOLOGY 

the  law,  for  the  acquisition  of  our  righteous- 
ness. .  .  .  The  death  of  Christ  is  indeed, 
according  to  Paul,  primarily  the  objective 
act  of  expiation  carried  out  in  Christ  as  the 
vicarious  head  of  mankind. " l 

St.  Paul,  when  he  preaches  the  uniqueness 
of  Christ,  is  found  to  hinder  Christianity 
rather  than  further  its  advance.  "In  St. 
Paul's  teaching  there  begins  a  kind  of  sepa- 
ration of  Christ  from  humanity  and  a  kind  of 
identification  of  him  with  God,  which  is 
practically  a  return  to  the  Jewish  opposition 
of  God  and  man.  .  .  .  He  regards  Christ's 
life  in  the  flesh  as  an  episode  between  a  life 
in  glory  before  his  birth  and  a  life  in  glory 
after  his  death,  and  thus  takes  him  out  of  all 
the  ordinary  conditions  of  humanity.  In  this 
way  he  seems  to  deny  that  union  between  the 
divine  and  the  human  which  was  the  essential 
lesson  of  the  gospel  of  Jesus."  Now,  as 
concerns  history,  is  it  not  exactly  in  these 
two  tendencies  that  the  value  of  St.  Paul's 
view  of  Christianity  lies  ?  He  won  his  place 
as  the  greatest  religious  genius  of  Christendom 
just  because  he  realized  so  completely  the 

1  Pfleiderer,  Gifford  Lectures,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  157,  161-162, 
167-168,  172. 


SPECULATIVE  THEOLOGY  73 

personal  contribution  of  Christ  to  His  religion, 
and  perceived  that  His  salvation  was  free,  by 
appreciation  of  His  services  engendering 
faith,  to  Jew  and  Gentile  alike.  He  sums 
np  the  "absoluteness"  of  Christianity  when 
he  says,  "Though  there  be  that  are  called 
gods,  whether  in  heaven  or  in  earth  (as  there 
be  gods  many,  and  lords  many)  but  to  us 
there  is  but  one  God,  the  Father,  of  whom 
are  all  things,  and  we  in  him ;  and  one  Lord 
Jesus  Christ,  by  whom  are  all  things,  and 
we  by  him. ' ' 1  God  remains  the  universal,  as 
the  speculative  writers  contend,  but  Christ  is 
recognized  as  "  the  one  and  universal  medium 
and  actualizing  cause,"  which  they  are  pre- 
cluded by  their  method  from  admitting. 
Relying  on  the  genuine  Epistles,2  was  it  not 
St.  Paul's  distinctive  office  to  have  discov- 
ered, not,  as  we  have  been  told,  the  idea  of 
Messiahship  in  Christ,  but  on  the  contrary, 
the  necessary  implication  of  divinity  in  the 
fact  of  fulfilment  of  the  Messianic  office? 
The  office  has  become  so  united  with  the 
person  that  St.    Paul's   lasting  merit  is  to 

1  1  Corinthians  viii.  5-6. 

2  Cf.  Romans  ix.  5,  x.  12-13,  xiv.  6-9  ;  Philippians  i.  21, 
ii.  11;  1  Corinthians  i.  9,  ii.  16,  xii.  3. 


74  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

have  perceived  all  that  Jesus'  life  involved 
—  that  he,  and  he  only,  was  the  Christ,  the 
divine  Son  sent  to  incarnate,  and  the  sole 
incarnation  of,  the  kind  of  life  that  he  lived. 
The  Sonship,  as  read  by  St.  Paul,  is  an 
actual  cause  destined  to  be  exclusively 
devoted  to  a  peculiar  function. 

The  meagre  Christology,  already  outlined 
above,  takes  its  source  in  the  implicit  denial 
of  originating  power  to  personality.  It  is 
easy  on  this  method,  —  to  take  an  illustra- 
tion, —  to  fall  into  the  error  of  constructing 
misleading  parallels  between  say,  Buddhism 
and  Christianity.  Just  because  the  former 
is  a  subjective  religion,  so-called,  and  because 
the  latter  contains  a  subjective  element, 
which  speculative  theology  fails  to  appre- 
ciate, the  error  originates.  Nevertheless,  in 
spite  of  a  common  search  for  salvation,  a 
common  integral  asceticism,  and  certain  exter- 
nal qualities  attributed  to  Jesus  and  Gautama 
alike,  the  two  religions  are,  in  all  essentials, 
most  luridly  contrasted.  The  person  of  the 
Christ  is  Christianity;  the  person  of  Gautama 
recedes  more  and  more  as  investigation  pro- 
gresses, while  his  system  gains  ever-increasing 
prominence.     "The   language   of  Buddhism 


SPECULATIVE   THEOLOGY  75 

has  no  word  for  the  poesy  of  Christian 
love."1  "The  sin  of  self,"  so  fittingly  cele- 
brated in  The  Light  of  Asia,  is  of  a  purely 
intellectual  matter,  and  has  no  reference  to 
that  self-seeking  which  is  condemned  in  the 
Sermon  on  the  Mount.  Mara  and  the  Devil 
do  not  tempt  in  the  same  way.  Gautama 
would  have  missed  salvation  had  he  insisted 
on  his  own  personality;  Christ  saves  men 
only  by  the  perception  that  his  personality 
was  indispensable.  The  conversion  necessary 
in  the  one  case  has  literally  no  point  of  con- 
tact with  that  desired  in  the  other.  The 
Buddha  is  "converted"  by  an  objective  trans- 
formation, by  a  new  mental  synthesis  respect- 
ing the  world.  He  becomes  "holy"  when 
he  understands  that  bodily  life  contains  no 
satisfaction;  he  is  "saved"  when  he  knows 
that  damnation  and  safety  are  equally 
meaningless. 

The  speculative  argument  lends  itself  to 
the  perpetuation  of  such  mistakes  on  account 
of  its  false  perspective.  The  contention  is 
that  Jesus,  like  other  men,  was  a  vehicle  of 
universal  principles,  or,  as  metaphysicians 
would  say,  a  symbol  of  essential  truth.     I 

1  Oldenberg,  Buddha,  p.  292. 


76  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

cannot  agree  that  the  explanation  is  satis- 
factory. If  nothing  more,  it  confounds 
Christ's  person  with  his  works.  The  one, 
as  I  maintain,  was  primary,  the  others  alone 
were  secondary.  The  uniquely  consecrated 
life,  by  being  set  in  a  timeless  series  of  lives, 
may  be  partially  rationalized ;  the  uniqueness 
and  the  daily  resurrection  in  other  lives  are 
not  to  be  accounted  for  thus.  The  historical 
construction,  proceeding  even  now  mainly 
along  the  lines  of  the  Tubingen  school,  is 
addressed  to  the  former  problem.  St.  Paul 
is  the  starting-point,  and  his  antagonism  to 
the  Judaizing  Christians  forms  the  type  of  a 
series  of  collisions  that  constitute  the  motive- 
force  in  the  after  development  of  the  religion. 
All  these  dialectical  movements,  which  are 
partly  objective  in  character,  presuppose  an 
inner  division  in  Christian  theory  itself.  Now 
the  pantheistic  element  predominates,  again 
the  monotheistic,  and  by  the  constant  inter- 
action between  the  two,  advance  is  con- 
ditioned. There  can  be  little  doubt  that  to 
this  hour  writers  have  permitted  their  view 
to  be  too  exclusively  colored  by  the  theo- 
logical deductions  of  such  thinkers  as  F.  C. 
Baur  and  Biedermann.     Although  the  former 


SPECULATIVE  THEOLOGY  77 

forced  New  Testament  criticism  to  become 
scientific,  he  employed  methods  which  are 
quite  opposed  to  sound  historical  research.1 
For,  the  self-revelation  of  an  immanent  idea 
was  to  his  mind  the  essence  of  history. 
Organism  was  investigated  to  the  exclusion 
of  environment;  external  conditions  were 
minimized  in  an  anxiety  to  prove  that  a  pre- 
conceived metaphysical  principle  can  be 
applied  to  remove  every  crux.  This  pro- 
cedure may  serve  to  throw  a  certain  light 
upon  some  large  aspects  of  the  development 
of  Christianity,  it  cannot  follow  out  the 
course  of  the  evolution  with  sufficiently 
minute  persistence.  The  struggle  between 
Christianity  and  Rabbinical  scholasticism; 
its  conflict  with  neo-Platonism ;  the  division 
between  the  Church  and  the  world  of  the 
Middle  Ages;  the  opposed  objectivity  of 
Catholicism  and  subjectivity  of  the  Reformers ; 
the  contrasted  Hellenism  of  Erastians  and 
Hebraism  of  Calvinists,  —  all  are  undoubt- 
edly aspects  of  the  progress  of  a  civilization 
into  which  Christianity  has  entered.  But  to 
allege  that  they  represent  the  evolution  of 

1  Cf.   Ritachl,  ia  Jahrb.  fur  deuts.   Theol.,  vol.  vi.  pp. 
429,  seq. 


78  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

Christianity  itself  is  to  disregard  many  other 
occurrences  pre-eminently  deserving  at  least 
equal  consideration.  And,  coming  now  to 
the  second  point,  it  is  also  to  forget  that  the 
evolution  of  Christianity  consists  in  the  long 
vicissitudes  through  which  Christ  himself 
has  gone  in  relation  to  persons  who  revere 
him.  For  its  advance  can  never  be  exhibited 
with  historical  accuracy  if  it  be  viewed  simply 
as  the  logical  movement  of  "the  Christian 
idea."  Its  manifoldness,  which  eludes  all 
categorizing,  is  due  to  its  inmost  nature  as 
an  objective  record  of  the  subjective  attempts 
that  men  have  been  making  in  all  the  ages  of 
our  era  to  realize,  each  for  himself,  what  the 
revelation  of  God  in  Christ  implies.  The 
importance  of  Christianity  lies,  that  is,  in 
the  office  performed  by  Christ  for  every 
individual  apart,  rather  than  in  an  elaborated 
conception  of  a  principle  which  expresses 
itself  in  him  "as  being  the  first  to  break 
through  the  Jewish  division  between  the 
divine  and  the  human,  yet  without  falling 
into  the  gulf  of  an  abstract  pantheism,  or 
losing  any  of  that  moral  idealism  in  which 
the  purifying  power  of  monotheism  lay." 
Christ,  the  Person,  is  only  to  be  grasped  by 


SPECULATIVE  THEOLOGY  79 

religious  means,  and  the  history  of  Christian- 
ity is  no  more  and  no  less  than  the  practical 
illustration  of  the  operation  of  these  means 
in  myriad  lives,  and  under  the  most  divergent 
circumstances.  Throughout,  it  is  largely 
subjective,  because  the  "  absoluteness "  of 
Christianity  consists  in  the  experience  of 
unity  with  Jesus,  and,  through  him,  with 
God.  And,  as  each  personality  is  a  separate 
universe,  so  his  sense  of  salvation  is  unique, 
be  the  philosophical  explanation  of  God's 
immanence  what  it  may. 

In  short,  a  theory  of  Christ,  though  necess- 
arily of  a  wholly  different  kind  from  that 
which  was  diffused  among  the  Jews  prior  to 
his  advent,  has  been  employed  to  perform  a 
precisely  parallel  service.  A  want  is  thus 
supplied  —  a  want  due  to  a  specific  colloc- 
ation of  intellectual  and  ethical  circumstances. 
But  whether  the  satisfaction  sufficiently 
tallies  with  the  facts  of  Christ's  appearance 
and  of  his  continuous  life  in  the  souls  of 
believers,  is  another  matter.  Be  this  as  it 
may,  what  he  effected  was  not  brought  about 
once  for  all  by  the  co-operation  of  prior  and 
contemporary  influences.  He  was  not,  and 
is  not,  a  mere  vehicle.     His  genius  is  not  the 


80  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

simple  expression  of  what  others  thought  and 
urgently  desired;  it  is  a  living  force  which 
still  remains  and  reproduces  its  own  qualities 
in  the  lives  of  men  now  and  here.  "  Heroes  " 
and  "representative  men"  are  the  quintes- 
sence of  epochs ;  he  is  the  genu  which  fructi- 
fies at  all  times.  In  this  respect  he  is 
without  parallel,  and  so  we  cannot  separate 
his  person  from  his  work. 

At  the  close  of  the  speculative  interpret- 
ation the  central  theological  problems  —  of 
God  and  of  Christ  —  are  thus  problems  as 
much  as  ever.  For  it  cannot  be  denied  that, 
both  in  theology  and  philosophy,  the  pos- 
itions here  reviewed  demand  very  careful  con- 
sideration. If  we  are  to  give  up  Christ's 
mediation  till  he  becomes  "little  more  than 
the  spiritual  brother  in  God,  and  Christ- 
worship  becomes  practically  impossible ; "  if 
we  are  to  adopt  this  theology  "with  all  its 
catholicity,  but  also  with  all  its  vagueness 
and  its  want  of  touch  with  the  practical 
religious  life,"  —  we  must  at  least  do  so, 
not  on  authority,  but  by  conscientiously 
rethinking  the  entire  scheme  for  ourselves. 
No  other  method  is  in  any  respect  defensible 
relative    to    matters  so   fundamental.     The 


SPECULATIVE  THEOLOGY  81 

logic  of  the  situation  substantially  is  —  Must 
we,  in  order  to  a  metaphysical  theory  of  God 
and  a  speculative  explanation  of  the  life  of 
Christ,  put  up  with  a  bare  minimum  of 
personal  religion  ? 


RITSCHLIAN    THEOLOGY 

I.   The  Presuppositions  of  the  Bitschlian  School 

In  approaching  the  Ritschlians,  a  prelimi- 
nary warning  must  be  issued.  Their  stand- 
point is,  on  the  whole,  so  foreign  to  the 
modes  of  thought  with  which  the  majority 
of  us  are  familiar,  that  a  special  difficulty 
accompanies  the  statement  of  a  theory  already 
sufficiently  complex  and,  as  one  might  per- 
haps  add,  shifting.  "It  is  a  system  which 
cannot  be  classified  under  any  definite  species, 
which  overturns  the  officially  recognized 
divisions."1  I  can  only  premise  that  I  shall 
attempt  to  be  as  fair  as  human  weakness 
permits. 

To  grasp  the  general  basis  of  this  latter-day 
theological  phenomenon,  one  cannot  do  better 
than  take  note  of  the  historical  tendencies 
that  have  produced  it.  For  this,  like  other 
conspicuous    movements,  is    the    expression 

1  P.  Lobstein,  La  Notion  de  la  Pre-existence  du  Fils  de 
Dieu,  p.  129. 


BITS CHL TAN  THEOLOGY  83 

of  a  want.  The  constructive  systems  of  the 
post-Kantian  period,  more  especially  Hegel's, 
resulted,  as  we  have  seen,  in  an  extraordinary 
theological  activity.  In  theology  proper,  as 
distinguished  trom  Old  or  New  Testament 
criticism,  this  took  form  in  the  restatement 
of  dogma.  As  the  philosophical  interest 
predominated,  the  tendency  was  to  bring 
theology  into  line  with  speculative  theory. 
The  "picture-thinking"  of  religion,  as  the 
contention  ran,  stood  in  need  of  reproduction 
under  the  strictly  notional  framework  of 
philosophy.  In  consequence,  dogmas,  if  not 
altered  entirely,  were  at  least  transformed  in 
meaning,  and,  after  a  time,  it  appeared  to 
many  that  the  old  landmarks  had  been 
removed.  A  feeling  of  uncertainty  and  dis- 
trust began  to  assert  itself.  When  this  con- 
dition obtains,  it  usually  happens  that  men 
cast  about  for  a  cause  on  which  to  throw 
blame.  In  this  case,  accusation  would  prima 
facie  have  been  laid  at  the  door  of  speculative 
theory.  But  just  when  Ritschl's  thought 
was  in  movement,  events  so  conspired  that 
speculative  rationalism  was  inevitably  debited 
with  the  charge.  The  lean  years  of  Hegelian- 
ism   were    beginning;    positive    science,    in 


84  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

access  of  triumph,  was  on  the  point  of  gener- 
ating, not  simply  an  exclusively  empirical 
treatment  of  things,  but  a  naturalistic  expla- 
nation of  the  entire  universe.  Let  alone  air 
and  earth  and.  sea,  exploited  by  Schelling  and 
some  of  his  followers,  the  theory  of  the  Abso- 
lute was  in  process  of  discredit  even  in  its 
own  peculiar  realms  of  morals  and  religion. 
Metaphysic  seemed  to  have  failed  all  round 
at  the  very  moment  when  science  appeared 
to  have  become  altogether  successful  in  its 
new  and  unscientific  role  of  an  ultimate 
theory.  In  these  circumstances,  the  position 
evidently  could  not  be  secured  for  theology 
by  any  alliance  with  the  much  bethumped 
system-mongers.  And,  as  a  result,  RitscJil 
was  one  of  the  first  to  take  up  the  now  well- 
worn  watchword,  "Back  to  Kant." 

Catch-phrases  are  a  little  apt  to  be  mislead- 
ing. I  suppose  we  must  all  go  back  to  Kant, 
and  keep  going  back  to  him,  oftener,  perhaps, 
than  we  should  care  to  acknowledge,  if  we 
are  to  grasp  the  methods  and  problems  of 
modern  philosophy.  But  the  phrase,  in  the 
historical  connections  now  before  us,  came  to 
imply  rather  a  return  to  those  portions  of 
Kant  that  best   consorted   with  the  private 


RITSCHLIAN  THEOLOGY  85 

opinions  of  the  pilgrim.  Accordingly,  the 
Ritschlian  point  of  departure  is  a  view  that 
is  not  necessarily  that  of  Kant,  but  for 
which,  at  the  same  time,  Kant  furnishes  a 
certain  defence. 

To  put  the  matter  very  summarily:  In 
his  criticism  of  the  theoretical  or  rational 
faculty,  Kant  answers  the  question  —  How  is 
science  possible  ?  And  he  shows  that  mind 
must  supply  certain  constitutive  factors  to 
our  perception  of  the  general  conditions  of 
phenomena  —  to  wit,  time  and  space.  It 
must,  further,  furnish  categories  capable  of 
ordering  sensations  so  that  we  may  obtain 
knowledge  of  relations  between  particular 
phenomena.  Science  is  possible  because  it 
exists,  and  reason  enters  of  necessity  into  all 
its  varied  aspects.  But^jon  this  analysis, 
metaphysic  does  not  exist.  For,  the  self, 
the  universe,  and  God  are  not  phenomena; 
they  are  ideas  of  reason.  They  cannot  be 
made  objects  of  thought,  and  so  no  certain 
knowledge  of  them  as  they  really  are  in  them- 
selves can  be  obtained.  Thus  man  is  seen  to 
live  a  twofold  life.  As  a  thinking  being,  he 
can  know  phenomena,  but  not  ultimate  real- 
ities.   As  a  moral  being,  he  does  not  deal  with 


86  CONTEMPORARY   THEOLOGY 

phenomena,  but  cannot  help  arriving  at  a 
conviction  that  God,  freedom,  and  immor- 
tality constitute  conspicuous  realities  in  his 
experience  —  they  are  the  mighty  practical 
persuasions. 

To  get  rid  of  metaphysic,  and  to  conserve 
an  inviolable  sphere  for  theology,  Ritschl 
and  his  followers  laid  hold  upon  this  sharp 
distinction,  and,  it  must  be  said,  the  ma- 
jority of  them  have  been  prone  to  empha- 
size it.  The  certainties  of  science  have 
nothing  to  do  with  the  objects  of  theology, 
and  the  objects  of  theology  hold  no  commerce 
with  the  certainties  of  science.  I  leave  you 
the  entire  material  world  to  dispose  of  as  you 
please,  says  the  Ritschlian  to  the  Darwinian; 
at  the  same  time,  I  warn  you  that  the 
methods  by  which  alone  you  can  hold  your 
kingdom  are  void  of  application  in  my  own 
realm  of  moral  and  religious  truth.  Or,  to 
use  Ritschl's  own  words,  "  The  contention  has 
gradually  become  prevalent  that  religion  and 
the  theoretic  knowledge  of  the  world  are  dis- 
tinct functions  of  the  spirit,  which,  where 
they  are  applied  to  the  same  objects,  do  not 
I  even  partially  coincide,  but  go  in  toto  asunder 
/   from  each  other." J     Religion,  to  put  it  other- 

1  Rechtfertigung  und  V.,  3d  edit.,  vol.  iii.  p.  185. 


RITSCHLIAN  THEOLOGY  87 

wise,  necessarily  implies  a  teleological  con- 
ception of  the  world;  science,  a  causal  one. 
And,  as  each  of  these  doctrines  has  its  sepa- 
rate sphere,  neither  conflicts  with  the  other. 
Theology,  therefore,  to  secure  its  own  results, 
must  carefully  abstain  from  any  such  incursion 
into  the  region  of  theoretical  inquiry  as  meta- 
physical discussion  inevitably  involves.  Phil- 
osophy is  tabooed  because  it  is  no  more  than 
another  kind  of  science  —  a  pseudo-science. 

To  this  point  no  one  with  a  general  ap- 
preciation of  the  concluding  portion  of  the 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason  need  have  difficulty 
in  grasping  the  position.  But  it  must  be 
confessed  that  the  next  step  puzzles  sorely. 
Ritschl  and  the  majority  of  ms  school  are 
not  pure  neo-Kantians  of  the  Lange  type; 
Lotze  has  entered  as  a  new  and  disturbing 
element.  Here  the  difficulty  of  fairly  es- 
timating the  standpoint  becomes  serious. 
Nor  is  the  necessity  for  overcoming  it 
merely  imaginary.  For  Ritschl  himself  has 
said,  "Each  theologian  is  under  compul- 
sion or  obligation  as  a  scientific  man  to 
proceed  according  to  a  definite  theory  of 
knowledge,  of  which  he  must  be  conscious 
himself,  and  the  legitimacy  of  which  he  must 


88  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

prove."1  If  this  be  so,  one  must  frankly  say 
that  the  adherents  of  the  master  afford  but 
little  aid.  Two  of  the  most  promjnent, 
Herrmann  and  Kaftan,  differ  from  each 
other,  the  former  Feing  a  more  or  less  ortho- 
dox neo-Kantian,  the  latter  leaning  more  or 
less  towards  Lotze,  while  neither  agrees  with 
his  chief.  In  these  circumstances  the  fairest 
course  is  to  look  at  Ritschl's  own  view,  and 
inquire  whether  it  contains  elements  that 
account  for  these  later  divergences.  Indeed, 
one  is  bound  to  this  course,  because  it  is 
by  no  means  simple  to  perceive  how  Kant's 
theory  and  Lotze's  are  capable  of  unification. 
Having  accepted  the  negative  results  of 
the  Kantian  criticism,  with  their  separation 
of  the  theoretical  and  practical,  of  the  intell- 
ectual and  the  moral  spheres,  Ritschl  went 
on  to  supplement  these  conclusions  by  adding 
a  positive  theory  of  knowledge.  In  this  con- 
nection we  have  the  most  express  statement 
of  his  indebtedness  to  his  Gb'ttingen  friend 
and  colleague,  Lotze.  He  says  summarily 
that  there  are  three  varieties  of  epistemolog- 
ical  theory  —  Plato's,  Kant's,  and  Lotze's. 
He  sharply  criticises  the  first,  finds  consider- 
1  Theol.  und  Meta.,  p.  40. 


RITSCHLIAN    THEOLOGY  89 

able  fault  with  the  second,  and  proclaims,  in 
so  many  words,  his  adhesion  to  the  third.1 

What,  then,  is  Lotze's  epistemology  ?  It 
is  a  theory  which,  in  opposition  to  absolute 
idealism,  reposes  upon  the  conviction  that 
reality  is  immensely  richer  than  thought,  and, 
as  a  consequence,  largely  shapes  itself  in 
showing  the  poverty  of  thought.  Thought 
is  limited  to  the  exercise  of  a  purely  formal 
function,  and,  accordingly,  one  must  protest 
alike  against  the  scientific  man  and  the  phil- 
osopher when  they  attempt  to  explain  every- 
thing by  its  means.  It  exercises  this  function 
upon  receipt  of  data.  When  these  data  are 
referable  to  the  senses,  the  objects  of  the 
so-called  outer  world  are  cogitated;  when 
they  are  referable  to  intuition,  the  ideal 
objects  of  art,  of  morals,  of  religion,  come 
within  ken.  But,  despite  a  predominating 
critical  and  analytic  tendency,  Lotze  could 
not  rest  satisfied  with  this  account  of  the 
conditions  of  subjective  thought,  and  immed- 
iately passed  over  into  metaphysic  proper. 
He  pointed  out  that,  as  space  is  a  subjective 
form  in  which  we  place  objects,  all  things, 
thus  regarded,  are  phenomenal;  they  appear 

1  Cf.  Rechtfertigung  und  V.,  2d  edit.,  vol.  iii.  pp.  19,  seq. 


90  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

in  spatial  relations  to  us;  they  are  not  so 
existent  actually,  as  far  as  we  can  know. 
What,  then,  are  they  ?  If  our  sensations  be 
the  occasion  of  phenomena  that  are  not  in 
any  way  like  real  things,  what  is  a  real 
thing?  This  problem  implies  the  abolition 
of  the  thing-in-itself,  and  takes  us  beyond 
the  Kantian  position.  Lotze's  reply  is  — 
Although  by  thought  we  can  never  know 
that  which  "  lies  behind  "  a  thing  and  gives 
it  reality,  yet  we  cannot  help  believing  that 
the  persistence  of  things  is  capable  of  ex- 
planatiqiL  !Now,  the  only  known  fact  of  ex- 
perience that  persists  through  the  varied 
changes  of  action  and  reaction,  is  the  self. 
Accordingly,  by  analogy  we  attribute  the 
nature  of  the  self  to  every  object.  We  con- 
clude that  things  must  be  soul-like,  other- 
wise they  would  not  possess  the  permanent 
value  in  our  experience  which  they  cer- 
tainly have.  While  for  reason  the  world  is 
no  more  than  phenomenal,  for  faith  it  is  a 
system  of    self-like   beings.      It  has,    that   is, 


a  value  over  and  above  all  that  we  can  learn 
about  it  by  reflection.  In  other  words, 
although  asserting  that  we  cannot  know 
reality,  Lotze  proceeds  to  dogmatize  concern- 


RITSCHL1AN  THEOLOGY  91 

ing  it,  because,  otherwise,  he  could  not,  on 
his  own  terms,  enter  the  sphere  of  metaphysic 
at  all.  He  thus  sets  himself  upon  a  see-saw 
between  a  thought  that  deals  in  phenomena 
and  a  faith  that  declares  itself  to  be  possessed 
of  ultimate  truth.  Ritschl's  theology  had  to 
face  the  difficulty  of  connecting  the  Kantian 
separation  between  reason  and  religion  with  the 
Lotzian  co-operation  between  logic  and  life. 

While,  in  his  early  thought,  Ritschl  was 
occupied  with  the  Kantian  division  between 
religious  practice  and  metaphysical  theory,1 
he  came  later  to  feel  the  need  of  attaching 
some  kind  of  ultimate  value  to  the  objects  of 
religion.2  So  he  seized  upon  Lotze's  doc- 
trine, and  especially  upon  its  "  judgment  of 
worth."  Just  as  for  Lotze  an  object  must 
possess  a  self-like  being  on  account  of  its 
place  in  experience,  so  for  Ritschl,  God, 
Christ,  and  the  kingdom  of  God,  irrespec- 
tively of  their  real  nature  —  about  which, 
indeed,  we  know  nothing  —  so  win  upon  us 
that  we  attach  absolute  value  to  them.  As 
with  Lotze,  so  with  Ritschl,  these  "  things  " 
are  held  experientially  to  be  of  worth  because 

1  Cf.  Rechtfertirjung  und  V.,  1st  edit.,  vol.  i.  p.  410. 

2  Cf.  ibid.,  2d  edit.,  vol.  iii.  p.  20. 


92  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

they  fill  a  certain  place  in  life.  To  this 
point  Ritschl  goes  with  Lotze.  But,  remain- 
ing true  to  his  neo-Kantianism,  and  being, 
as  one  is  forced  to  conclude,  almost  destitute 
of  metaphysical  interest,  he  ignores  Lotze's 
further  conclusion.  He  does  not  clearly  per- 
ceive that,  for  his  colleague,  things  are  no 
more  than  phenomena,  and  that,  in  so  far  as 
they  are  valuable,  they  must  be  lifted  up  to 
the  same  level  as  the  objects  of  religion,  so 
to  speak.  Accordingly,  he  seeks  both  to  eat 
his  cake  and  have  it.  He  throws  all  the  dis- 
credit of  phenomenality  upon  metaphysic 
from  his  neo-Kantian  standpoint,  and  he 
attributes  all  the  credit  of  operative  value  for 
us  to  theological  objects  from  his  Lotzian 
position.  Nevertheless,  he  does  not  appre- 
hend that,  according  to  the  latter,  the  objects 
of  metaphysic  are  on  a  level  with  the  objects 
of  religion ;  both  are  of  worth  in  experience 
for  the  same  reasons.  So  at  one  moment  he 
is  engaged  in  widening  the  gulf  between 
theology  and  metaphysic,  at  another  in 
aggrandizing  theology,  or  rather  in  rehabili- 
tating its  subject-matter,  by  a  method  which 
heals  this  sejoaration  entirely.  He  conserves 
anrnvioTable  realm  for  theology  by  that  strange 


R1TSCHLIAN  THEOLOGY  93 

critical  idealism  which  extrudes  metaphysics ; 
while  he  peoples  this  region  by  aid  of  a 
critical  realism  that  is  nothing  if  not  meta- 
physical. We  are  not  now  concerned  with 
the  validity  of  either  view  in  itself.  But 
we  have  to  bear  in  mind  that  the  great  diffi- 
culty of  understanding  Ritschl  lies  here. 
For,  while  he  alleges  that  theology  has  one 
task,  and  metaphysic  another,  he  at  the 
same  time  proceeds  to  delineate  the  work 
of  the  former  by  means  of  a  plan  which 
abolishes  this  assumed  difference  of  aim. 
With  Lotze,  the  phenomenal,  which  Ritschl 
relegates  to  metaphysic,  has  no  existence 
except  in  our  representation ;  therefore  things, 
in  so  far  as  they  contribute  estimable  ele- 
ments to  our  experience,  must  be  explained 
by  the  same  value-judgments  as  the  objects 
of  religion.  To  this  indigestible  philosophi- 
cal appetizer  may  be  traced  the  varied  results 
of  the  theological  meal  alike  with  Ritschl 
himself  and  the  members  of  his  school.  De 
gustibus  non  est  disputanclum.  Or,  to  put  it 
in  another  way,  when  staking  out  the  theo- 
logical field,  Ritschl  is  entirely  with  Kant; 
when  formulating  and  analyzing  theological 
doctrines,  he  is  entirely  with  Lotze.     So  in 


94  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

the  school  itself,  when  theological  affinities 
predominate,  as  with  Herrmann,  Kant  is  the 
great  authority;  when  philosophical  theory 
attracts,  as  with  Kaftan,  Lotze's  thought  is 
the  more  conspicuous. 

Ritschl  thus  bases  his  theology  upon  two 
main  theorems.  The  first,  derived  from  a 
partial  adoption  of  Kantian  criticism,  creates 
a  cleavage  between  metaphysical,  or  scientific, 
and  theological  interests.  Theology  has 
nothing  to  do  with  origins  or  with  ultimate 
nature.  These  are  left  to  metaphysics  and 
science,  and,  indeed,  must  be  so  far  decep- 
tive inquiries,  because  man  can  know  only 
the  phenomenal.  The  second,  taken  from 
Lotze,  lays  stress  on  the  principle  that,  in 
our  experience,  ideal  matters  must  be  judged 
strictly  in  relation  to  ourselves.  That  is, 
they  contribute  to  experience  in  so  far  as 
they  impress  us  with  an  irresistible  convic- 
tion of  their  own  value ;  and  this  is  capable 
of  estimate.  In  theology  we  ask  —  What  is 
the  worth  of  God,  or  of  Christ,  or  of  the 
other  objects  of  religious  experience  ?  —  we 
are  by  no  means  concerned  with  what  they 
actually  are  in  themselves.  These  being  the 
presuppositions,  what  now  are  the  results  ? 


RITSCHL1AN  THEOLOGY  95 


II.   The  Special  Conclusions  of  the  Bitschlian 
School 

Before  proceeding  to  a  brief  statement  of 
definite  doctrines,  it  ought  to  be  remarked 
that  the  Ritschlian  method,  both  in  its  nega- 
tive and  positive  aspects,  has  much  original- 
ity. The  critical  achievement  consists  chiefly 
in  an  attack  upon  prevalent  views  by  way  of 
a  new  interpretation  of  theological  history. 
The  early  period  of  Christianity,  as  the  argu- 
ment runs,  was  characterized  by  contamin- 
ation of  the  pure  and  original  teaching  of 
Christ.  A  "fatal  combination"  thus  took 
place  between  Christian  religion  and  Greek 
philosophy  and  ethics.  The  aspiration,  which 
is  so  plainly  the  mark  of  man's  religious  life, 
suffered  eclipse,  because  theories  of  the 
worlcLin  its  origin  and  import  came  to  com- 
mand the  lion's  share  of  theological  atten- 
tion.. So,  at  a  later  time,  writers  like  Anselm 
and  Thomas  Aquinas  framed  scholastic  sys- 
tems, instead  of  formulating  religious  dog- 
matics. After  the  Reformation  the  same 
movement  continued,  with  the  difference  that 
one  authority  — ■  the  Bible  —  took  the  place  of 


96  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

another  —  the  Latin  Church.  Towards  the 
close  of  last  century,  Kant,  in  the  concluding 
portion  of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  and 
his  "critical  idealist  "followers  proved  that 
the  dogmas  of  Catholicism  and  Protestantism 
equally  could  not  be  fundamentally  true,  be- 
cause reason  was  so  constituted  as  to  be  in- 
capable of  arriving  at  knowledge  of  reality. 
It  therefore  became  necessary  either  to  dis- 
pense with  religion  or  to  regard  it  from  an 
I  entirely  new  standpoint.  The  positive  work 
of  the  Ritschlian  method  was  to  provide  the 
latter. 

Seeing  that  all  speculative  theology  —  even 
if  the  speculative  admixture  be  very  slight 
—  inevitably  falls  into  the  error  of  becoming 
a  natural  religion,  and  thus  discredits  revel- 
ation, the  objective  as  well  as  the  subjective 
content  of  Christianity  must  be  derived  from 
revelation.  This  alone  will  safeguard  the  con- 
viction that  we  have  of  the  value  of  our 
religious  judgments.  We  are  certain  that 
they  possess  authority  because  we  perceive 
them  to  be  inspired;  if  they  were  not  direct 
from  God,  they  would  not  so  affect  us. 
Accordingly, "  one  walks  on  the  path  of  Ritschl 
if,  while  independent  of  him  in  details,  he  is 


RITSCHLIAN  THEOLOGY  97 

directed  by  him  to  the  task  of  forming  a  sys- 
tem of  Christian  doctrine  starting  from  the 
principle  that  we  are  to  think  of  God  eJ?  irepl 
Xpiarov,  that  God's  historical  self-revelation 
is  the  beginning,  not  the  concluding  point 
of  dogmatic  reflection. " 1  Faith  compels  us, 
as  it  were,  and  we  hold  that  the  "  impres- 
sion "  derives  its  power  and  vividness  from 
God's  direct  intervention.  As  Herrmann  says : 
"What  God  can  give  without  giving  him- 
self does  not  comfort  the  soul;  the  soul  never 
rests  until  it  has  pierced  through  all  things 
else,  and  reached  God  himself;  a  soul  is 
free  when  it  has  risen  above  all  that  is  not 
God.  ...  In  the  picture  of  the  man  Jesus, 
the  Catholic  Christian  sees  the  way  which  is 
to  lead  him  to  God.  And  he  is  not  altogether 
wrong,  for  it  is  only  because  we  know  Christ 
that  we  can  have  a  God  so  holy  that  he  at 
once  strikes  down  the  sinner,  and  yet  also 
forgives  him,  and  reconciles  him  to  himself 
by  his  own  act.  It  is  true  also  that  we  can 
only  come  to  God  by  following  Jesus,  and 
by  earnestly  seeking  to  be  truthful  and 
upright  like  Jesus.  But  this  is  not  enough. 
Christ  is  more  to  the  Christian  than  all  that. 

1  Kattenbusch,  Von  Schleiermacher  zu  Ritschl,  p.  81. 
7 


98  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

We  do  not  merely  come  through  Christ  to 
God.  It  is  truer  to  say  that  we  find  in  God 
nothing  but  Christ.  .  .  .  God  makes  him- 
self known  to  us,  so  that  we  may  recognize 
him,  through  a  fact,  on  the  strength  of 
which  we  can  believe  on  him.  .  .  .  Our 
certainty  of  God  has  its  root  in  the  fact  that 
within  the  realm  of  history  to  which  we  our- 
selves belong,  we  encounter  the  man  Jesus 
as  an  undoubted  reality.  Inasmuch  as  Jesus 
raises  us  into  fellowship  with  God,  he  is  to 
us  the  Christ.  The  true  Christian  confession 
is  that  Jesus  is  the  Christ.  Rightly  under- 
stood, however,  it  means  nothing  else  than 
this ;  that  through  the  man  Jesus  we  are  first 
lifted  into  fellowship  with  God.  .  .  .  Such 
confidence  in  the  person  and  cause  of  Jesus 
implies  something  else;  it  implies  that  we 
think  and  must  think  of  a  Power  greater  than 
all  things,  which  will  see  to  it  that  Jesus, 
who  lost  his  life  in  this  world,  shall  be  none 
the  less  victorious  over  the  same  world. 
This  thought  of  such  a  Power  lays  hold  of  us 
as  firmly  as  did  that  view  of  Jesus  by  which 
we  were  overwhelmed.  This  is  the  begin- 
ning of  the  consciousness  within  us,  that 
there  is  a  living  God;  this  is  the  only  real 


R1TSCHLIAN  THEOLOGY  99 

beginning  of  an  inward  submission  to  him. 
As  soon  as  trust  in  Jesus  awakens  this 
thought  within  us,  we  connect  the  thought 
at  once  with  our  experience  of  the  inner  life 
of  Jesus  as  a  present  fact  in  our  own  life. 
The  startled  sense  we  felt  at  the  disclosure 
of  actual,  living  goodness  in  his  person,  and 
the  sense  of  condemnation  that  we  felt,  are 
at  once  attributed  by  our  souls  to  the  power 
of  God,  of  which  we  have  now  become  con- 
scious. The  man  who  has  felt  these  simple 
experiences  cannot  possibly  attribute  them 
to  any  other  source.  The  God  in  whom 
he  now  believes  for  Jesus'  sake  is  as  real 
and  living  to  him  as  the  man  Jesus  is 
in  his  marvellous  sublimity  of  character. 
If  we  ask,  How  does  our  thought  of  God 
come  to  include  for  us  the  thought  of  Omni- 
potence? the  answer  is,  Clearly  from  the 
person  of  Jesus  alone.  We  arrive  at  the 
thought  of  omnipotence  because  we  are 
obliged  to  pay  to  Jesus  the  homage  of 
believing  that  he  must  certainly  succeed, 
even  if  all  the  world  besides  be  against 
him.  The  omnipotence  of  which  we  become 
conscious  in  this  way  must  be  wielded  by 
that  same  purpose  which  produced  the   life- 


100  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

work  of  Jesus.  Nothing  else  could  rule 
it."1 

But  what  are  we  told  of  God  and  of 
Christ? 

1.  The  doctrine  of  God.  According  to  the 
epistemological  principles  of  Ritschl,  it  is 
iinpossible  for  man  to  know  God  as  he 
actually  exists^  Notwithstanding  the  con- 
tempt for  natural  theology  and  for  absolutism, 
this  theory  presents  a  certain  parallelism  to 
Spinoza's.  The  absolute  substance,  appears 
-^to  than  under  the  modes  of  thought  and  ex- 
tension. It  may  originate  millions  of  mani- 
festations in  addition  to  these;  but  man,  on 
account  of  his  defective  experiential  machin- 
ery, cannot  apprehend  more  than  the  two. 
So,  with  Ritschl,  God  may  have  a  being  of 
his  own,  a  nature  special  to  himself.  But 
man's  knowledge  is  conditioned  in  such  a  way 
that  he  is  confined  to  moral  judgment  in  his 
recognition  of  deity.  Kant  had  completed 
the  final  destruction  of  the  so-called  proofs  of 
the  being  of  God,  and  had  shown  that  divine 
authority  must  be  sought  within  —  in  the 
practical   reason.     That   is   to   say,    God   is 

1  Herrmann,  The  Communion  of  the  Christian  with  God, 
pp.  24,  26,  51-52,  78-79. 


RITSCHLIAN  THEOLOGY  101 

known,  not  as  lie  exists,  but  as  we  apprehend 
his^  subjective  relation  to  ourselves.  Now, 
his  determination  of  himself  in  our  ethical 
experience  is  love.  "Either  he  is  thus 
thought,  or  he  is  not  thought  at  all." 
Ritschl's  doctrine  on  this  point  appears  to 
have  undergone  certain  important  changes. 
But  these  are  connected,  not  so  much  with 
the  central  tenet  of  the  teaching  as  with  the 
sphere  in  which  it  holds  valid.  At  first  our 
theologian  strove  to  go  beyond  Kant,  by 
showing  that,  just  as  theology  must  recognize 
the  validity  of  science  within  its  own  realm, 
so  science  must  be  forward  to  accord  similar 
authority  to  theology.  The  idea  pf_jGrodj, 
derived  from  moral  judgment,  has  as  much 
authority  in  experience  as  the  idea  of  gravit- 
ation, derived  from  scientific  research.  Dog- 
matic theology  finds  its  task  in  effecting  the 
recognition  of  this  proposition.  This  is 
another  way  of  saying  that  each  of  the  two 
great  departments  of  experience  embodies 
results  of  equal  worth  for  man's  life  taken  as 
a  whole.  One  series  of  investigations  enables 
us  to  maintain  ourselves  in  the  world,  another 
puts  us  in  a  position  to  conserve  ourselves  as 
against  the  world.     At  a  later  period,  how- 


102  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

ever,  Ritschl  resiles  from  this  conception, 
and  falls  back  upon  the  pure  neo-Kantian 
teaching.^  Following  the  only  legitimate  line 
along  which  his  epistemological  principles 
lead,  he  abandons  the  notion  of  forcing 
reason,  on  its  theoretic  side,  to  recognize  the 
validity  of  the  God-conception.1  It  is  a 
"judgment  of  worth,"  a  "helping  idea"  in 
the  moral  region;  elsewhere  it  cannot  be 
shown  to  possess  application,  and  therefore 
is  void  of  demonstrable  validity.  "God," 
accordingly,  is  the  expression  which  we  use 
when  we  state  the  formal  shape  attributed 
by  us  to  "  the  will  of  love  "  which  we  spon- 
taneously recognize  as  the  content  of  divinity 
in  our  subjective  moral  life.  For  a  deity 
whose  garment  is  the  universe  we  substitute 
one  who  is  a  "limiting  conception"  of  the 
inner  man.  God  thus  exists  only  when  he 
is  recognized  as  an  ethical  starting-point. 
He  need  have  no  personality,  nor  need  he 
possess  any  attribute  save  love,  which  is  the 
standard  of  value  whereby  the  ethical  creature, 
man,  appraises  him.  Love  is  God,  and 
aught  else  is  a  formal  addition  made  by  us 
to   this  norm  to  which,   by  our  nature,  we 

1  Comp.  Rechtfertigung  und  V.,  vol.  iii.  p.  192  (1st  edit.) 
with  vol.  iii.  p.  214  (3d  edit.). 


RITSCHL1AN  THEOLOGY  103 

must  refer  moral  and  religious  origins. 
Deity,  accordingly,  comes  to  be  the  subject- 
ive hypothesis  due  to  finite  spiritual  nature, 
just  as  "thinghood"  is  the  objective  judg- 
ment incident  to  finite  intellectual  nature. 

2.  Tlie  value  of  the  documents.  This  may 
be  dismissed  with  comparative  brevity, 
because  here  the  Ritschlian  view  is  not  so 
distinctive.  In  fact,  the  younger  members 
of  the  school,  just  like  their  speculative 
opponents,  accept  the  results  of  historical 
criticism  and  follow  its  methods.  Ritschl's 
own  originality  in  this  department  lay  mainly 
in  the  importance  which  he  accorded  to  the 
OIcT  Testament  writers.  Christianity  having 
been  debased  by  pagan  philosophy,  one  must 
look  to  Judaism  for  its  purest  spiritual  ally. 
Christ  set  free  the  true  spirit  of  the  Jewish 
religion,  and  so  the  books  of  the  New  Testa- 
ment which  best  preserve  Jewish  ideas,  and 
exclude  other  admixture,  are  likely  to  be 
the  most  valuable.  The  idea  of  God  devel- 
oped in  the  religion  of  the  Jews  formed  the 
matrix  of  Christianity;  hence  the  immense 
importance  to  theology  of  a  proper  appreci- 
ation of  Old  Testament  conceptions.1     With 

1  Schulz's  admirable  work,  Old  Testament  Theology,  is 
probably  the  best  result  of  this  portion  of  Ritschl's  teaching. 


104  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

regard  to  the  New  Testament  documents, 
Ritschl  and  his  followers,  though  accepting 
the  results  of  modern  criticism,  make  special 
deductions  of  their  own.  The  New  Testa- 
ment writings,  and  especially  the  synoptic 
Gospels,  constitute  the  Christian's  point  of 
departure.  But  whereas  for  the  speculative 
theologians  the  historical  record  is  valuable 
only  on  account  of  the  idea  which  it  encloses, 
for  the  Ritschlians  it  is  the  picture,  not 
simply  of  a  special,  but  of  the  single,  revel- 
ation. The  synoptic  Gospels  and  their  com- 
panion books  are  not,  indeed,  to  be  regarded 
as  an  external  authority  imposing  Christianity 
upon  man.  Nevertheless,  they  furnish  the 
sole  account  of  a  life  whose  supernatural 
character,  once  recognized  by  the  inner  man, 
possesses  the  unique  power  of  originating 
true  religion.  That  is,  the  documents  are  in 
themselves  without  authority  for  faith,  and 
so  religion  remains  untouched  by  historical 
criticism.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  they 
delineate  a  career  which  so  wins  upon  man's 
moral  consciousness  that  he  cannot  help 
recognizing  in  it  the  single  revelation  of  God. 
If  he  do  not  reach  this  stage,  he  has  not  even 
begun  to  be  a  Christian.     For,  as  Herrmann 


RITSCHLIAN  THEOLOGY  105 

says,  "  There  lie  in  each  man  the  conditions 
of  being  able  to  find  in  the  tradition  of  Jesus 
in  the  New  Testament  the  picture  of  a  man 
who  through  the  power  of  his  personal  life 
holds  us  above  the  abyss."1  The  realization 
of  these  conditions  is  consequent  upon  lov- 
ing appreciation  of  the  New  Testament  story. 
Hence  the  value  of  the  New  Testament  writ- 
ings is  that  they  afford  the  occasion  of  the 
moral  judgment  which  is  the  ultimate  guar- 
antee of  the  supernatural  character  of  Christ- 
ianity. "Only  he  who  yearns  after  an 
honest  fulness  for  his  own  inner  life  can 
perceive  the  strength  and  fulness  of  that 
soul  of  Jesus,  and  whenever  we  come  to  see 
the  person  of  Jesus,  then,  under  the  impress 
of  that  inner  life  breaking  through  all  the 
veils  of  the  story,  we  ask  no  more  questions 
as  to  the  trustworthiness  of  the  Evangelists. 
The  question  whether  the  portrait  of  Jesus 
belongs  to  history  or  fiction  is  silenced  in 
every  one  who  learns  to  see  it  at  all,  for  by 
its  help  he  first  learns  to  see  what  is  the 
true  reality  of  personal  life.  .  .  .  The  man 
who  has  had  this  experience  can  with  heart- 

1  See  Herrmann's  contribution  to  the  recent  creed  contro- 
versy in  No.  50  of  Die  Christlicke  Welt. 


V 


106  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

felt  confidence  allow  the  historical  criticism 
of  the  New  Testament  writings  to  have  full 
play.  If  such  investigation  discovers  contra- 
dictions and  imperfections  in  the  story,  it  also 
discloses  by  that  very  fact  the  power  of  the 
personality  of  Jesus,  for  that  personality  never 
lets  the  contradictions  and  imperfections 
of  the  stoiy  disfigure  the  clear  features  of 
that  which  it  gave  to  me,  namely,  Jesus' 
own  inner  life.  It  is  a  fatal  error  to  attempt 
to  establish  the  basis  of  faith  by  means  of 
historical  investigation.  The  basis  of  faith 
must  be  something  fixed ;  the  results  of  hist- 
orical study  are  continually  changing.  The 
basis  of  our  faith  must  be  grasped  in  like 
independent  fashion  by  learned  and  unlearned, 
by  each  for  himself.  Howsoever  the  story 
may  come  to  us,  whether  as  sifted  and  esti- 
mated lay  historical  criticism  or  not,  the  same 
results  ought  to  follow  and  may  follow  in 
both  cases,  namely,  that  we  learn  to  see  in  it 
the  inner  life  of  Jesus.  .  .  .  When  we  speak 
of  the  historical  Christ  we  mean  that  personal 
life  of  Jesus  which  speaks  to  us  from  the 
New  Testament,  viewed  as  the  disciples' 
testimony  to  their  faith.  Historical  research 
can  neither  give  this  nor  take  it  away,  and 


RITSCHL1AN  THEOLOGY  107 

when  we  have  it  we  know  that  we  are  at  one 
with  the  living  Church  in  possessing  that  gift 
of  God  which  brings  about  our  redemption."1 
3.  The  doctrine  of  Christ  and  of  the  car- 
dinal tenets  of  the  Christian  faith.  The  doc- 
trine of  Christ  that  follows  logically  from  these 
premises  is  not  difficult  to  perceive.  At  the 
outset,  Christ's  life  becomes  of  absolute  value 
as  soon  as,  by  an  inner  judgment,  man 
recognizes  in  him  the  sole  bearer  of  the 
divine  revelation.  The  content  of  this  judg- 
ment is  that  Christ  alone  satisfies  the  yearning 
for  God  —  for  the  power  that  is  able  to  lift 

man    above    the   world.      The divmi±y__jof 

Christ  is,  therefore,  a  consequence  of  his 
having  so  laid  hold  upon  the  sinner  that 
the  transforming  influence  cannot  otherwise 
be  explained.  It  is  judged  by  the  Christian 
to  be  the  essential  implication  of  the  oper- 
ation of  Christ's  spirit  in  him ;  and  so,  like- 
wise, of  all  the  other  attributes  of  the  divine 
Son.  Those  who  are  already  aroused  alone 
can  appreciate  this.  "  The  man  seeking  God 
sees  in  Christ  the  miraculous  fact  of  his 
personal  life  actual   in  history."    The  hist- 

1  Herrmann,  The  Communion  of  the  Christian  with  God, 
pp.  62,  63,  64. 


108  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

orical  Christ,  as  apprehended  by  the  Chris- 
tian —  by  the  man  whom  he  has  apprehended, 
as  the  old  theology  said  —  is  the  only  Son  of 
God,  the  only  instrument  of  God's  will,  the 
only  founder  of  the  kingdom  of  God.  These 
doctrines  our  moral  judgment,  once  excited, 
compels  us  to  accept,  and  so  morality  passes 
fver  into  religion,  and,  at  the  same  time, 
provides  a  sphere  wherein  science  and  criti- 
cism, metaphysic  and  mysticism,  are  incapable 
equally  of  constructive  or  destructive  results. 
For,  from  the  irresistible  moral  impression  of 
Christ's  person,  which  is  the  norm,  man 
goes  on  to  fill  out  his  work  and  his  attributes 
in  an  inviolable  realm  and  after  an  incontro- 
vertible manner. 

Plainly,  then,  the  old  view  of  the  cardinal 
tenets  of  the  Christian  faith  must  be  revised. 
The  atonement,  for  example,  is  no  longer  to 
be  regarded  as  a  legal  satisfaction  offered  in 
full  on  behalf  of  mankind.  Christ's  suffer- 
ing to  death  rather  forms  part  of  the  witness 
to  his  faithfulness.  To  do  the  will  of  God 
he  accepted  this  trial,  and  its  very  magni- 
tude testifies  to  the  perfection  of  his  revel- 
ation. And  if  these  pangs  were  but  "an 
accidental    accompaniment  of    his    positive 


R1TSCHLIAN  THEOLOGY  109 

faithfulness  in  the  calling  that  had  been 
appointed,  to  him,"1  it  is  easy  to  see  that  no 
great  stress  need  be  laid  on  such  similar 
details  as  the  miraculous  birth,  the  mystic 
baptism,  the  transfiguration,  or  the  resur- 
rection.2 Having,  by  a  judgment  of  value, 
recognized  that  Christ  is  God,  the  really 
important  matter  is  to  pass  on  to  the  under- 
standing of  all  that  he  accomplished  for  the 
manifestation  of  the  divine  nature  in  its 
relation  to  men. 

Now,  Christ's  chief  mission  was  the  revel- 
ation and  establishment  of  the  kingdom  of 
God.  "In  the  volitional  activity  that  was 
peculiar  to  Christ,  the  essential  will  of  God 
as  love  was  made  manifest  or  revealed,  in 
that  the  kingdom  of  God,  which  was  Christ's 
final  purpose,  is  identical  with  the  final  pur- 
pose of  God."3  In  relation  to  this  work  all 
Christ's  other  attributes  gradually  make 
themselves  apparent  to  the  eye  of  faith.  For 
"  spiritual  activity  alone  constitutes  the  real- 
ity of  a  moral  personality."4     Man   knows 

1  Rechtfertigung  und  V.,  vol.  iii.  p.  416. 

2  Cf.  Harnack's  Dogmengeschichte,  vol.  i.  pp.  74,  seq. ; 
Wendt's  Die  Lehre  Jesu,  vol.  ii.  p.  543. 

8  Rechtfertigung  und  V.,  vol.  iii.  p.  421. 
*  Bitschl,  Theol.  und  Meta.,  p.  30. 


110  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

nothing  of  a  pre-existent  or  exalted  Christ, 
but  only  of  the  temporal  career  of  the  Son  of 
God.  And  this  career  is  divine  because  it, 
and  nothing  but  it,  set  forth  the  loving 
nature  of  God,  and  the  outpouring  of  his 
purpose  in  the  organization  of  the  kingdom. 
The  true  Christian  life  cannot  be  realized 
except  in  effort  on  behalf  of  this  society, 
and  so  moral  judgment  is  transformed  into 
religious  worship.  Recognition  of  Christ 
necessarily  issues  in  this  devotion  of  self  to 
his  ends.  The  desire  is  to  achieve  the 
kingdom  now,  because  the  motive  force  pre- 
sented by  the  special  revelation  of  Christ 
cannot  find  outlet  save  in  resolve  to  work  for 
an  invisible  spiritual  community.  In  pursu- 
ing this  aim,  man  gains  a  mastery  over  nature, 
because  he  recognizes  his  own  unity,  in  love, 
with  the  deity  whose  realm  he  serves,  and 
thus  he  is  redeemed.  For  redemption  is  not 
a  mystical  process  wrought  out  in  the  sinner 
by  Christ.  There  is  no  original  sin  to  be 
removed,  but  rather  an  ignorance  of  the 
import  of  God's  nature  and  of  Christ's  mis- 
sion. When  these  have  been  fully  apprec- 
iated, man  redeems  himself  by  an  inner  act 
of  the  religious  consciousness  that  results  in 


RITSCHLIAN  THEOLOGY  111 

his  self -identification  with  the  divine  ends 
revealed  by  our  Lord.  Sin  is  a  subjective 
experience  precipitating  recognition  of  failure 
to  conform  to  God's  will.  The  revelation  of 
Christ,  in  the  shape  of  the  kingdom  of  God, 
provides  a  means  whereby  sin  may  be  actively 
overcome,  and  peace  made,  not  with  a  Judge, 
but  with  a  loving  Father  in  heaven,  who 
desires  that  the  ends  of  his  children  should 
be  identical  with  his  own.  These  are  the 
positive  channels  for  the  realization  of  the 
living  conviction  which  Harnack,  during 
the  controversy  on  the  Apostles  Creed,  sum- 
marized as  follows:  "The  question  who  and 
what  Jesus  is,  when  the  Church  tradition 
concerning  him  is  shaken  at  any  point,  can 
be  settled  only  in  the  way  and  with  the 
means  of  historical  investigation;  but  the 
conviction  that  this  historical  Jesus  is 
the  Redeemer  and  Lord  follows,  not  from 
historical  knowledge,  but  from  the  know- 
ledge of  sin  and  of  God  when  Jesus  Christ  is 
announced  to  it." 


112  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

III.   Criticism  of  the  Ritschlian 
Presuppositions. 

No  matter  how  deep  and  fundamental  our 
disagreement  with  the  Ritschlian  doctrines 
may  be,  they  are  facts  meriting  attention. 
Many  able  men  adhere  to  them,  many  others 
find  a  refuge  in  them.  Or,  to  be  brief,  they 
are  possessed  of  significance  and  authority. 
In  the  first  place,  there  seems  to  be  little 
doubt  that  the  Ritschlian  theology  has  met  a 
certain  need.  Agnostic,  it  yet  shows  a  path 
round  agnosticism ;  empirical,  it  yet  supplies 
a  defence  against  empiricism;  historical  in 
method,  it  nevertheless  refuses  the  evidence 
of  history;  socialistic,  it  yet  furnishes  the 
individual  with  a  species  of  mission ;  ration- 
alistic, it  nevertheless  is  supremely  fiducial. 
Little  wonder,  then,  that  many,  smitten  by 
the  varied  ailments  of  modern  culture,  should 
fly  to  it,  and  find  satisfaction  for  the  religious 
instinct  uncrossed  by  any  conflict  with  history 
or  criticism,  with  the  sciences  or  with  meta- 
physic.  The  specific  advantages  are  but  par- 
ticular cases  of  these.  For,  once  more,  the 
Ritschlian  insistence  upon  the  Jewish  element 
in  Christianity  and  upon  the  Hebrew  ideals 


RITSCHLIAN  THEOLOGY  113 

which  Christ  fulfilled,  has  a  certain  timeli- 
ness —  it  chimes  in  with  the  higher  criticism. 
This,  even  although  the  tendency  be  to  see  a 
breach  of  ordinary  historical  development  in 
the  apparition  of  Christ.  For,  notwithstand- 
ing the  embargo  laid  upon  inquiry  into  God's 
moral  government  of  the  universe,  Judaistic 
conceptions,  rather  than  Hellenic,  are  taken 
as  the  tests  of  New  Testament  trustworthi- 
ness. No  doubt  these  notions  have  been 
purified  by  a  recent  view  of  the  ideals  im- 
manent in  Judaism.  The  fact  remains  that 
the  direction  in  which  Ritschl  points  is  the 
quarter  where  an  important  truth  lies. 

Further,  the  doctrine  of  the  kingdom  of 
God  bears  many  fruitful  lessons.  "The 
precious  idea  of  the  kingdom  of  God  is  not 
a  dream  of  the  imagination,  an  illusion;  it 
is  a  divine  force;  it  reveals  itself  in  the 
Church,  it  seizes  hold  upon  us,  it  pene- 
trates us,  it  gives  the  will  a  decisive  im- 
pulse towards  the  most  elevated  ideal, 
towards  eternal  life."1  In  this  organism 
man  can  find  rest  in  activity,  self-realiz- 
ation in  social  effort,  salvation  for  himself 
with    others,    a    visible     crown   of    Christ's 

1  Thikotter,  Darstellung  der  Theol.  A.  Ritschls,  p.  58. 
8 


114  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

work  in  an  invisible  community  whereto  all 
Christians  belong.  Yet  again,  the  unique 
kind  of  Christ's  mission  receives  recognition. 
His  spirit  is  a  source  of  authoritative  impress- 
ions in  every  age.  It  seems  to  furnish  the 
one  positive  fact  to  which,  be  social  and 
intellectual  changes  what  they  may,  sinful 
man  can  cling  in  full  assurance  of  safety. 
The  affectionate  warmth  that  inspires  the 
Ritschlian  teaching  on  this  point,  the  religious 
halo  that  surrounds  the  shadowy  figure  of  the 
Master,  the  enthusiasm  with  which  his  origin- 
ation and  realization  of  the  kingdom  of 
God  are  treated,  —  all  these  serve  to  attract 
and  to  generate  new  hope  in  an  era  sick  of 
speculation,  barren  in  belief,  and  doubtful  of 
itself  in  all  spheres.  Finally,  the  implied 
protest  against  intellectualism  pleases  many, 
who  feel  their  own  mental  shortcomings,  and 
flatters  more,  who  have  neither  the  desire  nor 
the  leisure  to  reflect  on  religion.  The  evi- 
dences of  Christianity  appear  to  be  brought 
back  once  again  to  the  level  of  the  average 
man.  "That  ideals  exist  which  authoritat- 
ively appeal  to  the  instincts  of  the  human 
soul;  that  these  ideals  were,  historically,  in 
their  fulness    introduced    by   Jesus   Christ; 


RITSCHLIAN  THEOLOGY  115 

that  he  claimed  to  be  the  channel  through 
whom  God  could  permanently  speak  to  the 
world,  and  act  upon  it  in  grace;  that,  in 
point  of  fact,  it  is  through  faith  in  Christ, 
and  in  the  God  of  Christ,  that  men  are  led 
to  the  fulfilment  of  the  human  ideal,  —  such 
are  the  evidences  of  Christianity.  They 
afford  no  complete  logical  proof.  God  did 
not  mean  that  they  should.  Intellectual 
proof  would  fall  outside  the  region  of  the 
spirit  and  of  conscience."1  For  these 
reasons,  among  others,  the  adaptability  of 
Ritschlianism  and  its  exaltation  of  Christ 
have  appealed  to  men  of  widely  differing 
endowments.  Clamant  questions  have,  in 
some  instances,  been  stayed  for  the  moment. 
Whether  the  demands  themselves  were  alto- 
gether reasonable,  and  whether  satisfaction 
thus  achieved  can  prove  altogether  final,  are 
other  questions,  both  of  which  I  should 
incline  to  answer  strongly  in  the  negative. 
The  plain  fact  is  that  the  Ritschlian  posit- 
ion does  not  stand  critical  examination. 
No  doubt  its  imposing  outlines  and  its  system- 
atic  plan    might   easily  lead   one   to   judge 

1  Robert  Mackintosh,  Essays  towards  a  New  Theology, 
p.  99. 


116  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

otherwise.  Nevertheless,  the  foundation  is 
essentially  insecure.  To  begin  with,  the 
principle  of  construction  bears  many  traces 
of  being  no  more  than  a  reaction  against 
prevalent  ideas.  "The  theory  might  be  termed 
both  eclectic  and  non-eclectic.  But,  although 
piecing  together  bits  culled  from  his  pre- 
decessors, Ritschl  was  led  to  do  so  by  his 
antagonism  to  certain  contemporary  tend- 
encies. Absolute  Idealism  had  been  far  too 
confident,  and  had,  as  he  believed,  proved 
a  great  failure  in  theolog}r,  while  blank 
materialism  was  in  much  the  same  case. 
The  act  of  knowledge  that  referred  ultimate 
reality  to  spirit,  like  that  which  referred  it 
to  matter,  stood  self-condemned.  And,  by 
an  extreme  reaction,  the  method  proposed 
was  to  _bring_knowledge  _to  its  senses^  as.it 
were,  by  showing  that  it  could  not  know 
anything  ultimately.  It  had  too  long  been 
a  mischievous  disturber  of  the  peace,  too 
long  an  arrant  impostor,  and  needed  incar- 
ceration. Theories,  whether  psychic  or 
materialistic,  had  professed  to  explain  every- 
thing. So,  by  a  common  enough  swing  of 
the  pendulum,  the  new  theory  was  to  be 
fundamentally  incapable  of  explaining  any- 


RITSCHLIAN  THEOLOGY  117 

thing.  Ritschl  does  not  differ  from  Hegel 
on  the  importance  of  religion,  but  he  holds, 
contrary  to  his  quondam  guide,  that  the 
objects  of  religion  lie  beyond  the  range  of 
human  knowledge.  So,  to  castigate  an 
arrogant  intellectualism  and  yet  retain  a 
spiritual  universe,  the  separation  between 
philosophy  and  theology  was   proposed. 

On  this  arrangement,  theology  is  to  have 
a  sphere  peculiar  to  itself  and  above  know- 
ledge, while  metaphysic  is  to  be  content  with 
the  illusions  of  knowledge.  This  reminds 
one  of  the  family  tree  said  to  have  belonged 
to  an  ancient  Irish  house.  The  document 
covered  several  large  sheets  of  parchment, 
and  conspicuously  lettered  about  the  middle 
of  the  third  was  the  striking  annotation, 
"About  this  time  the  world  was  created." 
The  independence  of  theology  is  analogous 
to  that  of  the  remoter  scions  of  this  sept. 
The  objects  discussed  by  theology  and  by 
metaphysics  are  to  all  intents  identical. 
Both  by  their  very  nature  concern  themselves 
with  the  Absolute  and  its  implications.  The 
Ritschlian  value- judgments,  if  not  pure 
inventions  by  isolated  individuals,  depend 
upon  judgments  of  reality.     It  is  impossible 


118  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

to  frame  even  an  elementary  conception  of  a 
theological  object,  not  to  mention  a  system, 
wholly  without  reference  to  its  existence.  It 
must,  at  least,  be  an  object  of  thought.  But 
thought  has  been  condemned  already,  and 
man  finds  himself  in  the  extraordinary  pos- 
ition of  being  able,  by  means  of  sentiment,  to 
attach  absolute  value  to  things  from  which 
his  thinking  is  debarred.  This  is  no  mere 
subjective  idealism,  in  which  experience 
fashions  itself  "within"  and  leaves  "with- 
out "  well  alone.  On  the  contrary,  man's 
inner  nature  has  been  riven  asunder;  In 
the  interest  of  some  vaguely  defined  faculty, 
negatively  known  to  us  as  different  from 
thought,  thought  has  been  snubbed.  The 
impasse  thus  reached  may  be  overcome,  but 
only  in  one  of  two  ways.  Either  absolute 
scepticism  must  ensue,  wherein  experience  is 
clearly  seen  to  yield  no  valid  conclusions ;  jy 
an  equally  absolute  dogmatism,  wherein 
thought,  having  swallowed  the  snub,  retires, 
so  to  speak,  leaving  this  unknowable,  yet 
confident,  sentiment,  or  faith,  or  elaborative 
feeling,  or  whatever  it  may  be,  at  liberty  to 
pursue  its  peculiar  vagaries.  The  former 
alternative   is   self -contradictory;    the   latter 


RITSC3LIAN  THEOLOGY  119 

is  merely  absurd.  The  Ritsclilian  procedure 
is  illogical,  because  it  accepts  neither,  sup- 
posing that  somehow  experience  may  be 
divided  into  hermetically  sealed  compart- 
/  ments.  From  Monday  to  Saturday,  know- 
ledge dances  among  its  phenomena,  which  it 
knows  are  not  knowledge;  on  Sunday,  the 
other  power  moons  among  its  realities,  which 
cannot  fail  to  impress  it,  but  which  may  or 
may  not  exist.  The  knower  of  the  lawful 
days  doubts  and  cannot  dream;  the  dreamer 
of  the  sabbath  believes,  and  can  never  know. 
There  is  no  possible  appeal  from  Philip  sober 
to  Philip  drunk.  For  this  classical  gentle- 
man is  now  so  constituted  that  he  cannot  but 
be  always  drunk  and  always  sober  at  one  and 
\  the  same  time.  When  he  meets  a  policeman, 
he  knows,  because  the  officer  is  a  phenomen- 
on; when  he  sees  the  originals  of  the 
gargoyle,  he  is  impressed,  —  they  are 
among  the  mighty  mayhaps.  And  the  curious 
thing  is  that  the  policeman  and  the  devils 
may  be  present  together,  but  never  to 
the  same  psychological  power.  Philip  can 
think  the  one;  the  others  he  can  feel,  or 
accept,  or  something  equally  vague,  but 
can    by  no   means    think.     This    is   a  late 


120  CONTEMPORARY   THEOLOGY 

form  of  a  very  old  fallacy,  namely,  that 
experiences  are  possible  into  which  the 
element  of  thought,  of  mental  recognition, 
does  not  enter.  Now,  while  it  is  true  that 
certain  intuitions  may  be  difficult  to  explain, 
they  would  never  be  known  to  us  unless 
they  were  known.  The  element  now  of 
feeling,  anon  of  will,  may  indeed  predomin- 
ate here  or  there.  Yet  the  element  of 
thought  cannot  be  cast  out.  In  the  same 
way,  thought  cannot  evict  the  other  elements. 
Even  a  psychological  description,1  which  the 
Ritschlian  view  seems  in  some  respects  to 
favor,  is  in  essentials  a  testimony  to  the 
ubiquity  of  the  metaphysical  faculty.  And 
it  is  among  the  most  curious  delusions 
of  modern  culture  that  mysticism  can  be 
evaporated  by  the  intervention  of  indefinable 
perceptions  which  never  rise  to  the  level  of 
thought,  or  rather  are  supposed  to  remain 
always  above  it.  The  very  statement  that 
the  perception  occurs  is  itself  an  abstraction 
from  thought.  Condemn  the  one,  and  you 
condemn  the  other.  Experience  is  not  so 
unlike  Hudibras'  horse. 

1   Cf.   G.  Vorbrodt,   Psychologic  in  Theologie  u.  Kirche, 
and  Psychologie  des  Glaubens. 


RITSCHLIAN  THEOLOGY  121 

"  For  Hudibras  wore  but  one  spur, 
As  wisely  knowing,  could  he  stir 
To  active  trot  one  side  of 's  horse, 
The  other  would  not  hang  on  worse." 

To  be  able  even  to  say  that  metaphysic  has 
one  sphere  and  theology  another,  it  is  necess- 
ary to  know  something  of  the  larger  area 
from  which  both  are  carved.  There  is  no 
possible  co-operation  in  human  experience 
between  an  isolated  knowledge  and  an 
equally  isolated  faith.  If  they  could  be  sup- 
posed to  run  along  parallel  lines,  they  would 
only  confuse  or,  as  is  most  probable,  condemn 
each  other:  indeed,  neither  could  have  any 
other  office. 

The  Ritschlian  doctrines  furnish  an  excel- 
lent object-lesson  enforcing  this  conclusion. 
God  impresses  man  overwhelmingly,  and 
Christ  is  God's  revelation  enforcing  this 
impression.  But  we  are  forbidden  to  ask 
why  God  thus  strikes  home,  or  how  his 
revelation  is  a  possibility.  With  what 
result?  Deity  is  at  once  reduced  to  the 
level  of  a  mere  means  in  the  human  career. 
Man  earnestly  desires  to  free  himself  from 
the  world.  The  conception  of  God  aids  him 
to  realize   this    desire.     He    perceives   that 


122  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

deity  can  help  to  liberate  him,  and  deity  is 
adopted,  not  as  such,  but  as  a  useful  step- 
ping-stone. He  may  be  cast  aside  when  the 
end  has  been  brought  within  measurable 
realization.  Such  a  god  is  no  more  God 
than  any  similar  helping  idea.  Nay,  further, 
on  the  Ritschlian  principles,  he  is  not  even  a 
source  of  power.  For  the  assumption  is  that 
nothing  is  known  of  him ;  there  is  no  attach- 
ment of  reality,  yet  he  is  treated  for  the 
moment  as  if  he  were  real.  Thought  knows 
him  not,  yet  faith  perceives  that  he  is  of 
value  as  a  notion  analyzed  out  of  experience. 
Metaphysic  supplies  nothing  real,  yet  a  meta- 
physical object  is  endued  with  the  highest 
value  in  relation  to  what  the  individual  does 
know  —  the  progressive  whole  of  his  own 
life.  A  contingent  universal,  if  such  a 
phrase  be  permissible,  suddenly  comes  to 
receive  authority  over  all.  The  theory  is  so 
self-contradictory  as  to  be  practically  incap- 
able of  definite  statement.  Thus  theology, 
so  far  from  being  vindicated,  actually  be- 
comes impossible.  In  extruding  apologetics, 
the  Ritschlians  unwittingly  turn  themselves 
out  of  house  and  home.  For,  if  God  be 
a  bare  limiting  conception,  of  whose  reality 


RITSCHLIAN  THEOLOGY  123 

nothing  is  known;  if  Christ  be  a  man  in 
whom  this  conception  was  uniquely  vivid; 
if  the  historical  evidence  of  the  Biblical 
books  be  immaterial;  and  if  all  religious 
ideas  be  but  striking  feelings  asseverated  by 
this  or  that  person,  how  is  a  science  of 
Christianity  possible?  Personal  religion 
affords  no  sufficient  basis  for  a  theology,  yet 
no  other  is  offered.  The  universe  is  not 
God's;  it  is  but  man's  representation.  Faith 
is  flouted  in  the  very  delineation  of  the 
manner  in  which  alone  it  is  held  capable  of 
justification.  Man  is  asked  to  believe  in  a 
God  and  a  Christ,  after  his  belief  in  the 
being  of  the  one  and  in  the  historically 
divine  nature  of  the  other  has  been  laughed 
to  scorn.  What  need  to  say  that  "if  the 
religious  consciousness  hold  that  for  truth 
which  is  not  truth-in-itself,  it  is  the  prey  of 
a  delusion"?  Even  the  attenuated  christian 
truth  of  the  Ritschlians,  with  its  eviscerated 
Christ,  its  pliant  view  of  sin,  its  comfortable 
deity,  and  its  secluding  agnosticism,  cannot 
maintain  itself.  As  has  been  well  said,  "  We 
cannot  shirk  the  intricate  further  problems 
of  Christianity.  If  the  thing  could  be  done ; 
if  Christian  mankind  could  speculate  as  far 


6 


124  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

as  Ritschl  does,  and  then  desist  from  specul- 
ation at  his  word  of  command  —  Ritschl's 
theology  might,  I  conceive,  be  a  Christian 
theology.  He  does  not  refuse  tribute  to 
Christ,  but  argues  that  the  question  of  offer- 
ing this  special  personal  tribute  of  worship 
to  Christ  does  not  legitimately  arise.  Such 
a  thinker  is  a  Christian  manque."1  To 
answer  the  supreme  question  of  Christian 
theology  —  Who  is  the  person  who  redeems 
the  world  ?  —  we  must  know  the  terms  of  the 
process.  What  is  redemption?  what  is  the 
world  to  be  redeemed?  who  is  the  redeemer? 
and  how  is  he  able  to  save  ? 

1  Mackintosh,  Essays  towards  a  New  Theology,  p.  141. 


THE   THEISTIC   PROBLEM. 

I.  Philosophy  and  Theological  Problems, 
especially  Theism. 

Theology  is  a  standing  witness  to  the 
need  which  man  inevitably  feels  of  finding 
a  harmony  between  the  complex  elements  of 
his  experience.  A  philosophical  construction 
of  the  world  will  always  remain  a  desideratum 
for  such  a  being.  This  is  the  link  that 
brings  religion  into  connection  with  specul- 
ative theory.  If  there  is  to  be  any  rational 
unity,  the  two  cannot  but  react  on  one 
another.  In  the  past,  as  the  Ritschlians 
argue,  Greek  philosophy  may  have  led  Christ- 
ian theology  astray.  But  it  is  absurd  to  sup- 
pose that  the  single  method  of  expelling  this 
error  is  to  throw  all  philosophy  over.  The 
question  rather  is,  —  Can  theology,  accepting 
the  metaphysical  first  principles  which  spirit- 
ual inquiry  of  necessity  involves,  so  react  upon 
philosophy  as  to  produce  a  less  inadequate 
solution  of  difficulties  ?    Does  the  fact  of  sin, 


126  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

for  example,  enable  the  theologian  to  help 
the  philosopher  to  a  fuller  understanding  of 
the  divine  nature?  The  latter  approaches 
deity  cosmologically,  as  it  were ;  the  former, 
anthropologically.  Does  the  organic  inter- 
connection of  the  two  accounts  lead  further 
towards  truth?  Assuredly.  For  "at  the 
beginning  of  all  greater  religious  movements, 
we  are  in  presence  of  the  Absolute  in  its 
creative  power;  and  the  ultimate  cause  lies 
beyond  the  range  of  historical  inquiry."1 
Yet,  as  theology  points  out,  man  is  the 
medium  of  this  creative  power,  and  so  a 
specific  direction  is  given  to  the  extra- 
historical  speculation.  In  return  for  the 
critical  service  rendered  by  metaphysic, 
theology  can  throw  a  flood  of  light  on  several 
dark  places.  There  are  three  regions,  at 
least,  where,  amid  contemporary  contro- 
versies, theology  proper  could  both  assist 
and  correct  philosophical  speculation.  The 
questions  of  the  personality  of  God,  of  the 
creative  or  originating  power  which  marks 
the  divinity  of  Christ,  and  of  the  relation  of 
man  to  sin,  and  through  this  to  universal 
evil,  press  heavy  at  the  present  juncture.     In 

1  Weizsacker,  The  Apostolic  Age,  vol.  i.  p.  6  (Engl,  trans.). 


THE  THEIST1C  PROBLEM  127 

connection  with  the  first  it  is  valuable  to 
emphasize  the  religious  apprehension  of  God, 
with  its  implication  of  personality,  in  order 
that  the  problem  may  be  viewed  from  another 
side  than  that  of  intellect,  with  its  condemn- 
ation of  personality  as  a  phenomenon  of  the 
finite.  As  respects  the  second,  theology 
calls  attention  to  the  important  truth  that 
the  value  of  Christianity  does  not  lie  in  its 
affinity  for  natural  religion,  but  far  rather 
in  its  distinctive  extension  of  all  natural 
religion,  so  called.  Prior  to  Christ,  more  or 
less  mutilated  ideals  had  been  operative. 
But  when,  to  a  metaphysical  view  of  the 
nature  of  the  universe  and  of  man's  exper- 
ience, there  was  added  what  the  divinity  of 
Christ  brought  —  the  origination  and  practical 
embodiment  of  the  highest  moral  ideal  —  then 
God's  nature  was  known  in  its  essential 
implications.  Thirdly,  the  doctrine  of  the 
Incarnation  provides  a  clue  for  the  treatment 
of  the  problem  of  evil.  The  world  and  the 
things  thereof  are  to  be  employed,  not  cast 
aside  as  hindrances.  Because  they  exist,  and 
because  man  relates  himself  to  them  con- 
stantly, they  must  be  capable  of  subserving 
moral  purposes,  of  leading  to  religious  ends. 


128  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

The  state  of  inquiry  now  precludes  us 
from  arriving  at  any  other  result.  To-day 
theology  is  more  closely  connected  with 
philosophy  than  ever.  Both  attack  the  same 
problems,  although  they  do  not  seek  for  sol- 
utions of  identical  sweep.  And,  at  the 
present  time,  when  speculative  theory  would 
do  well  to  reconsider  the  theistic  and  the 
christological  questions,  a  reverent  and 
thorough  theology  could  furnish  well-nigh 
incalculable  assistance.  It  would  be  in  a 
position  to  insist  upon  full  consideration  of 
some  very  perplexing  problems  which  meta- 
physic,  its  interests  being  more  secular, 
might  perhaps  tend  to  dismiss  too  lightly. 
For  the  moment  it  may  seem,  to  abstract 
thinkers  and  theologians  alike,  that  system- 
atic presentation  of  the  being  of  deity  and 
of  his  revelation  is  at  a  discount.  But  the 
latter  and,  as  I  earnestly  believe,  the  former, 
have  only  to  remain  faithful  to  their  science. 
It  deals  in 

"  Those  thoughts  that  wander  through  eternity," 

and  so  must  be  the  subject  of  constantly 
renewed  interest  from  age  to  age,  of  an 
interest  to  which  man  gives  himself  up, 
because  he  is  always  trying,  however  feebly, 


THE  T HEIST IC  PROBLEM  129 

to  read  what  is  deepest,  truest,  most  subtle, 
yet  most  enthralling,  in  his  own  complex 
nature. 

Of  the  various  problems  to  which  reference 
has  just  been  made,  the  Theistic  is  at  once 
the  most  fundamental  and  the  most  easily 
brought  into  relation  with  the  competing 
views  —  the  Gnosticism  and  Agnosticism  — 
peculiar  to  the  Speculative  and  Ritschlian 
schools.  It  may  be  of  interest,  accordingly, 
to  direct  attention  to  it,  in  conclusion,  for 
the  special  purpose  of  gathering  up  the 
threads  of  our  inquiry  and  of  arriving,  if 
possible,  at  some  ground  from  which  further 
advance  may  be  undertaken. 

In  one  of  those  prose  notes,  so  frequently 
as  pregnant  with  intimation  as  the  poems 
themselves,  Goethe  has  pointed  out  that  ages 
wherein  faith  predominates  prove  hearty  and 
inspiring,  not  only  for  their  own  represent- 
atives, but  also  for  succeeding  generations. 
On  the  other  hand,  epochs  in  which  scepti- 
cism achieves  its  "miserable  victory,"  no 
matter  how  brilliant  for  the  moment,  are 
destined  to  vanish  from  the  sight  of  posterity, 
because  no  one  troubles  to  consider  what  is 
fruitless.     Doubtless,  periods  may  be  divided 


130  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

conveniently  into  fiducial  and  unbelieving, 
for  now  the  one  inclination  holds  the  mastery, 
now  the  other.  This  classification,  never- 
theless, takes  little  note  of  times  wherein  the 
two  elements  co-exist  with  approximately 
equal  influence,  or  of  years,  like  our  own, 
when  controversy  is  beginning  to  turn,  not  so 
much  on  faith  and  unfaith,  as  on  the  kind  of 
the  object  to  which  faith  may  be  directed. 
In  much  contemporary  speculation  of  an 
apparently  destructive  character  there  is  a 
solid  substratum  of  belief.  The  agnostic 
adopts  his  necessary  assumptions  in  the  same 
way  as  the  theist;  and  the  question  is 
gradually  reducing  itself  to  this,  What  can 
man  believe?  While  in  a  corresponding 
degree,  it  is  slowly  receding  from  the  old 
choice  between  such  mutually  exclusive  con- 
ceptions as  God,  the  Absolute,  the  Ultimate, 
and  no-God,  no-Absolute,  no-Ultimate.  In 
other  words,  faith  of  some  sort  exercises 
sway,  even  although  this  fact  be  obscured 
from  many  by  the  resounding  conflict  con- 
cerning its  object,  content,  nature. 

We  stumble  upon  the  diffused  conception 
of  the  ultimate  unity  of  phenomena  in  nearly 
all    departments    of    special    investigation. 


THE    THE/STIC  PROBLEM  131 

One  might  legitimately  regard  the  notion  as 
a  commonplace,  a  platitude,  which  philo- 
sophers, theologians,  social  reformers,  and 
men  of  science  agree  to  adopt.  There  can  be 
little  doubt  that,  in  past  epochs  of  thought, 
similar  ideas  have  performed  an  analogous 
function.  Formative  principles,  upheld  to  a 
greater  or  lesser  extent  by  every  member  of 
the  select  company  that  toils  for  the  "  spirit- 
ually indispensable,"  can  be  disengaged 
without  difficulty  from  the  complex  record 
of  history.  But,  at  the  present  time,  the 
conviction  of  the  substantial  unity  of  the 
universe  affects  the  average  man  as  well  as 
the  professed  investigator.  The  doctrine 
continually  peeps  out  in  newspapers,  in  maga- 
zines, and  even  in  novels.  These  form  the 
literary  food  of  the  "public."  Accordingly, 
ignorance  cannot  be  pleaded,  nor,  indeed, 
is  there  any  important  tendency  towards  this 
subterfuge.  So  far  as  his  opportunity  allows, 
the  "man  in  the  street "  re-echoes  the  faith  of 
the  student,  of  the  experimenter,  of  the 
political  reformer.  It  matters  nothing  that 
the  echo  must  frequently  be  even  cruder  than 
the  voice.  He  too  has  his  belief  in  "  some- 
thing "  that  underlies  everything.     As  might 


132  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

be  anticipated,  his  ideas  regarding  the  nature 
of  this  ultimate  power  are  generally  vague. 
At  all  events,  no  consensus  of  view  can  be 
gathered  from  the  masses.  Here  theologians 
have  been  prone  to  mislead  themselves,  when 
they  have  urged  that  a  precise  idea  of  God 
is  a  necessary  postulate  of  the  common  sense 
of  mankind.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  ordin- 
ary consciousness  usually  adopts  one  of  three 
attitudes  towards  the  question. 

In  the  first  place,  many  influences  —  which 
need  no  mention  now  —  combine  to  persuade 
the  wage-earner,  the  clerk,  and  the  capitalist 
that  life  centres  in  the  present.  How  many, 
for  instance,  dwell  upon  death,  even  although 
they  know  its  permanent  contingency  and 
final  surety.  For  some  the  provision  of 
to-morrow's  bread,  for  others  the  abounding 
comforts  of  to-day  burk  the  problems  which, 
with  a  grim  irony,  surround  man's  "single 
certainty."  So,  by  an  identical  process,  God 
comes  to  be  regarded  as  a  far-off  being,  or, 
at  least,  as  one  whose  nature  and  designs  do 
not  visibly  affect  temporal  events.  In  these 
cases,  the  question  of  ultimate  unity  either 
fails  to  occur,  or,  having  entered  into  the 
field  of  recognition,  is  thrust  aside  with  con- 


THE  THEISTIC  PROBLEM  133 

scious  repugnance  or  with  half-conscious 
indifference.  From  such  no  direct  aid  can 
be  derived,  however  valuable  they  may  prove, 
on  an  occasion,  as  object-lessons. 

But,  secondly,  large  numbers  escape  the 
pressure  of  the  leading  modern  idea  by  iden- 
tifying the  unity,  now  so  freely  attested,  with 
the  name,  God.  For  them  this  term  has  a 
fluctuating  signification,  although  the  limits 
of  wavering  are  commonly  clear  enough. 
From  parents  or  teachers  belief  in  what  is 
called  "  God  "  has  been  derived.  And  this  un- 
defined, and  often  self-contradictory,  notion 
seems  to  stay  any  very  fundamental  doubts. 
The  "  faith  once  delivered "  maintains  its 
authority,  not,  perhaps,  altogether  unchanged 
or  intact,  yet  as  a  sufficient  working  basis. 
Put  it  to  the  question,  and  you  will  receive 
replies.  Mayhap  an  attack  upon  the  quest- 
ioner, or  upon  some  lay  figure  meant  to 
represent  him;  mayhap  a  series  of  consider- 
ations which  are  characteristic  mainly  be- 
cause they  tend  to  cancel  one  another; 
mayhap  a  simple  affirmation  that  God  is 
over  all  his  works.  Here,  once  more,  the 
average  man  throws  little  light  upon  the  ob- 
ject   of   his   beliefs,    except  indeed    in  the 


134  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

limitations  that  he  usually  imposes   on  his 
anthropomorphism. 

In  the  third  place,  however,  we  discover 
a  smaller  class  composed  partly  of  those 
whose  "state"  is  deeply  interesting,  and 
partly  of  those  whose  arrogance  —  and  ignor- 
ance —  repel.  Many  are  passing  through 
the  vale  of  honest  doubt,  finding  small  help, 
yet  once  and  again  obtaining  a  veritable 
revelation,  possibly  from  such  a  writer  as 
Browning.  Not  a  few,  on  the  contrary, 
taking  a  restricted  view  of  the  outlook, 
readily  assert  that  the  Bible  is  a  well  con- 
structed "fraud,"  or,  when  their  condemn- 
ation broadens,  openly  declare  themselves 
atheists.  For  such  conclusions  all  alike 
prove  themselves  unable  to  offer  reasons  fit 
to  stand  the  fire  of  criticism;  although,  it  is 
to  be  remembered  that  the  honest  doubter 
frequently  comes  to  be  no  longer  in  any 
proper  sense  representative  of  the  average 
man.  But,  for  the  rest,  either  certain 
destructive  tendencies  of  modern  thought 
have  been  misunderstood,  or  have  been  made 
to  bear  the  burden  of  unwarrantable  deduct- 
ions. In  short,  the  partial  return  to  a 
standpoint  not  widely  different  from  that  of 


THE  THE1STIC  PROBLEM  135 

the  Aufkldrung  often  turns  out  to  be  only 
the  most  prominent  feature  of  "half -culture." 
The  self-styled  atheist  is  not  seldom  in  the 
most  literal  acceptation  a  fool  (I  happen  to 
have  a  case  in  my  mind's  eye),  or  a  dabbler 
who  has  not  won  the  right  to  such  freedom 
of  speech.  Thus,  although  the  average  man 
of  the  day  ponders  these  things  in  his  heart 
to  a  greater  extent  than  many  of  his  pre- 
decessors, it  can  hardly  be  said  that  the  results 
he  reaches  are,  as  yet,  helpful.  Nor  can  one 
blame  him  for  this.  Whether  he  be  indiffer- 
ent, or  quasi-orthodox,  or  consciously  nega- 
tive, the  leaders  on  whom  he  must  perforce 
rely,  have  scarcely  happened  upon  the  primary 
conditions  of  a  gospel,  —  agreement  among 
themselves  and  contagious  confidence  in  the 
teaching  they  have  to  impart.  What  mes- 
sages, then,  do  they  bear? 

II.  Agnosticism  and  the  Theistic  Problem. 

As  has  been  indicated  already,  two  main 
competing  theories  occupy  the  field.  The 
majority  of  the  more  prominent  thinkers 
affiliate  themselves  either  to  Agnosticism  or  to 
a  specialized  kind  of  Gnosticism.     Moreover, 


136  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

these  theories,  regarded  as  semi-philosophical, 
semi-theological,  speculations  may  be  alleged 
to  exhaust  the  formative  influences  of  the 
time  even  more  completely  than  they  enlist 
the  notable  leaders  of  thought.  Neverthe- 
less, signs  multiply  to  intimate  that  a  new 
movement  is  at  last  in  progress,  a  tendency 
dominated  neither  by  the  fascinating  seclus- 
ion of  the  "  Unknowable, "  nor  by  the  inspir- 
ing ubiquity  of  the  "Eternal  Consciousness." 

In  what  follows  it  is  proposed  to  notice  the 
Agnostic  and  Gnostic  positions  successively, 
and  then,  from  a  somewhat  different  outlook, 
to  attempt  some  constructive  suggestions  re- 
garding the  Theistic  problem.  On  the  whole, 
and  from  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  nothing 
is  to  be  expected  from  Agnosticism.  But  it 
is  useful  to  attempt  an  estimate  of  the  posi- 
tive contribution  made  by  Hegel  and  by  those 
who  repeat  him. 

The  Agnostic  account  of  deity  seems 
latterly  to  have  assumed  two  principal 
shapes.  As  it  is  possible  to  divide  exper- 
ience into  the  dual  constitutive  elements  of 
the  self  and  the  not-self,  so,  in  presenting  a 
rational  scheme  of  the  universe,  one  can 
emphasize  either  factor.     The  twin  Agnos- 


THE  THEISTIC  PROBLEM  137 

ticisms,  Transfigured  Realism  and  Critical 
Idealism,  go  hand  in  hand  for  a  while,  only, 
however,  to  part  company  when  pressed  by 
the  need  for  positive  results.  They  agree  to 
enforce  an  absolute  contrast  between  the 
phenomenal  or  apparent  and  the  noumenal 
or  real.  All  that  man  knows  stands  con- 
demned already  by  the  very  fact  of  his  know- 
ledge. This  wholesale  censure  arises  from 
the  application  of  a  test  which,  curiously 
enough,  is  not,  and  cannot  be,  known. 
Knowledge  finds  itself  in  the  disconcerting 
yet  irremediable  position  of  being  abased 
before  Not-knowledge.  Once  more,  each  of 
the  Agnosticisms,  according  to  a  method  of 
its  own,  opens  out  a  wide  cleavage  between 
the  self  and  the  not-self.  The  thinker  and 
the  object  of  thought  are,  as  one  must  infer, 
in  the  habit  of  making  their  appearance  under 
spatial  relations  and  restrictions,  similar  in 
essential  respects  to  those  governing  the 
comparative  contiguity  of  any  two  "  external  " 
things.  At  this  point,  no  matter  how 
reached,  the  common  path  ends.  For,  evi- 
dently, the  conclusions  —  mutual  so  far  — 
are  such  that  it  has  become  possible  either  to 
"transfigure"  the  not-self  or  to  "criticise" 


138  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

the  self.  Indeed,  a  further  advance  can 
scarcely  be  compassed  until  a  decision,  involv- 
ing one  choice  or  the  other,  have  been  taken. 
If  the  self  and  the  not-self  be  thus  completely 
at  odds,  the  plain  course  is  to  drop  one,  and 
in  the  issue  to  read  it  afresh,  not  for  itself, 
but  according  to  the  demands  that  assemble 
themselves  during  treatment  of  the  factor 
selected  for  fundamental  analysis.  In  both 
cases  a  theory  of  the  universe  emerges,  and 
with  it  a  pronouncement  on  deity. 

(a.)  Transfigured  Realism,  as  the  name 
implies,  seizes  upon  the  empirical  or  a 
posteriori  element  in  experience,  and  to  all 
intents  and  purposes  explains  the  ego  as  if  it 
were  identical  in  ultimate  nature  with  the 
non-ego.  No  doubt,  something  speciously 
like  separate  and  independent  consideration 
is  apparently  accorded  to  each;  as,  for 
example,  when  both  are  viewed  as  parallel, 
yet  mutually  inconvertible,  phenomena;  or 
are  dignified,  for  the  sake  of  accuracy  or 
argument,  by  the  presentation  of  an  algebraic 
symbol  (%,  y)  dedicated  to  exclusive  indi- 
vidual use.  But,  even  at  this,  severance 
leads  in  the  end  merely  to  the  practical 
annulment  of  one  factor.     Self  must  be  con- 


THE  THEISTIC  PROBLEM  139 

sidered  as  fundamentally  phenomenal  as  not- 
self.  That  is  to  say,  the  former  sinks  into 
the  latter  as  respects  ultimate  questions. 
The  primary  grounding  of  the  subject  comes 
to  be  identical  with  that  of  the  object.  Phe- 
nomenally the  two  may  differ ;  but  the  stress 
of  the  nature  of  the  not-self  forces  the  con- 
clusion that  both  actually  proceed  from  the 
same  power.  The  theory  of  deity  explicitly 
embodies  a  doctrine  of  this  species.  Nay, 
one  might  go  so  far  as  to  allege  that,  but  for 
a  confusion  of  self  and  not-self,  the  Unknow- 
able might  never  have  been  dragged  from  its 
natural  limbo  of  obscurity,  it  would  certainly 
never  have  been  honored  with  an  initial 
capital. 

By  a  process  of  reasoning  based  on  an 
inspection  of  the  contents  of  experience  as  if 
they  were  in  sum  a  posteriori,  as  if  they 
belonged  to  the  realm  of  the  not-self,  deity 
qu&  "Power"  is  reached.  This  furnishes  the 
substantial  identity  in  being  (reality)  whence 
difference  happens  to  have  manifested  itself 
now  in  phenomenal  becoming.  This  in  any 
case,  can  be  gleaned  from  Mr.  Herbert 
Spencer's  declarations;  although,  otherwise, 
one  may  take  heart  of  great  daring  and  say 


140  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

that  it  is  more  than  difficult  to  attach  any- 
precise  import  to  them.  "Common  Sense 
asserts  the  existence  of  a  reality;  Objective 
Science  proves  that  this  reality  cannot  be 
what  we  think  it;  Subjective  Science  shows 
why  we  cannot  think  of  it  as  it  is,  and  yet 
are  compelled  to  think  of  it  as  existing ;  and 
in  this  assertion  of  a  Reality,  utterly  inscrut- 
able in  nature,  Religion  finds  an  assertion 
essentially  coinciding  with  her  own.  We 
are  obliged  to  regard  every  phenomenon  as  a 
manifestation  of  some  Power  by  which  we 
are  acted  upon,  though  Omnipresence  is  un- 
thinkable, yet,  as  experience  discloses  no 
bounds  to  the  diffusion  of  phenomena,  we  are 
unable  to  think  of  limits  to  the  presence  of 
this  Power,  while  the  criticisms  of  Science 
teach  us  that  this  Power  is  incomprehensible. 
And  this  consciousness  of  an  Incompre- 
hensible Power,  called  Omnipresent  from 
inability  to  assign  its  limits,  is  just  that 
consciousness  on  which  Religion  dwells."1 
Once  more:  "Thus  the  consciousness  of  an 
Inscrutable  Power  manifested  to  us  through 
all  phenomena  has  been  growing  ever  clearer, 
and  must  eventually  be  freed  from  its  imper- 

1  First  Principles  (fourth  ed.),  p-  99- 


THE  THEIST1C  PROBLEM  141 

fections.  The  certainty  that  on  the  one  hand 
such  a  Power  exists,  while  on  the  other  hand 
its  nature  transcends  intuition  and  is  beyond 
imagination,  is  the  certainty  towards  which 
intelligence  has  from  the  first  been  progress- 
ing. To  this  conclusion  Science  inevitably 
arrives  as  it  reaches  its  confines;  while  to 
this  conclusion  Religion  is  irresistibly  driven 
by  criticism.  And  satisfying  as  it  does  the 
demands  of  the  most  rigorous  logic  at  the 
same  time  that  it  gives  the  religious  senti- 
ment the  widest  possible  sphere  of  action,  it 
is  the  conclusion  we  are  bound  to  accept 
without  reserve  or  qualification."1  When 
we  inquire  what  precisely  Mr.  Spencer 
intends  to  convey  here,  several  problems  at 
once  arise,  and  this  despite  the  apparent 
simplicity  of  the  passages  cited.  For  instance ; 
Are  the  phenomena  in  which  this  "  Power  " 
manifests  itself  wholly  distinct  from  it? 
Can  we  fairly  apply  the  spatial  relation,  or 
irrelation,  between  subject  and  object  to  the 
Ultimate  and  its  diffused  omnipresences? 
Again,  how  does  the  consciousness  of  this 
Power  —  about  which  there  is  such  finality  — 
stand  towards  the  Power  itself?    Have  we 

i  Ibid.,  p.  108. 


142  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

any  valid  reason  for  believing  that,  in  an 
experience  such  as  man's,  the  two  can  be 
rationally  distinguished?  Confined  as  he  is 
to  consciousness,  can  man  figure  this  Power 
to  himself  as  outside  the  limits  —  if  here 
there  be  limitation  in  the  ordinary  sense  —  of 
consciousness?  Mr.  Spencer  intends  that 
questions  of  this  kind  should  be  answered  in 
the  negative.  The  trend  of  his  reasoning  is 
exclusively  in  this  direction.  But  an  un- 
equivocal "no,"  so  far  as  one  can  infer,  either 
eviscerates  the  declarations  of  all  thinkable 
meaning  whatsoever,  or,  if  not,  depends  for 
significance  upon  an  unacknowledged,  or 
unperceived,  equivocation.  This  equivoca- 
tion, further,  involves  the  very  confusion 
between  self  and  not-self  that  the  assertion 
of  their  parallelism  and  consequent  separation 
seems  to  exclude  completely. 

The  Unknowable,  which  is  deity,  must  be 
MTiknown ;  that  is,  the  negation  of  the  known. 
If  so,  it  ceases  to  occupy  any  significant 
place  in  experience.  For,  divested  of  all 
relations  in  thought,  and  stripped  of  every 
connection  with  the  thinker,  it  disappears  in 
the  limitless  Ewigkeit.  Thus,  a  being  con- 
stituted  like   man  has   no   resource   but  to 


THE  THEIST1C  PROBLEM  143 

embrace  atheism.  If  not,  then,  somehow  or 
other,  the  Unknowable  makes  entrance  into 
experience;  it  ts,  as  we  are  informed,  an 
operative  conception.  But,  by  hypothesis, 
phenomena  exhaust  the  entire  range  of 
human  knowledge.  Therefore,  the  Unknow- 
able must  be  a  phenomenon,  and  so  God 
becomes  emptied  of  reality.  The  Unknow- 
able is  either  nothing  or  something.  If  the 
former,  as  Mr.  Spencer's  predominating 
theory  renders  it,  then  deity  vanishes.  If 
the  latter,  as  Mr.  Spencer's  prevailing  ten- 
dency represents  it,  then  some  phenomenon 
gains  added  dignity,  which,  however,  cannot 
amount  to  realit}r ;  or,  as  is  the  more  natural 
interpretation,  deity  loses  itself  amid  phe- 
nomena. The  choice,  accordingly,  lies 
between  a  "transfigured"  Atheism  and  a 
"  transfigured  "   Materialism. 

The  possibility  of  transferring  deity  into  a 
sphere  labelled  "Unknowable,"  like  the  con- 
templated value  of  the  transference,  depends 
upon  a  want  of  discrimination  between  the 
self  and  the  not-self.  For,  let  it  be  granted 
that  there  is  an  "Inscrutable  Power  mani- 
fested to  us  through  all  phenomena,"  and  it 
follows  either  that  the  power  is  a  common 


144  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

element  in  our  conscious  states,  and  therefore 
neither  necessarily  inscrutable  nor  necessarily 
divine;  or  that  it  is  a  "something,"  exactly 
like  Locke's  Substance,  which  we  superadd 
to  our  representations  of  what  we  call  the 
"external."  The  language  usually  employed 
by  agnostics  would  induce  us  to  adopt  the 
former  alternative, — a  "transfigured"  Mater- 
ialism. The  doctrine  evidently  contem- 
plated by  them,  nevertheless,  points  to  the 
latter  alternative,  —  "  transfigured  "  Atheism. 
In  the  one  case,  God  becomes  a  phenomenon, 
a  phenomenon  possessed,  no  doubt,  of  a 
special  character  that  operates  so  as  to  enable 
man  to  determine  the  similarity  of  successive 
conditions  in  consciousness,  but  a  phenom- 
enon still.  In  the  other  case,  God  is  the 
name  applied  to  a  merely  gratuitous  invent- 
ion which  is  in  consciousness,  because  a 
consciousness  produces  it,  but  which  as  such, 
in  result,  is  quite  beyond  consciousness,  and 
therefore  never  can  be  any  thing,  always  must 
remain  nothing.  The  analysis  has,  in  short, 
failed  to  rid  itself  of  several  fundamental  con- 
fusions, and,  as  a  consequence,  the  synthesis, 
the  "reconciliation,"  leaves  the  problem  of 
deity  as  much  a  problem  as  before.     It  has 


THE  THEISTIC  PROBLEM  145 

a  value,  however,  in  so  far  as  "  the  glorious 
uncertainty  of  it "  may  be  regarded  as  of 
"more  use  than  the  justice  of  it."  The 
stimulus  administered  is  admirable. 

(&.)  Critical  Idealism,  particularly  in  the 
theological  nuance  of  it,  affords  a  strange 
specimen  of  hybridity.  But  enough  has 
already  been  said  of  it  to  warrant  briefest 
consideration  now.  This  view  imparts  even 
less  confidence  than  Mr.  Spencer's.  It  is 
far  more  insidious,  more  fundamentally  fatal 
in  its  effects.  Experience,  as  we  have  seen, 
is  rent  asunder,  to  the  private  advantage  of 
some  vaguely  adumbrated  faculty  negatively 
"defined"  as  "different  from  thought." 
Instead  of  escaping  the  theistic  problem,  we 
only  light  upon  another  instance  of  the  very 
old  fallacy,  that  experiential  states  are  poss- 
ible from  which  the  element  of  mental 
recognition  has  been  entirely  expelled. 
And,  if  the  problem  be  faced  with  this  equip- 
ment, one  must  either  suspend  judgment  in 
perfect,  and  therefore  self-contradictory, 
scepticism,  or  delegate  the  solution  to  a 
capacity  unrecognizable  by  thought ;  that  is, 
to  one  that  can  have  no  existence  for  us.  To 
say  that  God  affects  the  inner  man  with 
10 


146  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

irresistible  power,  and  at  the  same  time  to 
deny  man  the  right  to  inquire  what  God  is, 
or  why  or  how  he  operates,  is  to  reduce  actual 
deity  to  the  level  of  a  mere  supposition  of 
the  moral  consciousness.  The  theistic  prob- 
lem, so  far  from  being  solved,  has  not  even 
revealed  its  terms.  The  proffered  answer 
has  all  the  defects  of  Agnosticism  together 
with  a  doubled  set  of  difficulties.  God,  to 
be  God,  must  include  truth  and  reality  in 
himself.  But  this  bare  "limiting  concept- 
ion," as  we  are  explicitly  told,  possesses  no 
reality.  It  also  lacks  the  content  necessary 
to  truth.  With  only  too  sufficient  complete- 
ness, condemnation  of  thought  balks  rehab- 
ilitation of  faith. 


III.   The  Principle  of  Rationality. 

In  the  Agnostic  teaching  of  the  Ritschlian 
theologians,  as  we  have  seen,  a  main  factor 
must  unquestionably  be  sought  in  the  work 
of  Kant  and  of  the  metaphysicians  who,  with 
due  allowance  for  individual  differences,  may 
be  regarded  as  his  pupils.  On  the  other  side 
stands  the  ubiquitous  power  of  the  positive 
sciences.     Those  who  know  not  Kant  usually 


THE  THEISTIC  PROBLEM  147 

pass  him  by  because  they  study  nature ;  those 
who  choose  to  know  him  only  in  part  select 
such  of  his  doctrines  as  seem  to  tally  with 
the  irrelatedness  of  mind  and  matter.  When 
scientific  nomenclature,  which  none  can 
escape,  does  not  hedge  every  prosoect  in,  an 
amalgam  of  half -critical  idealism  and  uncriti- 
cal realism  emerges;  or,  perhaps,  Hume's 
reductio  ad  absurdum  of  sensationalism  might 
as  well  never  have  been  promulgated;  or, 
yet  again,  a  new  scholasticism,  more  terrible 
than  its  prototype  only  in  jargon,  takes  the 
place  of  rational  philosophy.  But,  in  all 
cases  equally,  the  principal  influence  is  that 
of  Kant,  or  of  the  scientific  movement,  or  of 
a  suspicious  mixture  of  the  two.  It  may 
therefore  be  well  to  look  at  both  of  these 
factors  for  a  little,  in  order  to  set  conclusions 
in  perspective  —  relatively  at  least. 

It  is  often  said  that  ordinary  experience, 
the  information  of  the  fabled  "man  in  the 
street,"  is  unorganized  knowledge.  In  con- 
trast to  this,  science  may  be  called  partially 
organized  knowledge,  while  as  compared 
with  both,  philosophy  may  be  termed  com- 
pletely organized  knowledge.  No  doubt, 
such  statements  embody  a  certain  truth,  but 


148  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

they  cannot  be  taken  absolutely.  For,  to  be 
plain,  no  knowledge  would  be  worthy  of  the 
name  were  it  unorganized.  The  day-laborer 
would  be  unable  to  take  his  meals,  such  as  they 
are,  were  his  experience  unorganized  —  void 
of  principles.  So  too  the  mathematician, 
the  physicist,  the  chemist,  the  botanist, 
the  biologist  would  fall  into  many  errors  now 
avoided  were  their  knowledge  partially  organ- 
ized only.  The  truth  seems  to  be  that  for 
all  men  equally  the  question  is,  not  so  much 
one  of  greater  or  lesser  organization,  but 
rather  of  more  or  less  adequate  consciousness 
of  all  that  organization  implies.  The  day- 
laborer  assumes  more  than  the  scientific  man. 
He  takes  for  granted,  not  merely  his  know- 
ledge of  bread  and  bacon,  but  also  the  nature 
of  bread  and  bacon  in  themselves.  For  the 
most  part,  the  devotees  of  science  do  nothing 
to  eliminate  the  former  assumption,  but  their 
life-work  implies  the  rejection  of  the  latter. 
Knowledge  or  experience,  in  other  words, 
whether  it  be  characteristically  that  of 
peasant  or  philistine,  of  astronomer  or  physi- 
ologist, of  metaphysician  or  moral  philo- 
sopher, differs  in  degree,  never  in  kind.  As 
a  whole,  it  presupposes   the  same   unifying 


THE   THEIST1C  PROBLEM  149 

principles  in  every  case.  The  ordinary  con- 
sciousness never  need  appreciate  this;  the 
scientific  consciousness  busies  itself  with  a 
portion  of  its  truth;  the  philosophical  con- 
sciousness has  no  other  office  than  to  state 
the  fact  clearly  and  show  what  it  implies. 
Science  may  boast  itself  that  the  empire  of 
outer  experience  is  one  on  which  the  sun 
never  sets;  philosophy,  being  anxious  about 
the  implications  of  empire,  would  probably 
reply,  "Yea,  verily,  but  also  one  in  which 
the  tax-gatherer  never  sleeps." 

If,  then,  it  be  a  misnomer  to  speak  of 
different  kinds  of  experience,  the  contrasts 
of  outlook,  so  familiar  to  all,  must  be 
explained  otherwise.  The  scientific  move- 
ment is  so  far  like  ordinary  irreflective 
knowledge  that  it  attempts  to  treat  exper- 
ience as  if  it  were  composed  of  sections.  Ere 
science  is  possible,  it  appears  that  certain 
assumptions  require  to  be  made.  These  can 
be  stated  very  succinctly.  It  is  held  that 
experience  has  an  "outside  "  and  an  "inside." 
Science  deals  with  the  former  alone.  For 
the  successful,  or  undisturbed,  pursuit  of 
empirical  investigation,  certain  presuppos- 
itions would  seem  to  be  indispensable.     For 


150  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

example.  There  is  an  "external"  world, 
which  exists  and  goes  on  the  even  tenor  of 
its  way  apart  from  the  action  and  influence 
of  mind,  perhaps  even  despite  them.  Never- 
theless —  for  such  is  a  condition  of  know- 
ledge —  mind,  in  some  mysterious  manner, 
comes  to  grasp  this  foreign  order,  and  finds 
itself  in  possession  of  a  power  whereby  it  is 
enabled  to  reflect  upon  its  own  great  op- 
posite. This  is  not  to  be  taken  as  implying 
the  superiority  of  mind.  For  of  this,  science, 
by  its  very  nature,  can  say  nothing.  It  is  no 
more  than  a  statement  that  the  "inside"  of 
experience  has  a  faculty  of  comprehending 
the  "outside."  This  must  be  so,  otherwise 
science  would  not  exist,  and  science  is. 
But,  even  with  these  sufficiently  liberal 
asseverations,  it  is  impossible  to  rest  content. 
Mind  does  not  stand  possessed  of  mere 
existential  knowledge  concerning  this  exter- 
nal sphere.  Ere  science  can  take  a  single 
step,  the  judgment  of  existence  must  be 
elaborated  modally.  Mind  is  aware  that  this 
"outer"  reality  subsists,  or  persists,  in  cer- 
tain ways.  For  instance,  the  manifestation 
of  an  unaltering  force  makes  itself  apparent. 
For,  were  this  removed,   many  of  the  most 


THE  THEIST1C  PROBLEM  151 

fundamental  data  of  science  would  disappear. 
Above  all,  it  is  necessary  that  mind  should 
perceive  the  uniformity  of  "  reality. "  Things 
are  such  and  such  things,  because  they  find 
setting  in  a  series.  But  were  the  series  con- 
tinually changing,  were  it  capable  of  indefin- 
ite rearrangement,  the  science  of  to-day 
would  become  the  mythology  of  to-morrow. 
Accordingly,  mind  must  apprehend  the  world 
as  a  scheme  governed  by  uniform  sequence. 
On  these  conditions,  and  on  them  alone,  can 
science  stake  off  a  kingdom  within  the  borders 
of  which  investigation  may  be  pursued  with- 
out fear  of  disturbance.  Further,  granted 
these  conditions,  science  proceeds  to  christen 
its  kingdom  Reality,  as  opposed  to  the  sub- 
jectivity of  the  "inner"  mind,  which  is  not 
to  be  viewed  as  real,  at  least  in  the  same 
sense.  For  all  its  talk  about  Certainty  and 
the  like,  science  finds  it  necessary  to  presup- 
pose a  Gilbertian  world  —  one  in  which  the 
presence  and  activity  of  the  principle  of  real- 
ity in  thought  must  be  denied,  yet  one  in 
which  the  results  of  thinking  are  unique, 
because  only  to  them  can  value  and  validity 
be  ascribed.1 

1  Cf.  H.  Jones,  The  Philosophy  ofLotze,  p.  81. 


152  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

Many,  who  can  hardly  be  termed  unbiassed, 
would  curtly  dismiss  science  on  account  of 
the  assumptions  which  it  finds  itself  com- 
pelled to  make.  But  they  fail  to  perceive 
that  their  own  thought  is  in  still  more 
perilous  case.  So  long  as  science  keeps  to 
its  last,  its  necessary  presuppositions  must 
be  granted.  Were  it  inevitable  that  the 
so-called  "natural  philosopher"  should,  as  a 
prelude  to  his  physics,  furnish  forth  a  theory 
of  the  universe  and  of  experience,  —  heat, 
light,  electricity,  and  magnetism  would  have 
to  bide  long  ere  their  turn  for  attention 
arrived.  The  glory  of  science  lies  partly  in 
the  very  data  which  it  chooses  to  adopt,  and 
for  the  rest,  in  the  results  that  it  has  attained 
and  is  attaining,  but  which,  in  the  absence 
of  the  general  principles  just  indicated, 
would  never  have  been  gleaned.  Scientific 
faith,  scientific  imagination,  and  the  like, 
are  no  pleasing  fictions  of  the  empiricist  in 
his  moments  of  unbending.  To  his  theory 
they  are  bone  of  its  bone  and  flesh  of  its 
flesh.  Without  them  it  would  not  have 
been.  And  so  long  as  this  is  borne  in  mind 
one  can  find  no  fault.  Rather,  indeed,  the 
reverse;  for  science  ceases  to  be  science,  and 


THE  TEEISTIC  PROBLEM  153 

becomes  either  clumsy  poetry  or  bad  meta- 
physics, when  it  forgets  its  own  province. 
The  observer  who  sweeps  the  heavens  and 
finds  no  God,  the  true  sceptic  for  whom  God 
is  an  unnecessary  hypothesis,  the  biologist 
who  avers  that  he  has  been  able  to  make 
some  few  judgments  without  logic,  are  one 
and  all  justified,  if  they  continually  call  to 
remembrance  the  definite  extent  of  the  range 
in  which  they  have  deliberately  chosen  to 
toil.  By  dividing  they  conquer;  but  they 
are  not  thereby  gifted  with  a  right  to  sup- 
pose that  the  division  was  never  made. 
Science  scores  its  most  startling  triumphs  by 
devoting  assiduous  attention  to  the  "  outside  " 
of  experience,  or  to  a  portion  of  it.  The 
failures  which,  as  we  too  often  forget  at 
present,  need  to  be  placed  alongside  the  suc- 
cesses, are  traceable,  for  the  most  part,  to  a 
desire  to  repudiate  the  conditions  of  the 
compact,  by  observance  of  which  the  major 
victories  of  discovery  have  been  won. 

When  the  partial  experience,  which  science 
necessarily  sets  aside  for  the  exercise  of  its 
special  methods,  comes  to  be  treated  as  if  it 
were  the  sum-total  of  the  universe,  certain 
sufficiently    startling     conclusions     are    not 


154  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

unlikely  to  follow.  Now  this  is  in  great 
measure  the  phenomenon  that  has  presented 
itself  to  an  admiring,  a  timorous,  or  an 
astonished  crowd,  during  the  last  generation. 
Hence,  too,  the  Spencerian  phenomenalism 
and  the  Ritschlian  timidity.  So  mighty  had 
been  the  victories  within  the  "  outer  "  world, 
so  tangible  some  of  their  consequences,  that 
not  a  few  were  willing  to  accept  readily  the 
asseveration  of  the  discoverers,  "no  other 
world  exists."  Human  experience,  having 
arrived  at  the  strange  pass  of  possessing  an 
outside  and  an  inside,  has,  even  more  remark- 
ably, found  itself  able  to  acquiesce  with  the 
wife  —  when  her  husband  told  her  that  he 
would  keep  the  inside  of  the  house  while  she 
might  have  the  outside.  The  empirical 
theory  of  external  things  thus  came  to  take 
its  place  as  the  theory  of  the  universe,  and 
the  delusion  was  that  the  same  theory  could 
fulfil  both  functions  with  equal  success. 
Men  came  to  alarm  themselves  over  the 
perilous  position  into  which  religion,  morals, 
and  the  other  so-called  spiritual  realities  had 
fallen.  And  the  more  loudly  it  was  affirmed 
that  the  abstract  sphere  of  science  is  co-exten- 
sive with  the  universe,  the  deeper  became  the 


THE    THEISTIC  PROBLEM  155 

heart-searchings.  Signs  are  not  a  wanting 
that  this  phase  is  now  passing  away.  The 
misconceptions  out  of  which  it  originally 
sprang  are  being  brought  to  light.  Some 
select  spirits  begin  to  perceive  that  the 
essential  presuppositions  of  science  are  pre- 
suppositions. Nay,  a  very  few  candidly  con- 
fess that  they  are  not  to  be  reproached 
overmuch  for  their  experiments  in  meta- 
physic ;  for,  as  they  rightly  aver,  it  is  imposs- 
ible to  write  good  metaphysics  with  a  bad 
pen. l 

While,  then,  positive  inquiry,  as  Mr. 
Spencer's  and  the  Ritschlian  result  are  often 
termed,  has  thus  been  progressing  by  confin- 
ing itself  strictly  within  a  certain  range,  and 
has  been  making  considerable  drafts  on  the 
credulity  of  the  irreflective,  by  implicitly 
denying  the  restriction,  philosophical  specul- 
ation has  not  been  altogether  idle.  In  this 
century  —  since  Kant,  as  Mr.  Balfour  says  2  — 
one  chief  victory  may  be  attributed  to  it. 
At  length  it  has  come  to  recognize  its  own 
proper  problem.     Thanks  to  Hume,  men  do 

1  Eomanes  used  to  say  this  sometimes :  in  his  last  books 
he  has  made  his  reasons  public. 

2  Cf.  The  Foundations  of  Belief ,  p.  94. 


156  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

not  require  to  trouble  longer  with  the 
unthinkable  and  unanswerable.  He  who 
declares  that  thought  and  extension  are 
mutually  exclusive,  and  spends  his  life  in 
trying  to  get  out  from  the  one  to  the  other, 
had  better  go  to  school  with  the  Scotch 
sceptic.  There  he  may  achieve  an  insight 
into  the  moral  of  "Humpty  Dumpty."  Kant 
in  one  sense  made  philosophy  possible  by 
asking  the  philosophical  question.  Exper- 
ience has  neither  inside  nor  outside,  it  is  an 
organic  whole,  and  the  first  business  of 
speculation  is  to  set  forth  the  immanent 
principle  of  the  unity.  The  abstract  view  of 
science  gives  place  to  a  more  concrete,  a 
more  adequately  real,  doctrine.  Objects,  as 
the  sciences  believe,  may  have  a  nature  of 
their  own,  but  to  possess  this,  in  man's  exper- 
ience at  least  —  and  we  may  presume  that 
this  alone  is  interesting  —  they  must  be 
capable  of  rational  treatment.  It  is  no  part 
of  the  discipline  of  philosophy  to  assume  that 
objects  exist  and  can  be  known  by  mind.  Its 
task  rather  is  to  inquire  into  the  meaning  of 
existence  for  mind.  In  a  human  life  any 
"thing"  is  a  thing  for  a  "person."  That  is 
to  say,  rationality  is  not  read  into  it,  a  foreign 


THE  THE  1ST IC  PROBLEM  157 

being,  but  rationality  is  read  out  of  it,  a 
blood  relation.  The  "  person  "  is  not  only 
the  excluding  individuality,  but  is  also  the 
including  principle.  The  reality  of  which 
it  boasts  itself  it  has  a  right  to  boast  about ; 
for  to  it  the  "  thing "  belongs.  Wherever 
mind  ranges  it  comes  upon  itself.  The 
spiritual,  so  far  from  being  a  derivative,  is 
that  in  the  light  of  which  alone  a  derivative 
can  be  an  effective  component  of  knowledge. 
It  may  be  possible  to  speak  as  if  reality  occu- 
pied a  kingdom  denied  to  spirit,  but  the 
moment  these  words  cease  to  represent  a 
fiction,  which  is  a  convenient  addition  to  the 
apparatus  necessary  for  investigating,  say, 
the  behavior  of  forces,  they  lead  to  serious, 
if  not  fatal,  error.  Externality,  as  it  is 
quaintly  called,  cannot  but  be  for  man  one 
part  of  a  rational  order  yielding  itself  to  the 
persuasion  of  another,  a  more  essentially  real. 
Bearing  this  in  mind,  it  has  become  possible 
to  view  the  wildest  flights  of  recent  quasi- 
scientific  "  naturalism  "  and  theological  ag- 
nosticism with  an  equanimity  which  some, 
less  percipient  than  their  neighbors,  have 
chosen  to  confound  with  dogmatism,  or, 
more   probably,    with  ignorance.      The  pity 


\ 


158  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

expended  on  the  poor  "  transcendentalist " 
is  another  excellent  example  of  the  topsy- 
turvydom of  our  vaunted  modern  thought. 
The  transcendentalist,  whose  certainty  is 
that  man's  experience  is  limited  only  by  the 
rational,  finds  himself  expected  to  eat  the 
fragments  from  the  table  of  the  realist,  who 
openly  extols  himself  for  dogmatizing  about 
meats  whose  nature  is  unknowable.  He  who 
knows  to  know  is  a  dreamer;  he  who  knows 
only  what  he  avers  cannot  be  known,  walks 
the  solid  earth.  Slowly  but  surely,  however, 
philosophy  is  teaching  that  the  empirical 
remedy  for  ignorance  may  work  more  harm 
than  the  disease. 

The  term,  religious  reaction,  which  has 
been  applied  to  the  movement  whereout  such 
a  result  as,  say,  Mr.  Balfour's  Foundations 
of  Belief  has  precipitated  itself,  is  probably  a 
misnomer.  So  far  as  the  man  in  the  wood 
is  able  to  see  the  trees,  the  new  tendency 
partakes  scarcely  at  all  of  the  character  of 
reaction,  nor  can  it  claim  to  be  religious  in 
any  special  sense.  Rather  it  is  a  first  result 
of  the  steadily  growing  recognition  that  the 
spirituality  of  human  nature  has  no  more 
been  destroyed  by  Darwin  than  by  Lyall  or 


THE   THE  I  STIC  PROBLEM  159 

Copernicus.  The  mechanical  conception  of 
design  that  dominated  the  eighteenth  century 
and  the  resultant  ideal  of  God  as  a  high  class 
master-mason  tend  to  disappear.  They  linger 
still  in  some  few  pulpits,  and  the  sooner  they 
are  eschewed  there  the  better  for  religion. 
Wider  and  less  inadequate  conceptions  have 
supplanted  them;  and  the  so-called  reaction 
is  but  an  evidence  of  the  growing  tendency 
to  recognize  this  more  frankly,  or  at  least 
with  less  pharisaical  hesitancy.  The  truth 
is  that  latter-day  science,  theology,  and  philo- 
sophy have  long  been  engaged  upon  a  joint 
labor,  and  the  larger  confidence  of  many  at 
present  is  a  product  of  the  equating  of  results. 
The  doctrine  of  evolution  now  wields  the 
authority,  not  of  a  theory,  but  of  a  fact. 
Yet  some  of  the  deductions  from  it,  which 
have  been  masquerading  as  facts  for  a  few 
brief  years,  begin  to  shrink  to  their  true 
proportions.  God  qua  Mind  or  Matter  or 
Motion,  that  is,  God  according  to  a  set  of 
limited  categories,  has  vanished  into  the 
inane  of  unknowability ;  freedom,  viewed  as 
a  capacity  for  originating  muscular  move- 
ments, has  taken  its  proper  place  among  a 
crowd  of  superannuated  dogmas ;  even  to  ask 


160  CONTEMPORARY   THEOLOGY 

the  question,  Does  death  end  all  ?  is  to  make 
dangerous  concessions  in  the  direction  of 
foreclosing  the  reply.  The  introduction  of 
the  evolution  conception,  alike  in  meta- 
physics, in  theology,  and  in  science,  has  led 
to  a  revisal  of  former  doctrines.  God  cannot 
now  be  regarded  as  an  extra-mundane  arti- 
ficer who  made  the  world,  and  then  sent  it 
off  to  spin  through  space  for  a  season.  But 
this  is  a  very  different  doctrine  from  that 
involved  in  the  categorical  statement,  There 
is  no  God.  A  new  question,  on  the  con- 
trary, has  been  raised  with  respect  to  God's 
relationship  to  the  world.  So,  in  spite  of 
all  the  forcible  scepticism  of  the  age,  Mr. 
Balfour  can  make  a  declaration  like  the  fol- 
lowing with  every  prospect  of  commanding 
assent.  "Compare,  for  example,  the  central 
truth  of  theology  —  '  there  is  a  God  '  —  with 
one  of  the  fundamental  presuppositions  of 
science  (itself  a  generalized  statement  of 
what  is  given  in  ordinary  judgments  of  per- 
ception) —  '  there  is  an  independent  natural 
world.'  I  am  myself  disposed  to  doubt 
whether  so  good  a  case  can  be  made  out  for 
accepting  the  second  of  these  propositions  as 
can   be   made  out  for  accepting  the  first."1 

1  The  Foundations  of  Belief,  pp.  236-237. 


THE  T HEIST IC  PROBLEM  161 

Even  the  lay  mind  is  coming  to  observe  that 
a  world  full  of  natural  processes  is  not  to  be 
explained  by  the  simple  declaration  that 
there  are  no  such  processes;  and,  moreover, 
that  it  is  not  sufficient  to  say,  on  the  other 
side,  that  natural  processes  account  for  every- 
thing. They  too  are  ever  accompanied  by 
conditions.  Teleology  may  be  in  bad  odor 
as  a  doctrine,  it  is  more  than  likely  to 
vindicate  itself  as  a  fact,  if  the  evolution 
process  is  to  yield  up  further  secrets.  The 
commonplace  of  philosophy,  that  there  is  a 
new  issue  and  a  way  out  of  it,  seems  to  be 
filtering  into  the  general  mind.  Either  God 
is  unnecessary ;  or  he  is  far  more  immediately 
necessary  to  this  universe  than  any,  save  a 
small  group  of  "vaporing  mystics,"  had  pre- 
viously supposed.  The  former  alternative 
may  be  dismissed  as  being  irrelevant  from 
the  scientific,  and  impossible  from  the  philo- 
sophic, standpoint;  while  no  "plain  man" 
would  be  likely  to  make  the  confession  — 

"  And  thrice  I  ha'  patted  my  God  on  the  head  that  men  * 

might  call  me  brave."  Jr**^~ 

The  chief  doctrines  that  go  by  the  name  of 
modern  thought,  then,  can  hardly  be  said  to 
destroy  the  spiritual.     In  fact,  they  seem  to 
11 


162  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

bless  rather  than  to  ban.  Spiritual  life 
appears  to  overflow  the  strictly  natural,  for 
the  world  of  dead  matter  wanes,  while  the 
categories  of  organism  and  life  and  mind 
wax.  "The  materialists,"  as  Schopenhauer 
said,  "  endeavor  to  show  that  all,  even  mental, 
phenomena  are  physical;  and  rightly;  only 
they  do  not  see  that  on  the  other  hand,  every- 
thing physical  is  at  the  same  time  meta- 
physical." But  materialism  can  scarcely  be 
said  to  represent  an  estimable  force  to-day, 
and  the  perception  grows  stronger  and 
stronger,  affecting  an  ever  widening  circle  of 
thoughtful  men,  that  "  everything  plrysical  is 
at  the  same  time  metaphysical." 

IV.  Speculative  Gnosticism  and  the  Theistic 
Problem. 

There  is  a  frequently  quoted  catch  phrase 
to  the  effect  that  in  habit  of  mind  all  men  are 
either  Platonists  or  Aristotelians.  With 
some,  a  spiritual  passion  for  first  principles, 
with  others,  a  righteous  conscientiousness  in 
details,  maintains  ascendency.  The  founders 
and  the  eirtyovoi  of  systematic  and  of  pious 
Gnosticism  —  Plato,    some   of  the   medieval 


THE  THE  I  STIC  PROBLEM  163 

Realists,  the  Mystics,  Spinoza,  Schelling, 
Hartmann  —  might  justifiably  be  selected  to 
represent  the  former.  But,  after  all,  a  sharp 
division  of  this  kind  abounds  in  misleading 
suggestions,  for  principles  and  details  are 
scarcely  thus  separable.  And  undoubtedly, 
the  thinker  from  whom  a  specialized  Gnosti- 
cism received  greatest  impetus,  under  whose 
aegis  it  acquired,  and  still  wields,  widespread 
influence,  was  moved  by  a  vehement  regard 
for  some  details  —  perhaps  not  for  all  —  only 
little  less  than  by  eagerness  on  behalf  of 
principles.  This  combination,  indeed,  con- 
stituted the  secret  of  Hegel's  sway,  and 
moulded  the  nature  of  his  system.  The 
interest  of  his  theological  thought  centres, 
not  simply  in  his  grasp  upon  principles,  but 
also  in  his  illustrations  of  them  typified  by 
certain  groups  of  phenomena  that  fall  within 
the  range  of  human  experience.  God  ceases 
to  be  dismissed  as  unknowable,  and  ascetic 
seclusion  is  deemed  powerless  to  heighten 
divinity  one  whit.  Deity  is  the  most  real 
being;  but  complete  satisfaction  cannot  be 
extracted  from  this  abstract  statement.  So 
the  conclusion  follows  that  this  reality  reveals 
itself  equally  in  thought  and  in  things  —  in 


164  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

man  and  in  history,  in  life  and  in  matter. 
Nor  can  the  revelation  be  viewed  negatively; 
it  is  pre-eminently  positive,  because,  however 
limited  in  degree,  no  restriction  is  set  upon 
kind.  "  To  know  what  God  as  spirit  is  —  to 
apprehend  this  accurately  and  distinctly  in 
thoughts  —  requires  careful  and  thorough 
speculation.  It  includes,  in  its  forefront, 
the  propositions:  God  is  God  only  so  far  as 
he  knows  himself ;  his  self-knowledge  is,  further, 
his  self-consciousness  in  man,  and  man's 
knowledge  OF  God,  which  proceeds  to  man's 
self-knowledge  in  God.  .  .  .  When  the  immed- 
iacy and  sensuousness  of  shape  and  know- 
ledge is  superseded,  God  is,  in  point  of 
content,  the  essential  and  actual  spirit  of 
nature  and  spirit,  while  in  point  of  form  he 
is,  first  of  all,  presented  to  consciousness  as 
a  mental  representation.  This  quasi-pictor- 
ial representation  gives  to  the  elements  of 
his  content,  on  one  hand,  a  separate  being, 
making  them  presuppositions  towards  each 
other,  and  phenomena  which  succeed  each 
other.  Their  relationship  it  makes  a  series 
of  events  according  to  finite  reflective  cate- 
gories. But,  on  the  other  hand,  such  a  form 
of  finite  representationalism  is  also  overcome 


THE  THEIST1C  PROBLEM  165 

and  superseded  in  the  faith  which  realizes 
one  spirit  and  in  the  devotion  of  worship."1 
On  such  a  scheme  there  is  but  one  step  from 
the  sublime  to  the  ridiculous.  But  the 
important  fact  brought  to  light  is,  not  that 
now  and  then  the  sublime  descends  to  the 
level  of  the  ridiculous,  rather,  on  the  con- 
trary, that  always  the  ridiculous  cannot  be 
bereft  of  elements  of  essential  unity  with  the 
sublime. 

"  Partake  thy  confidence !     No  creature  'a  made  so  mean 
But  that,  some  way,  it  boasts,  could  we  investigate, 
Its  supreme  worth  ;  fulfils,  by  ordinance  of  fate, 
Its  momentary  task,  gets  glory  all  its  own, 
Tastes  triumph  in  the  world,  pre-eminent,  alone. 

As  firm  is  my  belief,  quick  sense  preceives  the  same 

Self-vindicating  flash  illustrate  every  man 

And  woman  of  our  mass,  and  prove,  throughout  the  plan, 

No  detail  but,  in  place  allotted  it,  was  prime 

And  perfect."  2 

One  need  not  travel  far  afield  to  detect 
the  strength,  impress! veness  and  animating 
inspiration  of  this  doctrine.  Although  it 
must  be  said  that  critics  of  Hegel  have  too 
often  been  prone  to  dismiss  these  merits,  and 
to  fix  only  upon  the  formal  weaknesses  in- 

1  W".  Wallace,  Hegel's  Philosophy  of  Mind,  pp.  176-177 
(the  italics  are  mine). 

2  Browning,  Fifine  at  the  Fair,  Sec.  xxix. 


166  CONTEMPORARY   THEOLOGY 

cident  to  the  dialectic  method.  They  have 
their  reward  in  missing  his  truly  formative 
influence,  which,  in  spite  of  scholastic  limit- 
ations and  the  arrogant  intellectism  of  some 
disciples,  exercises  most  potent  authority 
to-day,  even  if  "  since  the  death  of  Professor 
Michelet,  there  is  not  a  Hegelian  left  in 
Germany."  When  the  Teutonic  "national 
philosopher"  appeared,  certain  one-sided 
tendencies  had  too  long  determined  thought. 
His  destiny  was  to  remove  these  restraints, 
and  in  so  doing,  he  emphasized  other  prin- 
ciples, principles  with  which  it  is  impossible 
to  dispense  in  approaching  theistic  problems. 
How  far  he  overshot  the  mark,  and  became 
to  some  extent  a  reactionary  himself,  the 
sequel  must  show.  As  has  been  hinted 
already,  the  excellencies  of  his  essentially 
constructive  protest  lie  upon  the  surface. 

Although  many,  including  even  some  who 
are  not  actively  hostile,  fail  to  grasp  its 
significance,  Hegel's  achievement  forms  a 
powerful  factor  in  contemporary  discussion. 
The  chief  cause  of  misunderstanding  may  be 
traced  to  the  presence  of  two  strands  in  his 
theory  which  theologians,  and  others,  do  not 
trouble  to  disentangle  sufficiently.     The  one 


THE  THE  IS  TIC  PROBLEM  167 

lies  in  his  conspectus  of  the  ultimate  nature 
of  the  universe;  the  other  is  to  be  detected 
in  a  schema  of  the  method  whereby  the 
manifestations  of  this  nature  have  taken  place. 
In  the  latter  the  weaknesses  of  the  Hegelian 
philosophy  mainly  repose,  the  former  is  the 
source  of  its  strength.  Here  then,  God  be- 
comes the  synthetic  principle  immanent  in  the 
"single  and  unalterable  system  of  relations" 
known  to  man  as  the  world.  Humanity 
is  a  revelation  of  deity  on  one  rank,  nature 
on  another  and  lower.  Accordingly,  the 
universe  may  be  viewed  as  an  organism  of 
which  deity  is  the  maintaining  and  origin- 
ating agency.  In  the  most  literal  sense, 
"he  is  not  far  from  each  one  of  us,  for  in 
him  we  live  and  move  and  have  our  being." 
The  inestimable  value  of  the  stress  laid  by 
Hegel  on  this  doctrine  rests  upon  its  com- 
pacted rationalism.  Once  and  forever,  the 
trifling  dogma-trimming  of  the  eighteenth 
century  —  still,  by  the  way,  confounded  with 
"  speculative  "  rationalism  —  was  dismissed. 
Naturalism,  too,  so  far  received  acceptance, 
and  was  reproduced  in  an  improved  shape. 
The  hypothesis  did  not  stop  short  at  vague 
intimations,  but  presented  itself  as  a  rounded 


168  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

whole,  wrought  in  many  of  its  parts  with 
great  care,  and  welded  throughout  by  the 
almost  too  rigorous  application  of  a  consistent 
method.  God  is  not  simply  over  all  his 
works,  but  in  them,  and  in  them  with  deepest 
actuality.  To  conserve  religion,  to  lay  hold 
upon  deity,  man  is  no  longer  required  to 
condemn  his  own  experience.  Shorn  of  this 
he  would  be  poor  indeed.  Here,  on  the 
contrary,  he  is  schooled  to  perceive  that, 
within  the  circle  of  his  own  self-conscious 
life,  and  only  there,  can  he  ever  hope  to 
catch  a  glimpse  of  the  Absolute  Spirit.  The 
worth  of  this  protest  against  a  thought-damn- 
ing Agnosticism,  against  a  despiritualizing 
Materialism,  can  scarcely  be  overestimated. 
And,  despite  numerous  vicissitudes,  it  has 
vindicated  itself  for  the  last  three  quarters  of 
the  century  by  its  regenerating  results.  Nay, 
such  has  been  its  persuasive  efficacy  that  too 
many,  taking  the  complete  system  as  if  it 
were  a  kind  of  sacred  fetich,  have  met  criti- 
cism with  ill-concealed  temper,  and  have 
even  persuaded  themselves  that  friendly  hints 
about  possible  faults  and  dangers  ought  not 
to  be  brooked. 

Yet,  even  after  elimination  of  the  dialectic 


THE  THE  I  STIC  PROBLEM  169 

method,  the  solution  of  the  problem  here 
propounded  has  its  own  imperfections,  and 
drags  peculiar  perils  in  its  train.  The  doc- 
trine of  deity  faces  two  ways,  because  it 
embodies  at  once  a  theory  of  the  divine  and 
of  the  human.  Consequently,  the  cardinal 
difficulty  has  always  been  the  preservation  of 
a  nicely  adjusted  balance  between  these 
aspects.  And  it  is  hardly  a  slight  when  one 
points  out  that  the  task,  as  it  well  might,  has 
proved  too  severe.  Having  discovered  the 
Idea,  the  Absolute,  God  in  everything,  but 
most  eminently  in  man,  the  temptation  to 
proceed  as  if  the  known  universe,  and  human 
self-consciousness  in  particular,  furnished  a 
comparatively  exhaustive  presentation  of  the 
divine  nature,  became  too  powerful  for 
resistance.  The  warring  of  the  pantheistic 
and  monotheistic  tendencies,  both  implicitly 
present  in  Hegel,  ended,  unfortunately,  in  a 
comparatively  complete  victory  for  the  former. 
From  this  conclusion  Hegel's  long  travail 
with  Greek  thought  and  culture  did  nothing 
to  deliver  him,  and  his  criticism  upon  Kant 
served  but  to  strengthen  the  "set"  of  these 
early  currents.  A  double  danger  lurks  here. 
In  the  first  place,  if  God  be  identified  with 


170  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

the  world  in  which  his  self-conscious  revel- 
ation proceeds,  then,  not  only  is  he  degraded 
to  a  level  where  the  spiritual  characteristics, 
predominant  in  man,  fail  of  universality, 
but  the  means  whereby  the  interpretation 
of  the  divine  self-disclosure  may  be  read 
lose  significance.  What  could  we  make  of 
a  sentence  in  which  every  word  was  a  prepo- 
sition or  a  noun  or  a  verb;  or  if  every 
word  were  the  same  word?  Would  it  be 
a  sentence  any  longer?  Similarly,  level  up 
everything  to  God,  and  you  run  real  danger 
of  dissolving  him,  or,  at  least,  of  confound- 
ing him  with  some  vague  unity  which  is 
so  crass  that  it  cannot  prove  a  well-spring 
in  the  experience  of  a  spiritual  being. 
Combine  God  too  closely  with  the  universe, 
and  you  are  apt  so  to  infuse  divinity  into 
each  part  that  no  one  conveys  any  special 
information.  Unity  ejects  content  when 
identity  comes  in.  And  a  God  who  is 
anything  may,  on  closer  inspection,  turn 
out  to  be  a  suspiciously  easy  anagram  for 
nothing. 

In  the  second  place,  this  mastering  inclin- 
ation to  solve  the  theistic  problem  by  quietly 
ceasing  to  be  theistic,  detracts  largely  from 


THE  THE  I  STIC  PROBLEM  171 

the  really  permanent  import  of  Hegel's 
teaching.  With  the  utmost  decision,  he 
warned  man  not  to  look  for  God  in  some  far- 
off  sphere,  closed  to  intuition  and  impregnable 
to  imagination.  With  equal  decision,  he 
insisted  that  discovery  of  the  divine,  if  dis- 
covery be  possible,  could  not  take  place 
except  in  human  experience.  The  record  of 
the  race,  man's  self-consciousness,  and  man's 
knowledge  of  nature  denote  the  sufficiently 
broad  sphere  in  which  the  search  must  be 
organized.  No  more  salutary  advice  could 
be  tendered.  Nevertheless,  in  following  it, 
one  must  bear  in  remembrance  that  it  relates 
no  more  than  indirectly  to  "very  God  of 
very  God."  The  direct  reference  touches 
man's  equipment  for  clearly  thinking  out  the 
problems  that  surround  the  divine  being. 
And,  whenever  God  himself  is  supposed  to 
be  completely  envisaged  in  the  process  of  the 
Idea's  —  an  abstraction  from  human  exper- 
ience —  self-diremption  and  final  enriched 
self-identity,  these  very  problems  meet  with 
implicit  denial.  No  room  is  left  for  their 
occurrence.  The  implications  are  that  God 
and  the  universe  coincide,  for  the  reason 
that  only  in  the  universe  can  man  find  deity. 


172  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

This,  further,  implies  the  depletion  of  God's 
nature  by  the  very  simple  process  of  showing 
the  relativity  —  and,  therefore,  non-divinity 
—  of  every  separate  thing  that  contributes  to 
the  general  whole.  In  the  end,  nothing 
remains  to  which  your  deity  can  impart 
absoluteness;  consequently  he  is  nothing. 
Hegel,  in  short,  was  not  so  good  as  his  pro- 
fession. He  says  somewhere  that  Lalande 
was  right  when  he  swept  the  heavens  with 
his  glass,  and  declared  he  could  find  no  god. 
Nature  may  confirm  a  theory  of  God,  it 
hardly  suffices  to  originate  one;  the  prime 
elements  of  adequacy  would  be  wanting. 
Yet  this  same  Hegel,  who  is  so  bethumped 
for  treading  the  "high  a  priori  road,"  him- 
self sought  in  nature  a  too  exhaustive  present- 
ation of  deity.  Against  his  own  philosophical 
creed,  he  countenanced  a  procedure  of  which 
the  only  logical  conclusion  would  be  the 
disappearance  of  reality  in  blank,  indistin- 
guishable sameness,  —  a  sameness  that  would 
immediately  be  entitled  to  the  honors,  now 
somewhat  barren,  of  deification.  In  his 
anxiety  to  strike  home  with  the  great  truth 
that  possessed  him,  he  tended  to  forget,  and 
led  many  others   to  forget  completely,  that 


THE  THEISTIC  PROBLEM  173 

"to    deify    man    is    as    illegitimate    as    to 
naturalize  him."1 


V.  Personality  and  the  Theistic  Problem 

It  would  be  euphemistic  to  call  the 
Hegelian  position  easy  of  apprehension. 
Abounding  as  it  does  in  closely  related 
truths,  strictly  circumscribed  statements  of  it 
are  apt  to  seem  paradoxical  or  to  be  partial. 
Nor  are  these  difficulties  lessened  by  Hegel's 
own  conclusions  or  by  the  varied  repetitions 
of  them  emanating  from  his  followers. 
Nevertheless,  while  recalling  this,  and  mak- 
ing due  allowance  for  it,  no  impartial  observer 
can  fail  to  detect  the  central  truth.  What- 
ever its  resultant  perils,  the  permanently 
valid  principle  enunciated  by  Hegel  finds 
expression  in  the  doctrine  that  condemnation 
of  experience  must  proceed  from  within  exper- 
ience. Such  is  man's  relation  to  knowledge, 
that  here  he  cannot  but  save  or  damn  him- 
self; he  has  no  other  resource.  Only  from 
the  conceived  can  judgments  originate  on 
reality,  on  truth,  on  validity,  and  on  their 
opposites.     In  one  sense,  accordingly,  exper- 

1  J.  Seth,  A  Study  of  Ethical  Principles,  p.  440. 


174  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

ience  becomes  absolute.  The  danger  lies  in 
the  eventual  identification  of  it  with  the 
Absolute.  To  this  inference  the  propositions 
often  adopted  by  Hegel  lend  themselves  only 
too  readily.  "  God  is  God  only  in  so  far  as 
he  knows  himself.  His  self-knowledge  is, 
further,  his  self-consciousness  in  man,  and 
man's  knowledge  of  God,  which  proceeds  to 
man's  self-knowledge  in  God."  This  is  a 
specimen  of  those  overstatements  that  un- 
avoidably lead  to  the  perilous  verge  of 
pantheism.  Yet,  the  reference  to  man's 
"knowledge  of  God"  suggests  another  line 
of  thought.  When  confined  to  experience, 
humanity  has  only  a  relative  power  of  laying 
hold  upon  deity.  But  experience  furnishes 
the  starting-point,  the  material,  and  the  goal 
of  man's  theological  effort.  Hence,  indeed, 
the  theistic  problem.  For,  how  can  God 
remain  God,  and  still  be  for  man  a  construct- 
ion derived  from  experience?  In  other 
words,  is  it  possible,  on  this  basis,  to  preserve 
the  requisite  balance  between  immanence 
and  transcendence?  Hegel's  view  of  the 
importance  of  experience  must  be  accepted, 
if  we  are  not  to  abandon  or  obscure  the  prob- 
lem.    Working   from   this,    then,    does  any 


THE  THE1ST1C  PROBLEM  175 

line  become    perceptible    along    which    the 
direction  of  the  solution  lies? 

Broadly  speaking,  upon  reflective  analysis 
human  experience  betrays  the  presence  of 
three  constitutive  elements.  These  are  —  the 
self,  the  not-self,  which  are  sufficiently 
definite;  and  the  relation  between  the  two, 
which  is  sufficiently  indefinite.  True  to  a 
certain  tendency  in  the  Hegelian  system, 
though  not  necessarily  to  its  ultimate  genius, 
an  absolute  idealism  might  well  locate  deity 
in  the  last.  Subtle  and  fertile  as  this  sug- 
gestion undoubtedly  is,  the  objection  already 
noted  above  clings  to  it  very  closely.  The 
inevitable  consequence  appears  in  a  persistent 
failure  to  rate  personality  at  its  proper  worth. 
The  individual,  entangled  in  a  universal 
process,  takes  on  many  characteristics  of  a 
type,  maybe,  but  the  "  single  life "  wanes. 
Consequently,  when  the  problem  of  deity 
forces  itself  upon  attention,  a  similar  omission 
needs  to  be  marked.  God  is  something,  some- 
thing very  essential,  but  the  right  to  speak 
of  him  as  personal  possesses  only  the  slightest 
warrant.  Despite  faith  in  experience,  the 
subject  holding  it  —  who  is,  after  all,  the  heart 
of  the  matter  —  receives  scant  recognition. 


176  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

Personality,  then,  requires  to  be  reim- 
ported,  as  it  were.  For  only  here,  in  an 
ideal  region  which,  at  the  same  time, 
partakes  most  fundamentally  of  reality,  can 
the  data  requisite  for  the  resolution  of  the 
problem  of  divinity  be  acquired.  Hegel's 
epoch-making  insistence  upon  the  irrefrag- 
ableness  of  experience  implies  explanation  of 
life  by  reference  to  the  highest  rather  than 
to  the  lowest  factors  that  it  presents.  Now, 
within  the  broad  range  of  intelligency,  per- 
sonality may  be  regarded,  not  simply  as  the 
highest,  but,  in  one  aspect,  as  the  only 
factor.  Here,  in  any  case,  we  light  upon  a 
principle  which  conditions  experience  and 
includes  within  its  operative  grasp  intellect, 
will,  feeling.  They  are  its  subordinates,  not 
because  they  are  forced  to  toil  at  its  tasks, 
but  because,  in  thus  functioning,  they  come 
to  be  themselves.  The  point  at  which  per- 
sonality touches  the  theistic  problem  stands 
closely  connected  with  this.  Knowledge, 
volition,  affection,  are  moments  in  a  process 
that  reveals  two  selves  —  the  self  as  it  is, 
and  the  self  as,  in  many  varied  ways,  it 
deems  that  it  ought  to  be.  Personality  mani- 
fests itself  in  the  recognition  of  this  unbridged 


THE  THEISTIC  PROBLEM  111 

interval  between  the  actual  and  the  ideal. 
This  separation  and  its  healing  scarcely 
permit  of  severance  from  any  detail  of 
experience,  and  certainly  they  cannot  be 
disassociated  from  the  organism  of  experience 
as  a  whole.  The  importance  of  this  for  the 
present  discussion  centres  in  the  fact  that  it 
supplies,  ready  to  hand,  a  solution  of  the 
antinomy  between  immanence  and  transcend- 
ence. Not  an  element  enters  into  experience 
but  submits  to  the  all-transforming  power  of 
the  self,  in  the  sense  that  everything  is  sent 
to  its  place  in  an  order  to  which  it  had  not 
previously  belonged  in  the  same  way.  From 
another  side,  personality  must  be  viewed  as 
all-transcendent.  Were  it  not  more  than 
itself,  the  processes  wherein  its  immanence 
is  realized  would  never  be  initiated.  Per- 
sonality as  such,  therefore,  may  be  made 
subject  of  hopeful  appeal. 

It  may,  of  course,  be  approached  from 
several  different  sides,  or,  to  be  more  accu- 
rate, the  name  may  be  given  to  some  func- 
tion, or  group  of  functions,  with  which  we 
are  concerned  only  indirectly  now.  Walk- 
ing in  a  lonely  glen,  I  may  suddenly  pull  up 
with  the  exclamation,  "There  is  a  man!" 
12 


178  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

Personality  in  this  semi- void  form  has  plainly 
no  assistance  to  offer.  Rising  a  little  higher 
in  the  scale,  personality  might  be  taken  to 
imply  that  vague  feeling  of  quietude  almost 
of  lassitude,  that  one  experiences  while 
drinking  in  the  glory  of  a  summer's  day. 
Such  a  state  rises  beyond  the  purely  animal 
level,  because  the  subject  of  it  recognizes  it 
as  his.  But  the  sentient  element  maintains 
an  immense  predominance.  In  this  interpret- 
ation of  the  term,  as  in  the  last,  we  cannot 
discover  the  desiderated  aid.  Finally,  to 
adduce  but  one  other  example,  personality 
may  be  regarded  from  the  typically  psycho- 
logical standpoint.  This  implies  that  the 
ego  is  stopped,  so  to  speak,  at  a  particular 
juncture  —  it  may  be  any  one  —  in  its  self- 
conscious  life,  and  that  the  conditions  as- 
sembled at  the  moment  are  analyzed.  Most 
valuable  information  can  thus  be  gleaned,  but 
the  tendency  is  to  level  down.  Reason  and 
ideality  might  thus  be  reduced,  and  have 
been,  to  the  grade  of  feeling,  just  because 
the  opportunity  snatched  by  the  psychologist 
necessarily  omits  aspects  of  the  synthetic  and 
transf orming  power  of  the  self.  And  even  if, 
as  in  Mr.   Illingworth's  Bampton   Lectures 


THE  THEISTIC  PROBLEM  179 

on  Personality,  Human  and  Divine,  a  de- 
scription of  personality  be  undertaken  with 
direct  reference  to  the  problem  now  under 
discussion,  the  psychological  and  psycho- 
logical-descriptive interpretations  prove  to  be 
insufficiently  ultimate.  The  former  takes 
the  self  to  pieces  for  the  sake  of  so  doing, 
the  other  calls  attention  to  the  parts  in 
action.  Neither  specifically  addresses  itself 
to  the  essence  of  personality,  on  which  in 
approaching  the  theistic  problem  we  cannot 
choose  but  lean. 

Personality,  accordingly,  is  to  be  under- 
stood here  in  its  ontological  or  operative  sense. 
Extend  the  term  reason  —  adopting  it  because 
it  is  man's  differentia  —  so  as  to  subsume 
equally  intellect,  will,  and  feeling,  and  per- 
sonality might  be  defined  as  the  principle  of 
the  unity  of  the  reasonable  for  a  reasonable 
being.  This  principle,  as  it  operates  in  the 
constitution  and  moulding  of  human  exper- 
ience, combines  the  immanent  with  the 
transcendent.  The  person  is  immanent  in 
every  corner  of  his  experiential  possessions, 
giving  them  the  worth  they  have,  relating 
them  to  one  another,  and  overlooking  their 
interconnection  with  the  conscious  or  half- 


180  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

conscious  aim  of  rendering  them  more  effect- 
ive instruments  in  the  service  of  the  whole. 
But  personality  proves  to  be  transcendent  as 
well  as  transcendental  or  constitutive.  Prog- 
ress, development,  expectation,  mark  its  daily- 
path.  Strenuous  it  may  be  in  welding  the 
countless  parts  of  experience,  it  is  still  more 
strenuous  in  bidding  man  reach  forth  to 
higher  and  yet  higher  ends.  Conscience, 
dissatisfaction,  distrust,  are  but  other  names 
for  that  condemnation  which  personality 
pronounces  upon  itself,  upon  things,  upon 
others.  Its  transcendence  conditions  all 
these  judgments.  From  out  a  better,  a  more 
perfect,  a  less  evil  sphere  it  fetches  a  stand- 
ard which  it  applies  to  itself  with  as  much 
rigor  as  to  dead  matter.  This  power  of  pro- 
jection, whereby  personality  includes  within 
its  grasp  all  past  and  all  possible  experience, 
realizes  its  most  essential  nature  when  it  lays 
down  the  liberal  outlines  of  that  more  real 
world  towards  which  it  ever  moves.  Here 
it  touches  the  theistic  problem,  not  merely 
because  it  provides  an  analogy  upon  which 
God  may  be  worthily  viewed,  but  because  it 
supplies  man  with  the  sole  criterion  whereby 
he    can    frame   a   judgment    regarding    the 


THE  T  HEIST  IC  PROBLEM  181 

Infinite.  This  is  the  reason  for  which  it  is 
abundantly  true  that  "  no  positive  hypothesis 
can  be  offered  as  a  substitute  for  a  personal 
God,  which  is  not  either  an  abstraction  from 
personality,  and  therefore  demonstrably  un- 
real, or  an  abstraction  inconsistently  personi- 
fied, and  therefore  demonstrably  untrue."1 

The  term  infinite  is  not  to  be  regarded  as 
a  bare  negation  of  the  finite.  If  this  were  its 
import,  it  had  far  better  be  summarily  dis- 
missed. The  transcendence  of  personality, 
which  leads  directly  to  the  infinite,  has  itself 
positive  content,  and  on  this  reliance  must 
now  be  placed. 

For  the  theist,  the  infinite  is  not  simply 
that  which  remains  when  finite  characteristics 
have  been  cancelled.  There  is  a  positive  dif- 
ference, a  difference,  furthermore,  in  kind  as 
well  as  in  degree.  To  the  eye  of  reason  the 
latter  may  be  visible ;  the  former  appeals  to 
the  eye  of  rational  faith.  If,  then,  we  are 
to  conceive  of  God,  we  must  look  upon  him 
as  a  personal  being.  By  an  effort  of  reason 
it  is  possible  to  arrive  at  the  conclusion  that 
he  combines  the  qualities  of  immanence  and 

1  J.  R.  Ulingworth,  Personality,  Human  and  Divine,  p. 
209. 


182  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

transcendence  just  like  man.  Further,  one 
may  rest  satisfied  with  an  interpretation  of 
his  immanence  in  the  universe,  as  Hegel  ap- 
parently did.  Yet  this  does  not  necessarily 
prescribe  a  rule  for  all;  nor,  indeed,  will  it 
even  seem  sufficient  to  every  mind.  For  the 
question  immediately  arises,  Are  immanence 
and  transcendence  related  in  the  divine  nature 
precisely  as  they  are  in  human  experience? 
And  behind  this  lies  the  second  debatable 
point,  Would  not  an  affirmative  answer  imply 
a  fatal  concession  to  Gnosticism?  God's 
transcendence  over  us,  if  he  be  God  in  ful- 
ness, may  best  be  sought  in  the  conclusions 
which  we  are  able  to  draw,  from  an  inspect- 
ion of  our  own  spiritual  being,  regarding 
the  highest  conceivable  person.  And,  pro- 
ceeding thus,  it  may  be  affirmed  that  God 
cannot  but  be  viewed  as  all-immanent  in 
his  own  nature.  This  marks  his  transcend- 
ence above  man.  He  camiot  be  God  and 
transcend  himself.  For  him  there  can  be 
no  better  world  out  of  which  he  brings 
motives  productive  of  aspiration.  Yet  the 
universal  process,  as  man  knows  it,  leads 
us  to  believe  that,  despite  his  self-immanence, 
God  is  not  an  actus  purus. 


THE  THE  J  STIC  PROBLEM  183 

"  Brute  and  bird,  reptile  and  the  fly, 
Ay  and,  I  nothing  doubt,  even  tree,  shrub,  plant 
And  flower  o'  the  field,  are  all  iu  a  common  pact 
To  worthily  defend  the  trust  of  trusts, 
Life  from  the  Ever  Living." 

Were  God  simply  mfinite  he  might  be,  for 
aught  we  know,  an  actus  purus.  But, 
though  he  manifest  himself,  we  are  bound  to 
believe  that,  with  him,  the  transcendence  of 
personality  over  itself  is  non-existent.  As 
God,  he  must  see  the  end  in  the  beginning 
of  the  universal  plan.  So,  he  is  all-immanent 
in  self;  so,  too,  he  is  over  all  his  works,  and 
over  man.  His  transcendence  above  us  is  a 
transcendental  transcendence  —  a  transcend- 
ence informing  an  experience,  not  merely  an 
impotent  existence  in  an  unknowable  and 
unknown  region.  And,  so  far  as  the  eye  of 
faith  can  perceive,  it  centres  in  that  bridged 
distance  between  "grasp  and  reach"  which 
man,  because  he  is  man,  cannot  overpass. 

We  call  God  the  infinite,  and  worship  him 
as  a  person,  not  because  the  qualities  of  this 
present  evil  world  have  simply  slipped  from 
off  him,  far  rather,  because  we  have  discerned 
in  our  own  lives  something  of  infinity.  Our 
own  transcendence  ever  remains  an  impelling 
power    extending    the    dominion    in   which 


184  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

immanence  holds  sway.  Hence,  we  are  led 
to  a  rationally  grounded  belief  that  the  per- 
fect personality  must  be  one  in  whose  nature 
this  separation  between  the  two  sides  of  per- 
sonality has,  not  only  been  overcome,  but  has 
never  existed.  The  creative  power  of  human 
personality,  evidenced  most  eminently  by 
Jesus,  must  be,  in  the  conception  of  deity, 
at  once  capable  of  full  expression  and  sure 
of  all  that  this  energizing  can  accomplish. 
There  is  no  need  to  commit  the  error  of  pro- 
ceeding from  the  finite  to  that  empty  notion, 
the  non-finite.  The  passage  is  from  a  prin- 
ciple perceptible  in  process  to  the  same  prin- 
ciple now  believed  to  be  eternally  realized  in 
toto  —  from  germ  to  completest  actuality. 
The  beginning  of  our  contention  lies  wholly 
within  the  bounds  of  speculative  thought; 
the  conclusion  to  which  it  tends  must  always 
remain  largely  a  matter  of  faith.  The  only 
God  whom  man  is  able  to  know  cannot  but 
put  on  —  shall  we  say  for  man  —  the  "  limits  " 
of  personality.  But,  then,  personality,  as 
we  have  tried  to  see,  does  not  fall  under  the 
category  of  limitation  in  any  of  its  customary 
uses.  So  we  proceed  to  an  interpretation  of 
the  divine  nature,   which  indeed  preserves 


THE  THE1STIC  PROBLEM  185 

the  characteristics  of  personality,  but  which 

at  the  same  time  mirrors  them  as  recombined 

in  such  fundamentally  different  —  yet,  in  the 

circumstances,  imperative  —  relations  that  an 

all-embracing  being  shows  in  dim  outline,  to 

whom,    because   we   conceive   something   of 

what  he  is,  we  aspire  in  lowly  reverence. 

In  one  aspect,  the  anthropomorphic  view 

of  deity  may  be  legitimately  pushed  to  the 

extreme.     He   in  whom  we  live  and  move 

and  have  our  being  must  be  very  near  to 

each  one  of  us.     If  we  take  experience   as 

our  guide,  God  approaches  closer  and  closer 

in  the  relationship  that  subsists  between  the 

self  and  the  better  self,  which  is  the  seed  of 

all  our  doing. 

"  God  is, 
Man  partly  is  and  wholly  hopes  to  be." 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  easy  to  be  too 
anthropomorphic  by  stopping  short  here,  and 
so  bringing  God  down  to  the  level  of  an 
abstract  quality  common  to  men.  To  pass 
beyond  this  implies,  indeed,  the  necessity 
for  raising  the  theistic  problem.  Personality 
points  the  way  and,  to  this  extent,  may  assist 
toward  a  solution.  But,  by  its  very  nature, 
it  also  directs  us  to  look  for  a  new  spiritual 


186  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

life  wherein  all  that  a  person  can  ever  con- 
ceive of  the  perfection  at  which  he  feels 
impelled  to  aim  is,  not  only  present,  but  has 
ever  been  ineffably  surpassed  in  the  divine 
certainty  of  self  and  of  the  origin,  import, 
and  end  of  creation.  In  relation  to  this 
faith,  as  so  often  happens,  the  half-truth  of 
the  poet  witnesses  to  deeper  insight  than  the 
rigorous  demonstration  of  the  philosopher. 

"  O  Thou,  —  as  represented  here  to  me 
In  such  conception  as  my  soul  allows,  — 
Under  Thy  measureless,  my  atom  width ! 
Man's  mind,  what  is  it  but  a  convex  glass 
Wherein  are  gathered  all  the  scattered  points 
Picked  out  of  the  immensity  of  sky, 
To  reunite  there,  be  our  heaven  for  earth, 
Our  known  unknown,  our  God  revealed  to  man? " 


CONCLUSION 

The  Final  Idealism 

Idealism  has  generated  its  fanaticisms,  and 
their  debts  to  unreason  have  constituted  a 
call  upon  the  essential  merits  of  the  entire 
theory.  We  need  not  exclaim  "  Lord,  Lord," 
to  Hegel,  yet  we  cannot  but  acknowledge 
the  reasons  for  his  sway.  The  absolutism, 
out  of  which  so  many  fashion  a  convenient 
bogy,  has  after  all  little  to  do  with  man's 
making  himself  in  God's  image.  Rather,  it 
relates  to  certain  contributions  to  the  con- 
ditions of  philosophic  and  theological  progress, 
in  the  absence  of  which  a  theory  of  things 
would  be  incoherent  or  impossible.  Exper- 
ience must  be  its  own  judge.  This,  in  a 
word,  is  Hegel's  epoch-making  discovery. 
But  it  requires  to  be  extricated  from  the 
tangle  of  formal  apparatus  wherewith  it  was 
originally  presented.  As  we  have  tried  to 
observe,  two  elements  co-exist  in  the  bibles 


188  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

of  idealism.  The  one  furnishes  a  summary 
statement  of  the  nature  of  the  universe  as  it 
cannot  but  be  for  man,  the  other  details  a 
method  whereby  the  principle,  alleged  to  be 
immanent  in  this  nature,  has  characteristic- 
ally manifested  itself  from  generation  to 
generation.  Agnostic  critics,  and  even  Mr. 
A.  J.  Balfour,  tend  to  identify  these  two. 
Or,  at  all  events,  their  reasoning  so  operates 
that  the  condemnation  which  they  justly 
pour  out  upon  the  latter,  overflows  the 
former.  And  the  contention  to  be  urged  is, 
that  while  the  latter  constitutes  the  Achilles' 
heel  of  much  contemporary  idealism,  the 
former  furnishes  all  idealists  with  an  inex- 
haustible source  of  speculative  strength. 
Rationalism,  not  in  the  peddling  eighteenth 
century  sense,  but  in  the  guise  of  a  socialized 
reason,  wherein  all  men  are  partakers,  and 
whereby  alone  they  can  execute  valid  judg- 
ment upon  the  deep  things  of  life,  constitutes 
the  segis  of  a  satisfactory  theology.  Only 
within  the  charmed,  yet  supremely  natural, 
circle  of  self-consciousness  can  men  hope 
ever  to  obtain  a  glimpse  of  the  infinities  to 
which  in  common  they  yearn.  This  is  a 
theory  whose  line  cannot  be  turned  by  any 


CONCLUSION  189 

experience-destroying  agnosticism,  for  the 
simple  reason  that  it  has  no  flank.  So  far  as 
a  human  being,  at  least,  can  judge,  nothing 
irrational,  unrational,  non-rational  —  the 
name  matters  little,  so  long  as  it  is  under- 
stood to  imply  what  indeed  can  only  be  said, 
for  it  is  non-sense,  that  what  lies  out  of  self- 
consciousness  is  as  good  as  nothing  for  it  —  is 
able  to  occupy  an  organic  place  in  exper- 
ience. Only  from  what  has  been  envisaged 
by  self-consciousness  in  others  or  in  me,  can 
judgments,  theologically  speaking,  emanate 
with  regard  to  reality,  truth,  validity,  and 
the  like.  Experience,  as  conditioned  by  self- 
consciousness,  cannot  but  be  absolute  in  this 
respect.  Whether  the  Absolute  and  this  ex- 
perience are  one  is  a  totally  different  matter. 
Even  Mr.  Balfour,  in  his  anxiety  to  repud- 
iate the  latter  inference,  has  unfortunately 
forgotten  the  former  fact.  The  limits  of 
personality,  it  may  very  well  be,  cannot  cir- 
cumscribe God.  But  man  must  fit  his  infinity 
to  the  finite.  That  is  to  say,  within  his  own 
self -consciousness  if  he  is  to  be  a  man  in  any 
full  sense,  he  cannot  but  include  the  self- 
consciousness  of  his  neighbors.  A  purely 
personal  experience  is  as  inconceivable,  and 


190  CONTEMPORARY   THEOLOGY 

as  inept,  as  the  Unknowable.  Yet  this  is 
not  to  say  that  a  man  ever  can  get  beyond 
the  realm  of  ideas.  Idealist  he  is  by  nature, 
and  idealist  he,  therefore,  must  remain. 
And  it  is  possible  for  him  to  be  so  far  satis- 
fied with  this  state  of  nature,  because  he 
shares  it  along  with  all  his  fellows.  What 
they  accomplish  can  be  transferred  to  him, 
what  he  achieves  he  gains  with  them.  In 
short,  so  far  from  idealism  leading  to  solips- 
ism, its  main  presupposition  turns  out  to  be 
that  solipsism  is  a  word  representing  a  theory 
—  which  cannot  by  any  rational  possibility 
be  thought.  And  one  hardly  sees  sufficient 
reason  for  giving  up  the  priceless  treasure  of 
idealism,  the  rehabilitation  of  experience, 
because  some  idealists  seek  to  show  that 
deity  is  no  more  than  the  process  of  ideas. 

No  doubt  both  extremes  are  traceable  to 
the  same  causes.  Idealism  of  the  contempor- 
ary sort  has  scarcely  reached  its  centenary 
yet.  The  swaddling  clothes  of  system  with 
which  it  was  first  presented  to  a  half- 
delighted,  half-astounded  world,  still  tend 
to  obscure  its  outlines,  and  perhaps  to  warp 
its  growth.  But  the  central  life  itself  grows 
stronger  meantime.     When  it  has  come  to  be 


CONCLUSION  191 

more  fully  understood,  fewer  will  be  afraid 
of  it,  fewer  too  will  be  so  eager  to  descant 
on  its  seeming  accompaniments.  Meanwhile, 
it  is  enough  to  recognize  that  the  self- 
consciousness  of  men,  the  experience  of  the 
race  as  a  co-operation  of  these  self-conscious 
beings,  and  the  knowledge  which,  with  a 
modesty  that  veils  truth  too  much,  this  exper- 
ience alleges  itself  to  have  of  "  other  things  " 
are  conditions  of  the  approval  or  disapproval 
of  every  possible  conception.  To-day  we 
present  these  truths  to  ourselves  mainly 
under  biological  categories.  We  say,  for 
example,  that  "Society  is  an  organism." 
Yet,  do  we  not  know  full  well  that  this  is 
untrue?  Society  never  was,  is  not,  and 
cannot  be  an  organism.  So  too  we  tend  to 
regard  experience  in  the  same  way,  and  no 
small  portion  of  the  errors  into  which  we 
stumble,  all  unwittingly,  flows  from  this 
tendency.  For  an  organism  has  an  inside 
and  an  outside.  The  central  doctrine  of 
idealism,  the  citadel  of  the  possibility  of 
philosophizing,  of  building  up  a  theological 
system,  lies  precisely  in  an  explicit  denial  of 
this.  Nevertheless,  one  is  not  compelled 
to  suppose  that  a  tower  has  been  founded  on 


192  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

or  fashioned  out  of  omniscience.  Rather, 
looking  the  reality  in  the  face,  one  exclaims 
with  the  poet :  — 

*'  How  inexhaustibly  the  spirit  grows ! 
One  object,  she  seemed  erewhile  born  to  reach 
With  her  whole  energies  and  die  content,  — 
So  like  a  wall  at  the  world's  edge  it  stood, 
With  naught  beyond  to  live  for,  —  is  that  reached  ?  — 
Already  are  new  undream'd  energies 
Outgrowing  under  and  extending  farther 
To  a  new  object ;  —  there 's  another  world ! " 

Human  experience,  unlike  any  organism, 
can  be  traced  to  nothing  hut  itself,  can  be 
projected  into  nothing  but  itself.  And  the 
great  law  which  thus  decrees  is  perhaps  best 
expressed  as  the  law  of  sociality.  For  in 
thought  as  in  action,  seeing  they  are  but 
different  sides  of  one  being,  the  ultimate 
principle  must  be  conception  of  the  true,  and 
effort  to  realize  it  in  a  life  which,  at  every 
turn,  implies  contact,  companionship  and 
their  opposites. 

If,  then,  experience  be  a  closed  circle 
with  sides  ever  receding  as  man  approaches ; 
if  it  be,  that  is,  a  circle  containing  ideas, 
bounded,  if  hounded  it  be,  by  ideals,  then 
what  of  the  opposition  between  Authority 
and  Reason  so  much  vaunted  by  theologians  ? 


CONCLUSION  193 

One  may  agree  first,  that  "  always  and  every- 
where an  Imaginary  Observer,  contemplating 
from  some  external  coign  of  vantage  the 
course  of  human  history,  would  note  the 
immense,  the  inevitable,  and  on  the  whole 
the  beneficent,  part  which  Authority  plays 
in  the  production  of  belief."1  But,  it  must 
be  pointed  out,  further,  that  the  limitation 
of  the  Observer's  view  is  not  surprising. 
Being  outside  experience,  in  fact,  the  wonder 
is  that  he  perceives  so  much.  But  his  creator, 
being  himself  within  experience,  cannot  so 
limit  his  own  vision.  "  To  Reason  is  largely 
due  the  growth  of  new  and  the  sifting  of  old 
knowledge;  the  ordering,  and  in  part  the 
discovery,  of  that  vast  body  of  systematized 
conclusions  which  constitute  so  large  a 
portion  of  scientific,  philosophical,  ethical, 
political,  and  theological  learning.  .  .  . 
When  we  turn,  however,  from  the  conscious 
work  of  Reason  to  that  which  is  uncon- 
sciously performed  for  us  by  Authority,  a 
very  different  spectacle  arrests  our  attention. 
The  effects  of  the  first,  prominent  as  they 
are  through  the  dignity  of  their  origin,  are 
trifling  as  compared  with  the  all-pervading 

1  A.  J.  Balfour,  Foundations  of  Belief,  p.  200. 
13 


194  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

influences  which  flow  from  the  second."1 
There  is  an  "  antinomy  between  the  equities 
of  Reason  and  the  expediencies  of  Author- 
ity,"2 yet  "it  is  from  Authority  that  Reason 
itself  draws  its  most  important  premises."3 
To  all  of  which  it  is  possible,  if  not  necess- 
ary, to  say  Yea  and  Amen;  but  only  on  the 
condition  implied  in  the  last  statement.  If 
experience  be  of  the  nature  for  which  we 
have  contended,  then  Reason  may  draw  its 
premises  from  Authority.  Yet,  it  is  able  to 
do  so  only  because  Authority  is  its  very  self 
under  another  name.  To  what  indeed  do 
we  attach  the  term,  except  to  "that  vast 
body  of  systematized  conclusions  which  con- 
stitute so  large  a  portion  of  scientific,  philo- 
sophical, ethical,  political,  and  theological 
learning?"  What,  for  instance,  are  the 
Laws  of  Motion,  but  rational  conclusions 
which  the  physicists  take,  on  authority,  as 
the  basis  of  further  investigation?  Why 
does  Mr.  Balfour  hold,  with  Kant,  "that 
without  matter  categories  are  empty,"  unless 
he   accepts  a  rational  authority?     What  is 

1  A.  J.  Balfour,  Foundations  of  Belief,  pp.  226,  227,  228. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  215. 
»  Ibid.,  p.  228. 


CONCLUSION  195 

the  institution  of  marriage  but  a  rational 
recognition  of  the  necessity  of  the  family  for 
the  safety  of  the  commonwealth  authorita- 
tively enacted?  What  is  the  "ostentatious 
futility  of  the  rights  of  man,"  but  a  rational 
condemnation  of  a  brief  authority  rationally 
originated?  What  are  creeds  but  rational 
pronouncements,  by  those  reasonably,  or 
unreasonably,  assumed  to  be  experts,  authori- 
tatively put  forward  in  place  of  thoughts  on 
behalf  of  the  multitude  assumed  unable  to 
think  on  difficult  problems  ?  In  other  words, 
the  antinomy  between  Reason  and  Authority 
is  possible  only  on  the  ground  of  an  implicit 
identity.  And  it  is  the  business  of  the 
theologian,  not  so  much  to  emphasize  the 
difference  as  to  show  wherein  the  oneness 
consists.  To  insist  that  belief  is  wise  or 
necessary  or  expedient,  because  authority 
plays  so  large  a  part  in  human  history  is,  in 
the  circumstances  which  we  have  tried  to  set 
forth,  very  much  like  saying  that  a  Quaker 
loves  the  ocean  for  its  broad  brim.  No 
doubt  he  does ;  but,  with  equal  certainty,  he 
does  not.  And  so,  the  last  state  of  the 
theologian,  thus  hemmed  in,  is  worse  than 
the  first.     His  conclusion  would  really  be  an 


196  CONTEMPORARY  THEOLOGY 

apostrophe  to  the  unchangeable :  —  Would  I 
were  not  a  man  —  or  a  Quaker ! 

But  the  semi-agnostic  is  better  than  his 
bare  word.  The  arguments  which  he 
employs,  with  the  aid  of  the  Imaginary 
Observer,  carry  him  beyond  a  merely  trans- 
cendent idealism.  "  The  Incarnation  throws 
the  whole  scheme  of  things,  as  we  are  too 
easily  apt  to  represent  it  to  ourselves,  into  a 
different  and  far  truer  proportion.  It  absol- 
utely changes  the  whole  scale  on  which  we 
might  be  disposed  to  measure  the  magni- 
tudes of  the  universe."1  Most  certainly: 
but  why?  Because  man  inhabits  a  city 
whose  builder  and  maker  is  God.  In  this 
stupendous  fact  —  the  most  authoritative  of 
all  facts  —  his  reason,  especially  on  its  ethical 
side,  finds  one  relatively  complete  manifest- 
ation of  humanness.  The  persistence  of 
rationality  is,  even  here,  the  ultimate  cause 
of  the  operative  power  of  the  Incarnator. 
We  bow  our  heads  before  the  Cross,  it  is 
often  said,  in  presence  of  a  fathomless 
mystery.  But  the  mystery  centres  chiefly  in 
man's  surprise  that  his  own  most  essential 
qualities,  which  seem  so  temporal,  should  in 

1  Foundations  of  Belief,  pp.  346,  347. 


CONCLUSION  197 

truest  verity  be  eternal.  His  holiest  and 
highest  ideals  are  here.  So  his  beliefs  cease 
to  be  mere  otiose  acquiescences.  "For,"  as 
Mr.  Balfour  says,  in  a  passage  which  admits 
all  that  we  have  been  urging,  "they  minister, 
or  rather  the  Reality  behind  them  ministers, 
to  one  of  our  deepest  ethical  needs;  to  a 
need  which,  far  from  showing  signs  of  dimin- 
ution, seems  to  grow  with  the  growth  of 
civilization,  and  to  touch  us  ever  more  keenly 
as  the  hardness  of  an  earlier  time  dissolves 
away."1 

1  Foundations  of  Belief,  p.  354. 


INDEX 


Absolute  Idealism,  116  sq. 

Agnosticism,  112,  129,  146, 
157,  168. 

,  Ritschlian,  118  sq.,  154. 

and  the  Theistic  Prob- 
lem, 135  sq. 

American  Theology,  6  sq. 

Anselm,  95. 

Aquinas,  Thomas,  95. 

Arnold,  Matthew,  7. 

Aufklarung,  135. 

Authority  and  Reason,  192  sq. 

Balfour,  A.  J.,  155, 158, 160, 
188  sq.,  193  n.,  194  n., 
196  n.,  197  n. 

Bampton  Lectures,  178. 

Bender,  6. 

Beyschlag,  5,  66  n. 

Biedermann,  5,  7,  76. 

Bradley,  F.  H.,  51,  52  n. 

Briggs,  C.  A.,  7. 

British  Theology,  6  sq. 

Browning,  R.,  134,  165  n. 

Bruce,  A.  B.,  7. 

Buddhism,  31,  62,  74-75. 

Cssar,  65. 

Caird,  E.,  17  n.,  29  n.,  30  n., 
34  n.,  54  n.,  64  n. 


Campbell,  Macleod,  8. 

Carlyle,  29. 

Christ,  15  sq.,  23,  32,  34, 
37  sq.,  43,  57,  63  sq., 
97  sq.,  105  sq.,  107  sq., 
114sq.,  123,  127. 

,  Person  of,  66  sq.,  75-80. 

Christianity,  2,  14,  21,  26,  32, 
34,41,56,60sq.,77sq., 
95. 

Copernicus,  159. 

Critical  Idealism,  93,  137, 
145-146. 

Cromwell,  65. 


Dante,  34. 

Darwin,  158. 

Daub,  3. 

Deism,  40. 

Development  and  Evolution, 

57  sq. 
Dialectic  Method,  16,  30  sq., 

45  sq.,  53  sq. 
Dorner,  5. 


Ely  Lectures,  2. 
Epistles,  The,  24  sq.,  35  sq., 

73. 
Eternal  Consciousness,  The, 

136. 


200 


INDEX 


Ethical  Culture,  46. 
Everett,  C.  C,  7. 
Evolution,  159  sq. 
and  Development,  57  sq. 

Faibbairn,  A.  M.,  7. 
Faith   and  Historical    Criti- 
cism, 106  sq. 
Fichte,  3. 
Fisher,  G.  P.,  7. 
Flint,  E.,  7. 

Gautama,  34,  74-75. 
German  Theology,  2  sq. 
Gifford    Lectures,    2,    20  n., 

21n.,  28  u.,  41,  42  n., 

72n. 
Gladstone,  W.  E.,  7. 
Gnosticism,  129,  182. 
,  Speculative,    and    the 

Theistic  Problem,  162 

sq. 
God,    Personality  of,  47  sq., 

100  sq.,    121,     174  sq., 

183 sq. 
,   Kingdom    of,   109  sq., 

113sq. 
Goethe,  65,  129. 
Goschel,  3. 

Gospel,  The  fourth,  36. 
Gospels,  The,  24  sq.,  35  sq., 

103  sq. 
Greece,  31,  95,  169. 
Green,  T.  H.,  7,  28  n. 

Harnack,  109 n.,  111. 

Hartmann,  E.  von,  69,  163. 

Hegel,  3,  4,  1 1  sq.,  34,  39,  48, 
83,  117,  136,  163  sq., 
173  sq.,  182,  187. 


Hegel,  Disciples  of,  17  sq. 
Herrmann,  W.,  6,  67  n.,  88, 

94,    97,     100  n.,    104, 

105  n.,  107  n. 
Hibbert  Lectures,  2. 
Historical  Criticism  &  Faith, 

106sq. 
Holtzmanu,  25. 
Hudibras,  120. 
Hume,  147,  155,  156. 

Idealism,  Absolute,  116  sq. 

,  Critical,  93,  145-146. 

,  The  Final,  187  sq. 

Hlingworth,  J.  R.  178,  181  n. 
Incarnation,  The,  127,   196- 
197. 

James,  St.,  43. 

Jesus  (see  Christ). 

John,  St.,  43. 

Jones,  H.,  151  n. 

Judaism,  31,  56,  62,  103,  112. 

Judgment  of  Value,  91,  93, 

102,  107,  117  sq.,  122, 

146. 

Kaftan,  88,  94. 

Kant,  2,  6,  12,  84,  85-87,  88, 

93,   94,    96,    100,    101, 

146, 147,  155,  156,  169, 

194. 
Kattenbusch,  97  n. 
Keim,  5. 
Kingdom    of    God,    109  sq., 

113sq. 

Lange,  F.  A.,  87. 
Lobstein,  P.,  82  n. 


INDEX 


201 


Locke,  144. 

London,  2. 

Lotze,  6,  87,  88,  89  sq. 

Luther,  34. 

-       Ly'fcll,  158. 
\ 

Mackintosh,  R.,  8,   115  n., 

124  n. 

,  W.,  7,  9  n.,  35  n.,  38  n. 

Marheineke,  3,  4. 
Materialism,  168. 
Menzies,  A.,  7. 
Metaphysic    and    Theology, 

86  sq.,  92  sq. 
Michael-Angelo,  65. 
Michelet,  K.  L.,  166. 
Mozart,  65. 

Naturalism,  157,  168. 
Neo-Hegelians,  17  sq. 

Oetinger,  4. 
Oldenberg,  H.,  75  n. 
Orr,  James,  7. 
Oxford,  2. 

Paul,  St.,  38,  43,  60,  69  sq. 
Paulus,  0. 
Pentecost,  38. 
Personality,  50  sq.,  177  sq. 
of  God,  47  sq.,  100  sq., 

121,  174  sq.,  183  sq. 
&  the  Theistic  Problem, 

173  sq. 
Pfleiderer,  O.,  5,  6,  7,  20  n., 

21,    27,    28  n.,    42  n., 

44  n.,  70,  72  n. 
Philo,  25. 


Philosophy  and  Theology, 
13  sq.,  48  sq.,  125  sq. 

Plato,  88,  162. 

Principle  of  Rationality, 
146  sq. 


Raphael,  65. 
Rationalism,  40,  188sq. 
Rationality,     Principle     of, 

146  sq. 
Realism,  Transfigured,  137, 

138  sq. 
Reason  and  Authority,  192  sq. 
Reformation,  32,  95. 
Religion     and     Philosophy, 

48  sq. 
Renouvier,  7. 
Ritschl,  A.,  6, 77  n.,  83, 86,  87, 

88  sq.,  96,  100,  102  n., 

109  n.,  116,  117,  124. 
Ritschlian  Agnosticism,  118 

sq.,  154. 

Theology,  82  sq.,  95  sq. 

,  Criticism  of,  112sq. 

,  Strength  of,  112- 

115. 
Robinson,  A.,  38  n. 
Romanes,  G.  J.,  155  n. 
Rothe,  R.,  4. 
Rovce,  J.,  7. 


Saussate,  P.  D.  C  de  la, 

12  n. 
Schelling,  3,  4,  84,  163. 
Schleiermacher,  2,  4,  6,  12. 
Schopenhauer,  161. 
Schultz,  H.,  103  n. 
Science,  149  sq. 
Scottish  Universities,  2. 


202 


INDEX 


Seth,  J.,  173  n. 

Shakespeare,  34,  65. 

Sin,  111,  125 sq. 

Society,  191. 

Socrates,  34. 

Solipsism,  190. 

Speculative  Theology,  1 1  sq., 

19  sq.,  27  sq.,  96. 

— ^,  Criticism  of,  39  sq. 

Gnosticism  &  the  The- 

istic  Problem,  162  sq. 
Spencer,    H.,    139  sq.,    154, 

155. 
Spinoza,  100,  163. 
Sterrett,  J.  M.,  7. 
Stewart,  A.,  7. 
Stoicism,  31,  62. 
Strauss,  4,  39. 
Substance,  144. 

Teleology,  159,  161. 
Tennyson,  43  n. 
Theistic  Problem,  125  sq. 
and  Agnosticism, 

135  sq. 
and    Personality, 

173  sq. 
and    Speculative 

Gnosticism,  162sq. 
Theological  Situation,  The, 

lsq. 
Theology,  American,  6  sq. 
,  British,  6  sq. 


Theology,  German,  2  sq. 
and  Metaphysic,  86  sq., 

92  sq.,  117  sq. 
and  Philosophy,  13  sq., 

125  sq. 

,  Ritschlian,  82  sq.,  95 sq. 

,  Criticism  of ,  1 1 2  sq. 

,  Strength  of,  112- 

115. 
,  Speculative,  11  sq.,  19 

sq,  96. 
Thikotter,  113  n. 
Transfigured  Realism,    137, 

138  sq. 
Tubingen  Theory,  23  sq.,  76. 


Uleici,  50. 

Unknowable,  The,  136,  139, 
142  sq. 


Vatke,  4. 

Vedic  Religion,  31. 

Vorbrodt,  G.,  120  n. 


Wallace,    W.,    41,    42  n., 

165  n. 
Weiss,  Bernhard,  5,  6. 
Weisse,  C.  H.,  3. 
Weizsacker,  5,  126  n. 
Wendt,  H.  H.,  25,  109n. 
Wenley,  R.  M.,  61  n. 


BOOKS  BY  PROFESSOR  WENLEY. 


SOCRATES  AND    CHRIST:    A  STUDY  IN  THE    PHILO- 
SOPHY OF  RELIGION. 

As  a  whole,  it  must  be  pronounced  a  brilliant  analysis. 
Mr.  Wenley  picks  his  way  along  large  generalizations  with 
clear  and  firm  step.  His  criticism  is  full  of  penetration, 
.  .  .  and  will  be  found  both  richly  informing  and  suggestive. 
—  Critical  Review  of  Philosophical  Literature. 

A  thoughtful  and  able  book,  whichvno  one  will  read  with- 
out the  deepest  interest.  The  style  is  good  throughout, 
with  a  pleasant  tendency  to  epigrammatic  utterance,  especi- 
ally in  the  earlier  chapters.  —  Glasgow  Herald. 

This  book  should  rank  in  the  first  class  of  theological 
literature.  It  is  learned,  thoughtful,  and  profound.  —  Irish 
Ecclesiastical  Gazette. 

The  book  is  one  that  cannot  be  read  without  sympathy 
and  respect.  —  Saturday  Review. 

For  the  major  portion  of  the  contents  of  this  book  we 
have  nothing  but  praise.  The  account  given  of  the  philo- 
sophic world  before  the  appearance  of  Christ  is  clear,  con- 
cise, and  admirable,  and  the  author's  style  is  always  charm- 
ing.—  Manchester  Courier. 

Places  him  in  the  first  rank  of  Scottish  thinkers.  —  Brit- 
ish Weekly. 

ASPECTS  OF  PESSIMISM. 

While  we  could  have  wished  that  so  capable  a  critic  and 
so  able  and  interesting  a  writer  had  undertaken  the  con- 
structive work  Avhich  he  expressly  disclaims  having 
attempted,  we  are  heartily  thankful  for  what  he  has  given 
us.  .  .  .  We  heartily  recommend  it  to  all  who  are  inter- 


ested  in  watching  the  course  of  current  thought,  still  more 
to  those  who  are  striving  to  guide  it  in  a  right  direction.  — 
Quarterly  Review. 

In  all  the  essays  there  is  evidence  of  a  thorough  mastery 
of  detail  and  a  facile  art  in  bringing  the  salient  points  into 
prominence.  ...  In  a  passage  of  striking  force  and  elo- 
quence which  closes  the  essay  on  Jewish  Pessimism,  we  find 
the  clue  which  Mr.  Wenley  offers  for  the  understanding  of 
the  universe.  —  Scottish  Review. 

A  very  able  book,  full  of  interest  and  suggestiveness.  .  .  . 
Such,  in  barest  outline,  seems  to  be  the  pith  of  a  discussion 
which,  for  penetration  and  cogency,  could  hardly  be  sur- 
passed. .  .  .  One  is  tempted  to  linger,  for  almost  every  page 
has  some  sentence  worth  quoting.  —  Critical  Review  of 
Philosophical  Literature. 

Dr.  Wenley  devotes  great  erudition  and  critical  research 
to  the  consideration  of  Pessimism.  .  .  .  He  has  presented  a 
very  repulsive  topic  in  a  very  attractive  form.  —  Mind. 

We  do  not  remember  to  have  seen  it  so  effectively  put 
before.  —  St.  James's  Gazette. 

It  is  a  book  for  the  thinker,  lay  and  professional,  and  its 
criticisms  on  contemporary  thought  must  undoubtedly  come 
to  be  reckoned  with.  Throughout,  Mr.  Wenley  has  shown 
great  capacity  for  keeping  himself  clear  of  partisanship,  and 
in  this  respect  we  regard  his  book  as  invaluable  to  students, 
theological,  literary,  and  philosophical.  —  Glasgow  Herald. 

THE    PREPARATION    FOE    CHRISTIANITY    IN    THE 
ANCIENT  WORLD.     In  preparation. 


MM  1  b  )9ti(J 
RETD  BOOK  BOX 

AUG  1     1960 

QUPR 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 

Los  Angeles 
This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below. 


!76 


Form  L9-100m-9,'52(A3105)444 


li™«,?.U.n,H.S,lREGI0NAL  LIBRAR*  FACILITY 


A     000  595  254     4 


